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INTRODUCTION
 
This report presents the results of the physical, metallurgical,
 
chemical, and thermodynamic surveys that have been made on the high­
pressure tank and plumbing systems of the Apollo spacecraft. These 
systems comprise the pressurized oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, propellant,
and helium tanks and related plumbing of the command, service, and lunar 
modules. The purposes of the surveys are to lend support to the 
Apollo 13 investigation, to provide review and to extend knowledge of
 
spacecraft pressure systems, and to contribute to the safety of future 
manned space flights. To achieve these objectives, descriptive data for 
all tanks were collected, a metallurgical survey and a comprehensive 
physical chemical survey of all systems were made, and some detailed 
thermodynamical calculations were performed.
 
The overall descriptive survey of the high-pressure tanks used on
 
the Apollo spacecraft systems, including a review of the metallurgy
 
involved in their construction, pointed to (1) the importance of a crit­
ical examination of any incompatibilities in materials selections and
 
(2) the need for physical chemistry and catalysis studies of the reac­
tion processes involved in high-pressure fluid systems. The result is 
a critical assessment 'ofthe physical and chemical processes that can 
occur in high-pressure fluids and an assessment of the hazards and pos­
sible failure mechanisms associated with containment of cryogenic mate­
rials. Findings based on these surveys are tabulated in the report. 
As a general point, it should be noted that there is no such thing
 
as a nonreactive substance. The stability of a substance in its envi­
ronment is a matter of degree. Theoretically, the reactivity of mate­
rials can be assessed in terms of entropy and energy changes along with
 
an implied characteristic time. In practice, either in engineering or
 
in science, the experiment and the insight into the basic phenomena
 
provide the real assessment of reactivity. The successful completion
 
of two lunar landings and, before those, the extensive design, develop­
ment, and qualification aspects of the Apollo Program can be thought of 
as experimental verifications. The Apollo 13 incident provides an 
opportunity for reexamination, objective and refined evaluation, im­
proved design, and establishment of a broader base for future technolog­
ical objectives. 
An independent review of reaction processes in high-pressure fluids
 
used in spacecraft systems was assigned to an independent consultant 
(Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts). Interim reports 
from this consultant are included in the appendixes; the final report 
from this consultant will be issued as a separate report at a later 
date.
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SECTION A - DESCRIPTION OF TANKS IN USE
 
ON THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
A description of the Apollo command module (CM), service module (SM), 
and lunar module (IM) is shown in table A-I. For convenience, the tanks 
have been grouped by module and use. For example, the CM reaction con­
trol system (RCS) tanks are grouped together and are the first tanks 
listed. Abbreviations have been used sparingly to facilitate reading. 
When used, the abbreviations and letters are explained in footnotes at 
the bottom of the tables. 
Table A-I lists the engineering data that are necessary for the 
thermodynamic and kinetic calculations of hypothetical reactions in or 
surrounding the tanks. These data also give a frame of reference for 
discussions of compatibility-, contamination, and catalysis. Finally, 
they give a concise review of the tankage aboard the Apollo spacecraft. 
SERVICE CONDITIONS
 
The normal service conditions for the CM, SM, and LM tanks are
 
described in table A-II. The data were compiled to permit meaningful
 
calculation of reaction processes in high-pressure systems. Table A-II 
lists the normal and operating ranges for pressure, temperature, volume 
or quantity, and flow rates for the tanks to which these parameters are 
applicable. In those cases where complete information was not available
 
for a given tank, a line is drawn down the column.
 
The operational parameters never exactly match the normal operating
 
parameters; instead, they vary within a small range- When the variance 
was evenly about a mean value, the mean value is given with plus and 
minus limits. In other cases, a range is given.
 
The operation and qualification data in table A-II were derived 
from several sources, among which were the following: telemetry data
 
from sensors aboard Apollo 12 and 13; vendors statement of testing
 
(ref. A-l); pressure-vessel olerating-criteria specifications (refs. A-2
 
and A-3); and NASA reduced, collated flight data (ref. A-4).
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PREDICTABLE FAILURE MODES 
If a tank on t h e  spacecraft system fa i l ed ,  it would do so  by one of 
two b r i t t l e  f rac ture  f a i l u r e  modes: (1)  fragmentation or ( 2 )  tear ing 
caused by b r i t t l e  f racture  fa i lure .  B r i t t l e  f ractures  occur a t  strength 
levels  t ha t  are  belov material-yield strength levels  and are caused by 
preexisting flaws. Material toughness, operating s t r e s s  leve l ,  flaw 
location,  and flaw s i z e  influence the  character is t ics  of the  b r i t t l e  
fracture.  
The b r i t t l e  f rac ture  f a i l u re  modes f o r  the  Apollo tanks are  tabulated 
in t ab l e  A-111. The f a i l u re  mode predictions a r e  for  preexisting surface 
flaws, maximum design operating pressures (mop) ,  material  properties per 
specification,  and vessel  dimensions within design tolerances. Alteration 
of any of the  normal vessel  character is t ics  by physical damage t o  the 
tank, overpressure, improper heat treatment, or fabr icat ion errors  w i l l  
change the predicted f a i l u r e  mode. 
OTHER FAIL-URE MODES 
Another f a i l u r e  mode is the  duct i le  o r  overstress f a i l u re  mode. An 
overstress condition as high as the  ultimate s t rength of t he  tank material  
probably w i l l  r e su l t  i n  fragmentation of t he  tank. This f a i lu re  mode is 
not predictable by fracture  mechanics techniques. Mechanisms are dis-  
cussed b r i e f ly  i n  t he  following paragraphs for  reactions t ha t  can occur 
i n  t he  tank t h a t  may r e su l t  i n  duct i le  or  overstress fa i lu re .  
Ductile f a i l u r e  r e su l t s  from pressure buildup processes ins ide the 
.enclosed area. Pressurization can be caused by chemical and physical 
reactions t ha t  occur within the confined f lu id .  Failure can r e su l t  from 
any of several  reaction mechanisms. Pressure buildup can r e su l t  from 
exothermic or  heat-liberating reactions i n  a combined space. The pres- 
sure may be increased by the  addition of gaseous products resul t ing from 
so l i d  o r  l iqu id  reactants.  The pressure a lso may be increased by an 
increase of l i qu id  products compared t o  l i qu id  reactants.  
The decomposition of hydrazine induced by rus t  i l l u s t r a t e s  the  above 
mechanism. The complete decomposition of hydrazine by metall ic oxides 
yields two molecules of water for  each hydrazine molecule reacting.  
" 
+ 2Fe 0 -2H 0 + Heat 
2 (2) + 'qg) + 2Fe0H2-2 (S( 2 )  3 ( s )  
Liquid-product insertion into the confined space will increase the pres­
sure. The production of gaseous nitrogen will contribute to the pres­
sure, and the liberation of heat during the reaction will contribute
 
further to pressure buildup.
 
Pressure buildup can occur in some systems because of catalytic
 
Ni+ +
 Metallic ions, such as Fe.++
decomposition of container fluids. 

+++ r+++ ++ 
Al Cr or Cu. can be introduced either as impurities or from 
the vessel walls. This possibility exists with all hydrazine and sub­
stituted hydrazine fuels. The products are a mixture of NH3 , N2 , and H2 
In all cases, an excess of product molecules compared to reactant mole­
cules will result, and the container will experience a pressure increase.
 
Under other circumstances, tank surfaces that are inert or passivated
 
may be abraded mildly, thus removing the protective layer. The abrasion
 
can occur from particulate contamination and, although the abrasive
 
action itself may not injure the tank to failure, the'resulting reaction
 
between the contents and the fresh metal surface may liberate sufficient
 
heat to increase the pressure to overstress failure. Possibilities for
 
this failure mechanism exist, for example, in any oxygen tank under pres­
sure that contains parts constructed of aluminum. 
Mechanisms for ductile failure exist in possible reactions between
 
tank contents and incompatible materials of construction, between impuri­
ties from pressurant gases and tank contents, or from combustion processes
 
initiated by external energy (electrical) deposited in materials in 
oxidizer systems that are capable of acting as fuels. 
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Os or 
Vessel Function liqid
contained 
contained_ 

Pressure tank Pressurize Gaseous 
fuel and helium 
oxidizer 
Propellnt Qxxdizer 
 s204 

tank storage 

Propellant Fuel storage Monomethyl-
tank hydrazine 
Surge tank Astronaut Gaseous 
breathing oxygen 

Storage tank Astronaut Gaseous 
breathinga oxygen 

alnhibited nitrogen tetrozlde.
 
TABLE A-I.- APOLLO PRESSURE VESSELS 
(a) Command module tanks 
Quantity Vessel 
 Vessel
required dlmels3.ons, in. material 
Reaction control system
 
2 9.2 diem. Ti-6A1-4V 
0.102
 
2 19.907 x 12.6 TV-6AL-IiV 

0.022
 
2 11.32 X 12.6 Tx-6AL-4V 
0.022 
• Environmental control system
 
I 1h.00 x 1300 Inconel 718 
0.033/0.078
 
3 12.92 - 7.00 Indonel 718 
.i0,02$10.04
 
Design pressures, 
psoera 
Limit Proof Burst 
5000, 6667 7560 
360 ,525 54o, 

3 0 525 540 
1070 1356 1530 
4070 1600 1800 
operating 
pressure, pi 
.4150 ­
291 
29:1 
900 
900 
TALE A-.- APO!ZO PRESSURE VESSELS - Continued
 
(b)Service module tanks
 
Gas or
Vessel Function liquid Qut vseVse einpssues ora
contained required dimensions, in. material a operating
 
I I Limitro of3IB=t Ipressure, psia 
Service propulsion system
 
Pressure tank Pressurize Gaseous 
 2 h0.17 diam. Ti-6Al-4V 3685 ,910 5540 3600 
fuel and helium 0.366 
oxidizer 
Propellant Oxidizer N204 
 1 153.05 - 45 Ti-6A.I-V 225 300 337.5 186
 
tank storage 2.04o/0.025
 
Propellant Fuel storage U]XmHb 1 153.05 45 Ti-6A-4V 225 300 337.5 186
 
tank Hlydrazine 0.047/0.025
 
Propellant Onidizer sump N200 1 152.30 x 51.10 Ti-6Ai-iV 225 300 337.5 5.86
 
tank 0,054/0.028
 
Propellant Fuel sump UDMH 1 152.38 x .51 TI-6AI-4V 225 300 337.5 186 
tank Hydrazine 0.0541/o.028 
Pressure Pneumatic con- Gaseous 
tank trol actuator nitregen 2 9.16 x 4.92 Stainless 2900 5000 7500 2900 
fuel and 0.130 steel
 
oxidizer, AMS 5745 
Reaction control system
 
Pressure tank Pressurize fuel Gaseous 
 2 12.0 diem. Ti-EAI-4V 11oo 5985 7000 4150 
and oxidizer helium 0.130
 
Primary pro- Oxidizer N01 4 27.563 x 12.6 Ti-6AI-WV 248 360 46o 185
 
pellant tank storage 
 0.017
 
Primary pro- Fuel storage Monomethyl- 4 22.722 x 12.6 TL-6AI--V 248 360 460pellant tank hydrazine 0.01? 
185 
Secondary Oxidizer "204 4 19.907 x 22.6 Ti-6AI-4V 2h8 480 540 185propellant storage 
 0.022
 
tank 
Secondary Fuel storage Monoethyl- 4 17.32 x 12.6 Ti-6AI-V 248 480 540 185 
propellant hydrazine 0.022
 
tank
 
b50:50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical hydrazine. 
TABLE A-I.- APOLLO PRESSURE VESSELS - Continued 
(b)Service module tanks - Concluded 
Vessel 
I 
Function 
orDesign 
liquid Quantity Vessel 
I 
Vessel De 
pressures, 
psia 
Ijorna! 
o a 
cQntainedI5-1l required dimensions, in. material mi t P r oof I B u r t pressure, psap e s r , i 
Electrical power system 
Cryogenic tank Fuel-cell Liquid oxygen 2 26.28 diem. Inconel 718 1020 1356 1530 900 
storage 0.020 
Cryogenic tank Fuel-cell Liquid 2 28.2h diam. Ti-5A1-2.5Sn 285 00 450 225 
storage hydrogen 0.045 > S 260 
Pressure tank Pneumatic con- Gaseous 3 6.0 diam. Ti-A1-2.5Sn 1730 3000 5100 1500 
trol actuator nitrogen 0.099 
fuel cells 
TABLE A-I.- APOLLO PRESSURE VESSELS - Continued 
.(c) Lunar module tanks 
GasorDesign Pressure, Normal 
Vessel 
Vse ueaGas 
Function 
or 
contained 
uantity
edquie 
In. 
eVessel lPas.aVesselmoat rii
mtril l pssit IFroof IBurst 
operating 
Pressure, psia 
Environmental control system 
Storage tank Astronaut Water 3 Aluminum 6061 45 6o 90 44.5 
descent and drinking 
ascent 
Storage tank Atronaut Gaseous 1 23.522 × 21.722 Loy-carbon 3000 3990 45oo 2869 
descent 'breathing oxygen 0.118 seel D6AC 
Storage tank Astronaut Gaseous 2 14.500 " 11.968 Inconel 718 100O 1330 1500 850 
ascent breathing oxygen 0.029 
Reaction control system 
Pressure tank Pressurize fuel Gaseous 2 12.o0 aiem. Ti-TAI-4V 3500 4650 5250 3420 
and oxidizer helium 0.099 
Propellant tank Fuel storage UH 2 32.2o6 X 12.5 
llydrazirne 0.020/0.017 Ti-6Al-4v 250 333 375 179 
Propellant tank Oxidizer 
storage 
N2O42.025/0.017 
2 38.819 x 12.5 Ti-6 I-4V 250 333 375 179 
Descent tropulsion sysren 
Pressure tank Pressurize luel Gaseous 1 14.9 dim. -i-6A!-hV ,-50 2328 2625 1750 
and onidizer helium 0.06 
Propellant tank Fuel storage UDM 2 70.28 x 51.00 Mi-6A!-4v _75 360 4o5 246 
H7ydrine 0.065/0.033 
Propellnt tank Oxidizer 11,04 2 70.28 x 51,00 TI-6Al-4V 275 36o Lo 216 
storage 0.065/0.033 
Pressure %an. Fuel Sucrcritical 1 26.9 dian, T4-5A2.5Sn 171O 2a74T 3hq 1555 
pressurant helium 0.147 
TABLE A-I.- APOLLO PRESSURE VESSELS - Concluded 
(c) Lunar module tanks - Concluded 
Vessel Function as or uuontaty Vessel 
IDesaga
Vessel 
pressure, 
, psia 
Normal 
operating 
contained required dimenszons, in. mterial 
Ascent propulsion system 
Pressure tank Pressurize fuel Gaseous 2 22.25 diem. Ti-6A-4V 3500 4650 5250 3050 
and oxidizer helium 0.198 
Propellant tank Fuel storage Uh4H 3. 49.4 diam. T-6Ai-4V 250 333 388 184 
,%dra~inn 0.032 
Propellant tank Oxidizer N20 1 49.4 diem. Ti-6AI-4V 250 333 388 18h 
storage 0.032 
TABLE A-11.- ANALYTICAL CRITERIA, PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, F M W ,  AND ELECTRICAL DATA 
(a) Cornand module tanks 
i i n a l y t ~ c a l  c r= te r laa  Normal S p e c l f i o n t ~ o n  (b)  Aetusl
operatingTank qua l l f l ca t lon  operat ing 
temperature, "F Pressure, Temperature, pressure, p s i  
PSI O F  
Reactlon con t ro l  system 
Fuel 295 40 t o  90 308 ' 85 

O x l d ~ z e r  295 40 t o  90 308 ' 85 
 I 

Helium 4150 175 t o  185 m u .  5000 140 : 4105 t o  4158 

EnYirOmental con t ro l  system 

GO2 surge 900 40 t o  90 1070 --

GO2 backup 900 40 t o  90 1070 --

Portable l i f e  950 40 t o  90 1110 --

~ " ~ p o r tSystem 
'1500 
'Reference A-2. 

$he temperature and pressure comb~natlon not t o  be exceeded. 

C ~ p o l l o16 and subsequent f l i g h t s .  

NormalActual Actual
operat ing
operating flow,flow,
temperature, OF l b / h rl b j h r  
I 1 I
6 4  

Tank 

Fuel (primary) 
Fuel (secondary) 
Oxidizer (primary) 
Oxidizer (secondary) 
Helium 
H L02 
12 

ON2 

Sump fuel 
Sump oxidizer 
Storage fuel 
Storage ox,,izer 
Hellum 
ON2 

TABLE A-I.- ANALYTICAL 
Normal 
pesr, qualification
operating Spec  

pressre, temperature, OF 
185 ho to 90 

185 ho to 90 

185 ho to 90 

185 ho to 90 

4150 ho to 90 

d900 ho to 90 

255 4o to 90 

1475 h0 to 90 

175 40 to 90 

175 ho to 90 

175 Io to 90 

175 h0 to 90 

3650 175 to 185 max. 

2500 40 to 90 

CRITERIA, PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, PLOW, AND ELECTRICAL DATA - Continued 
(b) Service module tanks 
Analytical criteria Normal
operating ActualActual flow, 
Pressure, Temperature, pressure, psi temperature, OF flow/hr 
(b) operatingActual operatin  

Reaction control system
 
20T 85 173 ± I
 
207 85 173 ± 1
 
207 85 169 1 1
 
207 85 169 t I
 
4500 140 h028 to 4073 74 to So
 
Electrical power system
 
1010 -a95 882 to 896 -189 to -199 0.65 0.71 to 0.653 
285 -423 22 to 234 -416 to -417 0.065 0063 to 0.079 
1500 75 -- 75
 
Service propulsion system
 
205 85 172 t 1 70 ± 5
 
205 85 169 70 z 5
 
205 85 112 ± 1 70 t 5
 
205 85 169 70 ± 5
 
3685 14o 3530 to 3552 85 to 87
 
2900 -- 2500 60 to E+1251
 
bThe temperature and pressure combination not to be exceeded. 
dThe normal operating pressure varies from 865 to 935 psi. 
TABLE A-I!.- ANALYTICAL CRITERIA, PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, FLOW, AND ELECTRICAL DATA - Concluded 
(e) Lunar module .ankse 
f
 
Normal Analytical criteraTank oermating Specification (b) Actual Actual Normal 
pressure, qualification operating operating operating flow, 
psi temperature, OF Pressure,p i Temperature, pressure, psi lb/hr b/hrOF temperature, fw fl r 
Reaction control system
 
Fuel 101 192 85 178 to 183
 
Oidizer 
 181 
 192 
 85 178 to 183
 
Helium 31120 3500 140 1729 to 2905 65 to 71 
Ascent propulsion system
 
Fuel 20a 205 85 
 20 to 240 65 to 95
 
Oxidizer 203 
 205 85 
 227 to 239 55 to 69 
H 3060 3500 140 3o86 to 3105elium 

-136 to +6g 
Descent propulsion system
 
Fuel 253 275 75 
 236 56 to 71
 
Oxidizer 253 275 75 
 270 55 to 69
 
Helium 1663 
 1750 14O 1336
 
Supercrltical 1555 
 1967 
-- 1710 

-319
 
helium I 
Environmental control system
 
Ascent GO2 850 
 1000 
-- 847 to 602 - 0.3 to 0.4 0.24
 
Descent GO2 2690 
 3060 
-- to 598j 0632 0.3 to 0.4.3 to o.4 

bThe temperature and pressure combination not to be exceeded.
 
eData from Apollo 12; gathered by The Boeing Company and General Electric Company (Houston).
 
rReference A-3.
 
TABLE A-I.1- BRITTLE FRACTURE FAILURE MODES 
(a) Command and service module tanks 
Normal Predicted failure 
Gas or Vessel Vessel operating dMOFa 
liquid contained material dimensions, in. temperature, psi mode at KDOp 
b 
.
QF 

Command module reaction control system
 
Gaseous helium Ti-6Al-4V 9.2 dim 64 ± 4 5000 Fragment 
0.102 
N 0 Ti-6Ai-4V 19.907 x 12.6 -- 360 Fragment0.022 
monomethyl- mi-6Al-V 17.32 x 12.6 -- 360 Fragment 
hydrazine 0.022
 
Command module environmental control system 
G02 surge Inqonel 718 14.00 x 13.00 -- 1070 Fragment 
0.033/0.078 
GO storage Ineonel 718 12.62 x 7.00 -- 1210 Leakage2 
 0.028/0.o045
 
Service module service propulsion system 
Gaseous helium Ti-6Ai-hV 40.17 diem 85 to 87 3685 Fragment 
0366 
Ti-6A-WV 153.05 A h5 70 ± 5 225 Fragment
m40710.025
 
Aerozine-50 Ti-6M-V 153.05 x 45 70 ± 5 225 Fragment 
0. 04 10. 025 
N2 0 samp T-6Ai-4V 152.30 x 51.10 70 ± 5 225 Fragment 
0.054/0.028
 
Aerozine-50 Ti-6A1-4V 152.38 x 51 70 ± 5 225 Fragment 
sump 0-05410.028 
Gil Stainless 9.16 x 4.92 6o to 85 2900 Fragment 
steel 0.130
 
A4 350
 
aaximum design operating pressure.
 
bEReference A-5.
 
15 
TABLE A-III.- BnTTLP FRACTURE FAILURE MODES - Continued 
(a) Command and service module tanks - Concluded
 
Normal
 
Gas or Vessel Vessel operating MDOP a Predicted failure 
liquid contained material dimensions, in. temperature, psi mode at 1DOP 
Or
 
Service module reaction control system 
Gaseous helium Ti-6AI-fV 12.0 diem 74 to 8o 4500 Fragment 
0.132 
14 0 4 primary Ti-6A1-4V 27.563 - 12.6 - 2h8 Fragment 
0.o1? 
MMH primary Ti-6Al-.4V 22.722 x 12.6 248 Fragment 
0.017 
H204 secondary Ti-6AI-4V 19.907 x 12.6 -- 248 Leakage 
0.022 
MMH secondary Ti-6Ai-V 11.32 x 22.6 -- 248 Leakage 
0. 022 
Service module electrical power system
 
Supercritical Inconel 718 26.28 diam -189 to -199 1020 Leakage
 
oxygen 0.020
 
Supercritical T-5A-2.5Sn 28.24 diem -416 ± l 285 Leakage 
hydrogen 0.045 
GN2 Ti-5A1-2.5Sn 6.0 dim 75 1730 Leakage
 
0.099 
aMaximumt design operating pressure.
 
bReference A-5. 
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TABLE A-Il.- BRITTLE FRACTURE FAILURE MODES - Concluded
 
(b) Lunar module tanks 
I 	 Normal 
Gas or Vessel Vessel operatng 
liquid contained material dimensions, in. temperature, 
oF 
Environmental control system
 
Water Aluminum 6o61 	 -- -
G02 Low-carbon 23.522 x 21.722 --

steel D6AC 0.118
 
GO2 Inconel 718 	 14-500 x 11.968 --
0.029
 
Reaction control system
 
Gaseous helium Ti-6Al-ky 12.00 diem 65 to 71 
0.099 
Aerozine-50 Ti-6A-4V 	 32.206 x 12.5 --
0. 020/0. 017 
N20 Ti-6AI-hV 	 38.819 x 12.5 ­
0.025/0.017
 
Descent propulsion system
 
Gaseous helium Ti-6AI-4V 14.9 dnsm --

.064
 
Aerozine-50 Ti-6Ai-4V 	 70.28 x 51.00 56 to 71 

0.065/0.033
 
N204 Ti-6AL-4V 	 70.28 x 51.00 55 to 69 
24o.065/0.033 
Supercritical Ti-SAl.-2.5Sn 26.9 dim -319 

helium 0.147
 
Ascent propulsion system
 
Gaseous helium Ti-6AI-4V 	 22.25 diam -136 to +69 
0.198 
Ae~ozine-50 Ti-6AI--4V 	 49.4 dim 65 to 95 
0. 032 
N20 T-6A1-V 	 h9.4 diam 55 to 69 0.,032 
aMaximum design operating pressure.
 
helerence A-5.
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MDOPa Predicted failure 
psi mode at MDOp b 
5 Leakage 
3000 Fragment 
1000 Leakage
 
3500 Fragment 
250 Fragment 
250 Fragment
 
1750 Fragment
 
275 Fragment 
275 Fragment 
1710 Fragment 
3500 Fragment 
250 Fragment 
250 Fragment
 
SECTION B - METALLURGY - APOLLO HIGH-PRESSURE VESSELS 
MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT 
The metallurgical assessment of Apollo pressure vessels includes 
both the inherent metallurgical characteristics of the tank materials 
and the two primary potential problem areas - combustion and stress 
corrosion. Cbmbustion is a concern in any environment that contains
 
either oxygen or a material capable of providing an oxidizing environ­
ment. However, corrosion is the most common form of environmental metal
 
degradation. In stressed systems such as those using pressure vessels,
 
stress corrosion can be a damaging problem if not considered properly
 
in design and use. Stress corrosion can cause localized cracks in the
 
metal that can be potential failure sources. 
A detailed description of all Apollo pressure vessels has been in­
cluded in another section of this report. The pressure vessels may be
 
classified into three groups: titanium vessels, steel vessels, and
 
Inconel vessels.
 
Titanium Vessels 
The majority of vessels used for the Apollo Program are fabricated 
from titanium alloys. The Ti-6A1-4V alloy, in the solution-treated and 
aged condition, is used for all gaseous helium pressurization vessels 
and for all vessels that contain propellants in the primary and auxil­
iary propulsion systems on the command and service module (CSM) and the
 
lunar module (EM). The Ti-5Al-2.5Sn alloy, in the annealed condition, 
is used for the liquid hydrogen tank, the supercritical helium tank, 
and the fuel-cell gaseous nitrogen tanks.
 
The metallurgical compatibility of the titanium alloys with exter­
nal ambient environments encountered in spacecraft applications has been
 
established previously by tests and proven by use. A review of the ef­
fects of these external environments has not provided reason to question
 
this accepted compatibility. The internal environments are included in 
the following discussions of titanium tanks.
 
Gaseous helium tanks.- No known metallurgical or compatibility
 
problems are associated with the use of the 6A1-4v titanium alloy with
 
helium. The gaseous helium vessels do not have internal electrical or
 
mechanical devices. This eliminates concern over both the possible
 
problems associated with dissimilar metal combinations and the effects
 
of potential sparking or localized hot spots. Because of the inert na­
ture of helium gas, a compatibility problem is not expected with other 
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components of the high-pressure helium systems if the gas meets the ap­
plicable specification limits for impurities.
 
Propellant tanks.- The oxidizer used in the Apollo propulsion sys­
tems is nitrogen tetroxide and the fuel is Aerozine-50, except for the
 
fuel used in the command module (CM) reaction control system (RCS),
 
which uses monomethyl hydrazine. The propellants have been the subject
 
of extensive investigation for compatibility with the tank materials
 
and for stability in the presence of the tank materials. The tanks in
 
the main propulsion systems (service propulsion system (sPS), ascent
 
propulsion system (APS), and descent propulsion system (DPS)) also are
 
exposed to referee propellant fluids (water or trichlorotrifluoroethane)
 
during check-out of the systems. These fluids also have been the sub­
ject of extensive investigation for compatibility with tank material.
 
If only the approved fluids and procedures are associated with the use
 
of the tanks, the possibility of stress corrosion is remote. The impor­
tance of using only approved fluids is exemplified by the previous meth­
anol and nitrogen tetroxide incompatibilities. Methanol has been
 
eliminated from approved use, and the nitric oxide content of approved
 
nitrogen tetroxide must be at least 0.6 percent to ensure compatibility.
 
Electrical-apparatus components or connections are isolated from
 
the propellants (for example, in the descent propellant tanks propellant
 
quantity gaging system (PQGS) probe). The possibility of combustion of
 
metallic tank materials is considered remote.
 
Liquid hydrogen tanks.- The liquid hydrogen tanks are similar in
 
construction to the liquid oxygen tanks, except that the pressure vessel
 
is 5A1-2.5Sn titanium alloy. A variety of metallic materials are used
 
for internal components and accessories. The use of both tin-lead
 
solder and brass is receiving further attention because tin can degrade
 
at cryogenic temperatures, and lead and zinc are individually incompat­
ible with liquid hydrogen. It is not presently known in what potential
 
manner the tin-lead solders or brass (copper-zinc alloy) may react. Expe­
rience to date, however, does not support concern over these materials.
 
Another condition requiring attention is the use of iron in fan motors,
 
solenoid and aperture, and switch assemblies. Combustion of any of the
 
metallic materials is unlikely. The hydrogen tank bimetal joint leak
 
encountered on Apollo 12 has been attributed to improper processing in
 
two lots and not to a basic metallurgical problem. The titanium alloy
 
vessel material (Ti-5A1-2.5Sn) and hydiogen are compatible under normal
 
Apollo use conditions in which temperatures are less than -1600 F. At
 
room temperature, compatibility is questionable. The allowable maximum
 
temperature for the Apollo liquid hydrogen tanks is 80' F. The use of
 
the alloy (Ti-5A1-2.5Sn) for tanks operating in the warmer temperature
 
range could constitute an incompatible condition.
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Supercritical helium tank.- No internal electrical connections or
 
moving parts are in the tank. The combustion of material is improbable
 
under any use conditions. The most probable causes of tank failure are
 
failure of the burst disk to operate (which is remote) or heating of
 
the tank wall to a level at which the wall would fail before the burst
 
disk because of reduced wall strength at the elevated temperature. The
 
latter probability is theoretically possible, and it is understood that
 
this condition may occur under certain operational conditions.
 
Gaseous nitrogen tanks.- Examination of the gaseous nitrogen fuel­
cell tanks has not shown reason to question the service compatibility 
of a tank with its service environment. Combustion of the tank material 
is unlikely. 
Steel Vessels
 
The following three types of steel are used for Apollo vessels:
 
AM350, D6AC, and cryoformed 301 stainless steel. The specific applica­
tions are discussed in the following paragraphs.
 
Service propulsion system gaseous nitrogen tanks.- The AM350 steel
 
is used for fabrication of these tanks. There are no internal electrical
 
connections or moving parts. Combustion is highly unlikely. There is
 
no metallurgical reason to question the compatibility of the tanks with
 
their environment under use and test conditions.
 
Lunar module descent stage oxygen tank.- This tank is fabricated
 
from D6AC steel. The interior of the tank is nickel plated, and the
 
exterior is painted to guard against corrosion. The possibility of com­
bustion is remote. If plating and paint integrity is maintained, envi­
ronmental corrosion should not be a problem. Crevice corrosion has been
 
avoided in Apollo use but is a potential problem with D6AC steel.
 
Portable life support system primary oxygen tanks.- Cryoformed
 
stainless steel is used for the primary oxygen tanks on the portable
 
life support system (PLSS). These tanks contain no internal electrical
 
connections or moving parts. Combustion of the tank material is un­
likely. Instrumentation is not bonded directly to Tank surfaces, and
 
fraying surfaces are avoided. The incidence of crevice corrosion, which
 
has not been experienced on the PLSS tanks, indicates that the design
 
and the environments associated with Apollo usage are compatible.
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Inconel 718 Vessels
 
The CM oxygen surge tank and rapid repressurization tanks, the ser­
vice module (SM) cryogenic oxygen tanks, the LM ascent stage oxygen tank, 
and the PLSS oxygen purge tanks are fabricated from Inconel 718. In­
conel 718 alloy, in tests and by past performance, has demonstrated com­
patibility with gaseous oxygen.
 
METALLURGICAL INCOMPATIBILITIES AMD IMPURITIES EFFECTS STUDIES
 
Whenever the free energy change of a system is negative and reaction
 
is limited by kinetics, the possibility exists for catalysis to occur
 
even with trace additions bf certain materials. The high-energy liquids
 
(that is, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, nitrogen tetroxide, and hydrazine)
 
would be expected to react with most of the container materials. The
 
only reason these liquids are at all compatible is because of protective
 
films and slow-reaction kinetics. In studying the compatibility of the
 
material in terms of bulk reactions, care should be exercised to deter­
mine the course and extent of reactions in materials without protective
 
films. The electrochemical.behavior of freshly exposed titanium (that
 
is, fractured specimens) is markedly different from titanium with an
 
oxide coating. The combustion of metals with a protective oxide can be
 
initiated only by breakage of the oxide. Thus, it is known that titanium 
is a satisfactory container material for hydrogen only if the surface 
oxide is reformed.
 
The state of the art of stress-corrosion cracking is such that priori
 
predictions about susceptibility of material-environment combinations
 
cannot be made with a high degree of certainty. The presence of halides
 
in either aqueous, organic, or fused salt environments generally promotes
 
stress-corrosion cracking of metals, but the effect of other environmental
 
species cannot as yet be predicted. Although it is a goal of scientific
 
laboratories to be able to predict stress-corrosion behavior from first
 
principles, the phenomenon is complex and achievement of this goal is
 
still in the future. Trace impurities in the environment can have a
 
large influence on rate of crack propagation. For example, stress­
corrosion cracking of some titanium alloys in methanol can be inhibited
 
completely by the addition of a few parts per million of nitrate. The
 
addition of chloride increases susceptibility and crack-propagation ve­
locity. These additions play the role of catalysts, positive and nega­
tive. In electrolytically conducting solutions such as water or methanol
 
with dissolved halide salts, crack-propagation velocity is also a function
 
of applied potential. Under open-circuit conditions, this potential may
 
be determined by electrochemical reactions such as dissolved oxygen re­
duction on the surface of the specimen.
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Localized attack usually is initiated and maintained by either non­
uniform supply of a reactant to a surface (for example, pitting corrosion
 
in electrochemistry) or by the partial destruction of a protective film.
 
Recent research has been directed to investigating environment-induced
 
cracking. It has been found that the cracking is influenced by the fol­
lowing factors.
 
1. Metallurgical variables (for example, composition of alloy,
 
heat treatment)
 
2. Environment variables (for example, chemical composition, im­
purities)
 
3. Temperature and pressure
 
4. Stress 
5. Electrochemical variables (for example, electrical potential and 
conductivity, in systems where the interaction is electrochemical ­
(Aerozine-50 and monomethyl hydrazine, but presumably not oxygen, hydro­
gen, or nitrogen)).
 
According to the present state of the art, interpretation of test
 
results requires that the crack-propagation velocity is known for a
 
range of stress intensities. For each test condition, a curve of crack­
propagation rate as a function of stress intensity can be plotted, con­
veniently on logarithmic paper, because recent measurements range from
 
l0-T to 102 cm/sec. On such a plot, if complete, at least three dif­
ferent mechanisms of crack propagation can be distinguished. As shown
 
in the following figure, at high stresses (region III), the crack is
 
unstable mechanically, accelerates, and may approach the velocity of
 
transverse acoustic waves. Fracture mechanics is the science dealing
 
with this phenomenon and with determining the critical stress intensity
 
(K1 c) for this to occur. At lower stresses, cracks grow at a rate that
 
is independent of stress intensity (region II). Fracture chemistry is
 
rate-controlling in this region. Fracture may proceed across the grain
 
(titanium alloys) or along the grain boundaries (aluminum alloys). This
 
seems to have little relevance. Region I is important because it deter­
mines the lower threshold stress intensity (IH). Unfortunately, present
 
fundamental knowledge about the mechanisms that control crack propagation
 
in this region is lagging.
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Supercritical Oxygen Tank - Inconel 718 
Major construction materials are Inconel 718, stainless steel 321,
 
Aluminum 6063 and polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) polymer.
 
References B-1 and B-2 listed PTFE as satisfactory for liquid'oxy­
gen service, except if pigmented (ref. B-3) or contaminated. No quan­
titative information is available on the permissible contamination of
 
PTFE, nor is there anything known about the effect of contamination of
 
the oxygen on the ignition of PTFE. Dissolved contaminants in the tank
 
possibly could be measured by the use of the quantity gage for resistivity
 
measurements. Resistivity has been correlated with impurity content in
 
the case of Freon (ref. B-4) and boron trifluoride (ref. B-5). Of course,
 
solid contaminants could not be traced by this technique. In general,

solids become effective as catalysts by impinging on surfaces (ref. B-6)

(particulate contaminants) or by intimate contact (as in valve seats,
 
washers, insulations). 
 Inconel 718 is one of the most suitable materials
 
for liquid oxygen service (refs. B-2 and B-7). If the postweld heat
 
treatment were omitted, however, Inconel 718 would be incompatible with
 
liquid oxygen (ref. B-8).
 
Tiner, et al. (ref. B-9)'measured corrosion in ozone difluoride
 
(0.05 percent) liquid oxygen and found that Inconel X, brass, and alu­
minum 1100 corroded, whereas none of these materials corrode in pure
 
oxygen. It is also significant that Tiner found that corrosion was more
 
pronounced in gaseous oxygen than in liquid oxygen. Boeing (ref. B-8)
 
conducted a stress-corrosion test in liquid oxygen, and Tiner, et al.
 
(ref. B-9) conducted a stress-corrosion test in liquid oxygen that was
 
contaminated deliberately with 0.05 percent ozone difluoride. Neither
 
found significant stress-corrosion susceptibility.
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Austenitic stainless steels are compatible with liquid oxygen but
 
somewhat more combustible than Inconel (ref. B-1).
 
Aluminum alloys usually are listed as compatible, although alloy
6061 occasionally is ignited by impact in liquid oxygen (ref. B-10).
 
Brass, .used to a limited extent, is considered as compatible
(ref. B-2), but its catalytic potential should be examined. The same
 
can be stated about copper.
 
Under impact conditions, tin-lead solder is not compatible with
 
liquid oxygen (ref. B-2).
 
Gaseous Okygen Tank, D6AC
 
This tank is made of low-alloy nickel-molybdenum-vanadium steel, is

nonaustenitic, and is stress brittle at cryogenic temperatures. 
The
fracture-toughness values (data from the Fll 
investigation) are as
 
follows.
 
Temperature, 'F Oil quenched Brine quenched 
70 90 55 
-20 58 4o 
-65 45 30 
Based on the information that the steel was air-quenched and that
the service temperature was 
500 F, there is no incompatibility in this
 
case,
 
Comments concerning other materials within the tank are the same as
 in the case of the supercritical oxygen tank.
 
Nitrogen Tanks
 
The major structural materials are Ti-6A1-4V and stainless steel
 
AM350. 
Nitrides are known to form; thus, incoippatibilities are not im­possible. Stress-corrosion-test results, however, indicated hardly any

decrease of critical stress intensity.
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Helium Tank, Ti-6A-4H 
Rot only do noble gases not react with metals, but also the per­
meability of helium through metals is extremely low. The only cases of 
helium embrittlement known are caused by alpha-particle irradiation 
(ref. B-l).
 
Hydrogen Tank, Ti-5A1-2,56n
 
The interaction of hydrogen with titanium has been studied for many
 
years. There is no evidence for the reaction of liquid hydrogen with
 
titanium alloys (ref. B-12). There is some lowering of the critical
 
stress intensity at low temperatures, but this seems to be related to
 
temperature rather than to the presence of hydrogen (ref. B-13). At
 
room temperature, however, reaction of titanium with oxygen was observed
 
(refs. B-12 and B-14), and the substitution of Ti-5A1-2.5Sn alloys for
 
the unalloyed titanium piping solved the then existing problem. A second
 
research program, however, -showed that titanium alloys were equally vul­
nerable if the surface was abraded or cleaned (ref. B-15). The
 
Ti-5A1-2.5Sn was shown to be more compatible with hydrogen than unalloyed
 
titanium, but less so than Ti-6A1-4V. At the recent American Institute
 
of Metallurgical Engineers Conference, May 11 to 14, l970, several papers
 
were presented on the interactions of hydrogen with titanium alloys. The
 
following statements can be made.
 
1. Hydrogen does produce slow crack growth in titanium alloys.
 
2. The rate of such crack growth is often quite fast (10 - 3 cm/sec 
(ref. B-16)). 
3. Notched and precracked specimens show a more dramatic effect than
 
unnotched speciments (ref. B-16).
 
4. The purity of the hydrogen is very important. Slow crack growth 
occurs more readily in high-purity hydrogen. 
5. Crack growth occurs even at very low hydrogen pressures 
-
(10 2 atmospheres).
 
6. There appears to be some influence of heat treatment and micro­
structure, but this was not well established.
 
There were no data reported on the Ti-5A1-2.5Sn alloy; most work was­
performed on commercial-purity titanium and Ti-6A1-4V. It is obvious
 
that more careful and systematic work on the phenomenon is required before
 
it can be controlled or understood. It is now evident that the traces of
 
oxygen or water present in commercial-purity hydrogen had been a very
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effective inhibitor in prior experiments. Dell P. Williams (NASA Ames
 
Research Center), states that an embrittling effect has been observed
 
° 
at temperatures as low as -l00 C (ref, B-16). 
 The concentration of
 
oxygen in hydrogen necessary for inhibition has not yet been measured
 
but is estimated by Williams to be approximately 100 ppm. A suitable
 
surface treatment might improve the compatibility but would not neces­
sarily improve the fracture toughness.
 
Some secondary structures within the tank are made of commercial­
purity titanium and deserve particularly urgent attention.
 
Other secondary structures are made of aluminum alloys, 1100, 2024,
 
3007, 6061 and 7075. Aluminum alloys clearly are the alloys least af­
fected by hydrogen, and there have been no reports that an external
 
hydrogen environment at room temperature degrades the properties of
 
aluminum alloys (ref. B-17).
 
The PTFE polymer is used as an insulating material within the hydro­
gen tank. There has been a scientific publication by DuPont (ref. B-18)

that, once ignited, PTFE can react with hydrogen. A significant experi­
mental effort is being initiated at MSC to verify this observation.
 
Nitrogen Tetroxide Tank
 
The principal structural material is Ti-6A1-4W; the materials for
 
the zero-g can are Al 6061 T6 and Al 2024 T3.
 
Corrosion.- There is no evidence that noncontaminated nitrogen tetro­
oxide ( 
 rrodes titanium alloys, 300 series stainless steels, or
 
Inconel X (ref. B-19). 
Most aluminum alloys are considered as compatible,
 
except for 7075 and 2024 (ref. B-8). 
 This point requires further exami­
nation. 
Also, if two different alloys are connected electrically, a
 
galvanic cell is formed in N204 (ref. B-19). Water reacts with N204 to
 
form nitric acid, which is corrosive to most structural materials (except

3o4 stainless steel and titanium), The water is regenerated during the
 
corrosion process (ref. B-21) and, thus, does not exhaust. 
 Corrosion of
 
aluminum alloys becomes significant with a water content of 0.45 percent
 
or more (ref. B-20). The specifications limit the water content to
 
0.1 percent (ref. B-19). 
F. D. Hess reviewed potential inhibitors and,

in his paper (ref. B-20), recommends NH SO3F for further evaluation.
 
Grunt, et al. (ref. B-21) conducted accelerated corrosion tests with
 
contaminated N204. The contaminations were chlorine, water (0.91 percent),
 
oxygen (0.04 percent), NOCL, NOC1 + oxygen. 
He found that these contami­
nants did not promote corrosion in the case of Ti-6Al-4v. In the case
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of 6061-T6 -aluminum, the addition of water and oxygen did promote 
corrosion.
 
Stress corrosion.- Early work in the 1960's indicated that titanium
 
alloys behaved passively in N204, and there was no evidence of cracking
 
in this environment. However, in 1965, Bell Aerospace Systems Inc.
 
(ref. B-19) reported premature failure of a Ti-6AI-4V alloy tank contain­
ing R204' (The conditions were as follows: temperature 105' F; stress
 
level, 90 000 psi; failure time, 40 hours). Examination of the fracture
 
surface indicated that crack growth had occurred before catastrophic
 
failure and, thus, indicated a stress-corrosion-cracking process had
 
occurred. This failure initiated a detailed investigation of the com­
patibility of titanium alloys with N204 
and, by 1966, the following
 
statements were made in a DMIC report (ref. B-22).
 
1. Stress-corrosion cracking usually'will occur in N204 when no
 
significant or measurable amounts of nitric oxide (NO) are present and
 
the system is exposed to moderately high stresses at temperatures in
 
the range of 85' F to 165' F.
 
2. Stress-corrosion cracking does not occur in N20 when the N204
 
contains an excess of NO.
 
3. The commercial and military specifications to which N20 is proc­
essed do not control either the oxygen or NO content. As a result of
 
this work, NASA developed a specification for N204 that controls the NO
 
content.
 
4. All tests to date have shown complete inhibition of stress­
corrosion cracking of titanium in "green" N204
 
5. 
Further work has indicated that additions of sufficient water
 to red N204 will eliminate the stress-corrosion cracking of titanium.
 
(This, in effect, adds NO and eliminates free oxygen because water forms
 
nitric acid and NO in N20 ). Nitric acid, however, leads to general 
-corrosion problems. 
Since 1966, Battelle (NASA Contract NASr-l00(09) and Hercules Inc.
 
(NAS 8-21207) have continued work on this problem. The main conclusions
 
of the Battelle study are summarized below.
 
1. All alloys tested were susceptible in "red" N204.
 
2. Both intergranular and transgranular dracking occur.
 
3. The mode of cracking depends on the stress intensity.
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Some fracture-toughness testing has been performed within the Boeing

Company (ref. B-14), and a reduction of fracture toughness of only 30 per­
cent was reported in NO-enriched N204 (green" N204) (that is, cracks
, 

propagate slower than they would in sea water).
 
Impact sensitivity.- Reports on the impact sensitivity in N204 are
 
contradictory. 
Two 1961 manuals (refs. B-23 and B-24) list aluminum and
 
titanium as incompatible, whereas a more recent report (ref. B-25) lists
 
these two metals as insensitive to impa~t. This contradiction should be
 
decided by experiment.
 
Monomethyl Hydrazine and Aerozine-50 Tanks
 
The major structural material is Ti-6A1-4V.
 
Corrosion.- Few corrosion data have been found in the available
 
literature. The manufacturers recommend use of 300 series stainless
 
steels and advise against use of copper, lead, zinc alloys, and so forth,

without specifying the reasons (ref. B-26). Titanium alloys are "ap­
proved" for use with Aerozine-50 (ref. B-26). Tests conducted for a
 
different purpose indicate corrosion of copper, although the test pressure
 
was only 4 torr (ref. B-27).
 
Stress corrosion.- The decrease of the fracture toughness of
 
Ti-6A1-4V by monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) is only approximately 25 percent,

and by Aerozine-50 approximately 20.percent (refs. B-28, B-29, and B-30)
(that is, no difficulties are indicated). One publication mentions crack­
ing of 2014 aluminum alloy, indicative of stress corrosion in this alloy

(ref. B-31). No further information concerning stress corrosion was
 
found, nor was any information uncovered concerning the effect of impuri­
ties on stress corrosion.
 
Catalytic degradation.- Long-term storage of the propellant is lim­
ited by the catalytic effects of the tank walls and the impurities. The
 
worst undesired catalysts are rust, molybdenom, and molybdenum-bearing
 
alloys (ref. B-26), followed by nickel, iron, copper, stainless steel
 
(ref. B-32), and gold (ref. B-8). Aluminum seems to be the most desir­
able material from this point of view, but the 4.5 percent copper content
 
of the 2000 series aluminum alloys seems to-be enough to spoil the inert­
ness of aluminum (ref. B-33). Thus, aluminum alloy 2024 T3 should be
 
eliminated from the "zero-g can." No information was found on the cata­
lytic effect of titanium alloys.
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SECTION C - CHEMISTRY SURVEY
 
A chemistry survey was made on the Apollo high-pressure fluid sys­
tems. This survey includes examination of the tank contents, specifica­
tions, and analyses procedures; extent of polymer involvements; and 
catalytic effects on reaction processes. 
CONTENTS, ANALYSES, AND SPECIFICATIONS - HIGH-PRESSURE 
'FLUIDS AND GASES ON APOLLO SPACECRAFT 109 
Cryogenic Hydrogen
 
Characteristics, chemical reactivity, and incompatibilities.- Liquid 
hydrogen is less dangerous than high-pressure gaseous hydrogen and is 
similar in hazardous respects to highly volatile gasoline (ref. C-i). 
The main precaution is to prevent air leakage into the liquid hydrogen 
containers. If this should happen, the air will solidify on the walls 
or will sink to the bottom of.the tank. Solid air and liquid hydrogen 
will not explode spontaneously; a spark is required for an explosion. 
The spark, however, can be produced by the breaking of a crystal of 
solid air or oxygen or by a malfunctioning heater or motor wire immersed 
in liquid hydrogen containing solid air. 
As a summary of the materials review, the materials inside and out­
side the tank generally are compatible with liquid hydrogen: The only 
possible exceptions are solder joints used in the heater and fan assem­
blies and polymers that can hydrogenize. 
Materials considered incompatible with liquid hydrogen are listed
 
in table C-I. They are class IV materials (ref. C-2) that have one or
 
more of the following reactive properties: (1) have corrosion rates
 
greater than 50 mils per year, (2) cause extensive decomposition of the
 
propellant, () cause spontaneous combustion, or (4) are impact
 
sensitive.
 
Solder is not listed in table C-I as an incompatible material in
 
liquid hydrogen. However, solder contains lead in solid solution.
 
Solder is used in two places on the Simmonds probe.
 
Reports in the literature place lead in the incompatible list for
 
hydrogen use. A teleconmunication to Batelle Memorial Institute reveals
 
that this is in error. An error exitsts in the Defense Metals Informa­
tion Center Memorandum. Lead is rated compatible with liquid hydrogen
 
(ref. C-3). 
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Hydrogen manufacture.- The impurities present in hydrogen depend
 
upon the source (reaction used in preparing the hydrogen) and the methods
 
of purification. Hydrogen is manufactured by several methods (ref. C-1),
 
among which axe (1) electrolysis of water; (2) separation from flue gas,
 
water gas, or coke-oven gas; (3) thermal decomposition of natural gas;
 
(4)decomposition of steam on heated iron; and (5)action of steam on
 
refinery oil. The water-gas reaction and the electrolysis of water are
 
the two most important methods of production. Several methods of produc­
tion are listed to show that several impurities must be guarded against
 
and that they will vary with source.
 
The purest product results from the electrolysis of water; the
 
method of decomposing water on hot iron results in the second purest
 
product. The other methods of production give mixed products, and the
 
purity of the final hydrogen depends upon the efficiency of the
 
purification.
 
Impurities in hydrogen.- All known substances are essentially insol­
uble in liquid hydrogen. Helium is possibly soluble to about 1 percent.
 
Impurities in liquid hydrogen, therefore, must be considered as segre­
gated or particulate in nature. As a result, the primary concern is
 
with contamination rather than with dissolved homogeneous impurities.
 
After purification, the main precaution to be taken is the preven­
tion of air leakage into the liquid hydrogen containers. Twenty percent
 
of air is oxygen, which will collect in the tank.
 
Hydrogen in either gaseous or -liquid form will react violently with
 
strong oxidizers. Because the air impurity will concentrate in liquid
 
hydrogen and because it contains an oxidizer (oxygen), liquid hydrogen
 
must be kept completely out of contact with air.
 
The impurities in hydrogen should run less than 50 ppm by volume.
 
Most of the impurities will be helium, which is inert. Other impurities
 
expected are oxygen, nitrogen, argon, water, carbon dioxide, carbon
 
monoxide, and methane.
 
Specifications for hydrogen.- The procurement specifications for
 
liquid and gaseous hydrogen are the same. The requirement is for the
 
material as delivered at the spacecraft interface. The procurement
 
specification for liquid hydrogen is listed in table C-II.
 
Conclusions.- Analysis of hydrogen for procurement and control
 
should be from a representative .sample. Analysis of gases withdrawn from
 
the ullage area above a liquid sample will not give a complete and accu­
rate analysis. Withdrawal of a gaseous sample in effect means that the
 
cryogenic hydrogen has been purified one more time by distillation;
 
therefore, the sample is not representative of the liquid.
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Liquid hydrogen represents a potential fire and explosion source,
 
but only in the presence of an oxidizer and an energy source to initiate
 
the reaction. The two potential electrical sources present are the
 
electrical wiring and air crystals in the hydrogen. Breakage can furnish
 
electrical energy.) Two potential oxidizer sources present are air crys­
tals and Polytetrafluorethylene, (PTFE).
 
Oxygen
 
Contaminants in oxygen.- Contaminants found in oxygen generally 
arise as a result of manufacture (air Qondensation) and failure of com­
plete removal by purification. Some contaminants found are the follow­
ing (ref. c-h). 
1. Acetylene, O.08 ppm
 
2. Ethylene, 0.88 ppm
 
3. Carbon dioxide, 6.6 ppm 
4. Nitrous oxide, 2.0 ppm
 
5. Ethane, 3.56 ppm 
6. Aliphatic hydrocarbons, 31 ppm
 
Concentration effects may occur. This was the case with an onboard 
converter (ref. C-5). The mechanism is as follows. The original com­
position of impurities was determined. The tank then was emptied and 
filled 25 times and the contents were reanalyzed for the impurities. The 
contaminant concentration effects are illustrated in table C-III. 
Hydrocarbons such as methane, ethane. ethylene, acetylene, and 
higher homologues are potentially dangerous because they can be concen­
trated and oxidized in liquid oxygen to carbon dioxide (CO ) and water 
(H20), with liberation of heat. The same consideration applies to 
ammonia (BH3 ). 
Carbon dioxide is deleterious for an entirely different reason. 
Carbon dioxide "snow" exists at all times in missile liquid oxygen 
(ref. C-6). Carbon dioxide concentration tends to rise with increase 
in filtration rate. It precipitates (solubility limit = 4.42 ppm in 
liquid oxygen (L 2) at -1830 C) as the oxygen (02 ) is handled or vaporized 
while in storage. The CO "snow" will agglomerate where conditions are
 
2
 
35 
static (e.g., launch-pad storage tank). In subsequent operations, it
 
may create blockage in the missile LO2 system.
 
Contaminants found in container equipment.- Tank and container con­
tamination can be divided into (l) impurities left during equipment 
cleaning operation and (2) impurities introduced by filling operations. 
Trichloroethylene and carbon tetrachloride are adsorbed by and often 
desorbed from container walls. Stabilized grades of trichlorethylene
 
giving residues as small as 1 mg (0.4 in 2 in area) can be detonated by 
liquid oxygen. Residues from halocarbons should be regarded as poten­
tially hazardous in service. The same generalization can be made about 
penetrant residues (ref. C-7). Closely controlled rinsing and cleaning
is required for final cleaning; and, where possible, inspection methods 
for oxygen containers other than penetrant inspection should be used. 
A table of contaminants detected at Kennedy Space Center on ground­
support equipment (GSE) is contained in appendix B. This table illus­
trates the potential hazards associated with contamination introduced 
to L0 systems in filling and support operations. 
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Contaminants from pressurizing gases.- Nitrogen and helium are
 
common pressurant gases. Helium is inert and nitrogen is relatively in­
ert. Chemical reactions do not occur between the liquid and the ullage
 
gas. However, both gases contain impurities. Nitrogen is obtained by
 
essentially the same process as oxygen and has generally the same con­
taminants. Nitrogen can be dissolved in liquid oxygen up to 30 percent
 
under nitrogen pressure (ref. c-8).
 
Impurities such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen are common in both
 
gaseous nitrogen and gaseous helium (ref. C-9). When present in ullage
 
gases for oxygen, the impurities are oxidized exothermically to form
 
solid CO2 + H 20, which may contribute to filter blockage. Exothermic
 
oxidation of impurities generally occurs at ppm concentration, and the
 
reaction is imperceptible. However, if impurity concentration can
 
occur for any reason, the resultant oxidation-reduction reaction may be
 
deleterious to the system. The procurement specifications for liquid
 
oxygen are shown in table C-IV; the impurities likely to be found in
 
liquid oxygen are shown in table C-V.
 
The contaminant gases likely to produce a pressure rise are listed
 
in table C-V along with relevant physical data (refs. C-10 and C-11).
 
The service module oxygen storage tank (part number 282-0046) pres­
sure is nominally 900 psia, and system pressure has a range of 865 to
 
935 psia. The temperature of the tank appears to run at -200 ± 200 F,
 
as judged by the time-line information. Comparison of the data in
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table C-VI with the tank-operating parameters shows that the temperature 
in the tank is below the critical temperature of all hydrocarbon impur­
ities. It is below the sublimation point'and normal melting point of 
acetylene and methyl chloride, respectively. As a result, the impurities 
will exist as solids and liquids in the normal system. Any process that 
raises the temperature above 2040 F will cause the impurities to become
 
gases.
 
Gasification of hydrocarbons in the oxygen tank is undesirable for
 
two reasons: (1) A change of volume will occur for the hydrocarbons,
 
with resultant increase in pressure. For the amounts of hydrocarbons
 
present (<14 ppm), this physical process is insignificant. However, the
 
impurity change from solid to gas will allow the impurities to oxidize
 
at comparatively rapid rate.
 
4 CH4 + 7 02 -4 co2 + 6 H2 0 + 21 495 Btu/lb 
Similar reactions occur for the other hydrocarbons. The products
 
of such reactions are condensable at the temperature and pressure of the
 
tank. The reactions, however, are exothermic and offer a possibility of
 
furnishing activation energy for other reactions.
 
An impurity-concentration process may occur through normal liquid 
oxygen boiloff in any storage tank from the time of production to the 
time of ultimate use aboard the spacecraft. 
Nitrogen
 
Characteristics and chemical reactivity of nitrogen.- Nitrogen
 
usually is considered an inert gas. It neither supports combustion nor
 
sustains respiration. At high temperatures, however, it will combine
 
with hydrogen, oxygen, and the other elements, and it will combine with
 
some of the more reactive metals to form nitrides.
 
Nitrogen manufacture.- Nitrogen is produced commercially at air­
separation plants by liquifaction of atmospheric air and removal of 
nitrogen by fractionation. As a result, impurity content in nitrogen is 
very similar to that in oxygen. 
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Nitrogen impurities.- Typical impurity levels for nitrogen are
 
given below for a purity level of 99.998 per cent nitrogen (ref. C-12).
 
1. Acetylene, 0.05 ppm 
2. Argon, 5.0 ppm
 
3. Carbon dioxide, 0.5 ppm
 
4. Helium, 5.0 ppm
 
5. Hydrogen, 1.0 ppm
 
6. Methane, 0.5 ppm
 
7. Nitrous oxide, 0.1 ppm
 
8. Oxygen, 1.0 ppm
 
9. Water, 1.0 ppm
 
10. Carbon monoxide, 1.0 ppm
 
These values are typical of the concentrations that are expected
 
for this designated purity level. Actual analyses will vary from batch
 
to batch.
 
Specifications for nitrogen.- The procurement for gaseous and liquid
 
nitrogen is the same. The requirement is for the material as delivered
 
at the spacecraft interface. The specifications for nitrogen are listed
 
in table C-VI.
 
Conclusions.- The nitrogen in the electrical power system is used
 
to flush the fuel cells of water, unused oxygen, and hydrogen. As a
 
result, the chemical purity of the nitrogen is not critical except Tor
 
oxygen and hydrocarbon content. The hydrocarbon cofntent is controlled
 
to 5 ppm or less, and, in a flowing vented system, this control is
 
adequate. The oxygen content even at 150 ppm is not hazardous in a
 
flowing system if adequate arrangements are made for venting and isola­
tion from electrical energy sources.
 
Because nitrogen is used for flushing and blanketing, aerosols and
 
particulate matter are critical. If particulates are present, abrasion
 
can open fresh surfaces for possible reaction with oxygen or hydrogen,
 
plugged filters and faulty valve action also can result.
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Monomethylhydraz ine
 
Characteristics and chemical reactivity of monomethylhydrazine.­
Propellant-grade monomethylhydrazine (MMH) 'contains a minimum of 98 per­
cent MI (CH NHNH') the remainder being primarily water. 
Monomethyl­
hydrazine is weaklyalkaline, a strong reducing agent, and very hygroscopic.
It will react accordingly with carbon dioxide, oxygen, and water, all of 
which are present in air. For example, carbon dioxide reacts with MMH 
to form a carbonic acid salt. Monomethylhydrazine will react with other
 
acidic and oxidative materials (ref. C-13). 
A film of MMH in contact with metallic oxides such as rust or other
 
oxidizing agents (including oxygen in the air) may ignite from the heat
 
evolved in the oxidation reaction. Catalysts such as copper, iron, or
 
their alloys can cause decomposition on contact, with ignition possible

(ref. C-l4). Contact with mercury forms azide-type materials, which are
 
very sensitive to shock. Zinc and alloys containing more than 0.5 weight­
percent of molybdenum are not compatible with MI{. 
Monomethylhydrazine manufacture.- The general method for making
MMI starts with amnonia (mH3 ) and uses chloramine (NH2 Cl) as the inter­
mediate. 
NH3 + NaOC --+NH2Cl + NaOH
 
NH2C1 + CH3NH -- CH3NHNH 2 + HC1 
HCl + NaOH - H20 + Na + C1-
The synthesis is analogous to the Raschig synthesis for hydrazine. It is 
particularly well suited for the manufacture of MMH and is the manufactur­
ing method generally used. 
Monomethylhydrazine impurities.- As a result of the manufacturing 
process and the chemical characteristics of MMH, the following compounds
are probable impurities. (Where percentages are given, the results are
 
representative of MMH samples in reference C-15.) 
1. Water, = 0.56 percent 
2. -Nitrogen, = 0.09 percent 
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3. Nitrous oxide, = trace 
4. Chloramine, = 0.1 percent 
5. Ammonia, = 0.10 percent
 
6. Methylamine, = 0.07 percent 
7. Triethylamine, = 0.07 percent 
8. Monomethylhydrazine carbonate, = trace 
9. Methylene monomethyldydrazine = 0.97 percent
 
The contaminant present in the largest amount is usually water, with the
 
others present in lesser amounts. None of the other impurities will
 
cause detrimental reactions.
 
Filterable solids are not required to be counted or identified, but 
a gravimetric recordtis kept'.' Copper and iron metals, particularly iron 
oxide (FE203, rust), can cause pressure buildup by catalysis and oxida­
tive decomposition of the fuel. The following metals have been found
 
in residues from representative MMH samples at the ppm level stated
 
(ref. C-15): magnesium, 10; iron, 0.005; copper, 0.01; aluminum,
 
<0.0005; and silicon, <0.01. The only metal found in any appreciable
 
concentration was magnesium. Iron and copper, which should not be al­
- 7
lowed to come in contact witk MM11, were present in less than 1 x 10

parts and would cause no trouble. 
Specifications for MMI.- The procurement specification for mono­
methylhydrazine is listed in table C-VII.
 
Conclusions.- The fact that some solids can cause catalytic and 
oxidative decomposition means that consideration should be given to 
quality analysis and control of residues in the fuel. Also, the titri­
metric procedure described provides largely for the analysis of major 
components, but without differentiation of the various amine impurities. 
Chromatographic techniques have been developed for the separation and 
analysis of MMII impurities.'- They should be implemented to control the 
fuel better. 
Nitrogen Tetroxide
 
Characteristics, chemical reactivity, and incompatibilities of 
nitrogen tetroxide.- Nitrogen tetroxide (N204 ) is an equilibrium mixture
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of nitrogen tetroxide and nitrogen dioxide N20 -2-- 2NO2. Propellant­
grade inhibited H204 tetroxide contains 98.5 percent by weight of N204
 
Nitric oxide (NO), the inhibitor, is present in 0.6 minimum to 1.0 maxi­
mum percent by weight. The water equivalent for propellant N204 is main­
tained at 0.2 percent by weight or less, delivered. The 0.2-percent
 
limit, by common acceptance, defines dry nitrogen tetroxide.
 
Dry nitrogen tetroxide can be contained readily by several metals 
and their alloys. The metals are listed in reference C-16. Wet nitro­
gen tetroxide is, in general, more corrosive than dry nitrogen tetroxide 
because of the nitric acid formed. Marked corrosion appears on metals 
exposed to N204 containing approximately 3 percent water. Under wet 
conditions, stainless steel (300 series) is the only recommended tank
 
material. When the moisture content is 0.1 percent or less (dry), the
 
following materials can be used: carbon steels, aluminum, stainless
 
steels, nickel, and Inconel (ref. C-13). Lists of compatible materials
 
that fail to differentiate metal compatibility caused by water content
 
should be suspect.
 
Materials incompatible with N204 and materials that are satis­
factory for limited service in N204 are listed in table C-VIII. 
Polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon) is listed as a compatible material.
 
However, Teflon swelling in N204 has been noted (ref. C-17). The swell­
ing characteristic is troublesome ih packing and glands and is indicative
 
of absorption or reactions in the polymer. In either case, the swelling
 
is indicative of long-term incompatibility and a potential hazard any­
time after it occurs.
 
Titanium originally was placed on the incompatible list because of
 
stress-crack corrosion tendency in "red" N204. With the advent of
 
"green" N204 (nitric oxide inhibited), titanium was removed from the list. 
However, upon further test, it was found that titanium Al-4V is vibration 
sensitive'in inhibited N204 (ref. C-18). 
Nitrogen tetroxide manufacture.- The purity of the nitrogen tetrox­
ide and the types of impurities to expect are dependent upon the manu­
facturing method used. At the present, there are three methods of
 
manufacture. The preparation of N204 by oxidation of nitrosyl chloride 
is cheap but it yields gaseous chlorine as a byproduct. A second method, 
the decomposition of metal nitrites, furnishes a pure product, but it is
 
more expensive. The usual method is to produce ammonia by the synthetic
 
41
 
ammonia process and then oxidize it with air over platinum catalyst 
(ref. C-19). The method is straightforward and produces no trouble­
some contaminants.
 
Impurities of nitrogen tetroxide.- When N2 04 is purchased from
 
several sources, chlorine, nitrosyl chloride, water, nitric acid, and
 
particulate matter will be the major impurities. Nitric acid results
 
from the reaction of water and the equilibrium mixture NP0- N02 
(ref. C-20). The overall reaction proceeds as follows.
 
3N204 + 220 - -+ hn0 3 + 2NO 
As a result, the elimination of water to 0.1 percent or less is desirable 
to prevent nitric acid formation with subsequent attack on the plumbing. 
It is stated generally that there are no reactions between N204 ana 
components of the air. The statement is generally true. 
However,
 
N04 will react with any reducing agent in the air to which it has been
 
exposed. Carbon monoxide (CO) generally is present in air in populated 
areas. The reaction between CO and N2 04 will produce carbon dioxide.
 
Because of the acidic nature of the reaction products of N264
 
particulate contamination is a problem in long-term N2 04 service con­
tainers. Reports of valve malfunction in N2 04 systems have been 
received that indicate blockage by solid tank oxidation products. 
Specifications for nitrogen tetroxide.- The procurement specifica­
tion for nitrogen tetroxide is listed in table C-IX.
 
Conclusions.- Nitrogen tetroxide is a powerful oxidizer that is
 
hypergolic with some organic compounds. By itself, it is not flammable.
 
Nitrogen tetroxide is capable of a second type of reaction; namely, ni­
tration with organic materials. When the reaction can occur, substances
 
are produced that are extremely shock-, heat-, or electrically-sensitive.

The materials of construction for the N04 tank are chosen to preclude
 
the nitration reaction.
 
Water and particulate matter offer the greatest possibility for
 
adverse effects in the system. The particulate matter only becomes a
 
problem on long-term storage in steel containers. Further test work
 
is required to determine the compatibility effects of inhibited 
N204 on titanium 6A1-4V underloadings. 
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Hydrazine-Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine - Aerozine-50 
Characteristics, chemical reactivity, and incompatibilities.­
Aerozine-50 is a 51:47 percent (nominally 50:50) mixture of hydrazine 
and unsymmetrical dimethyhydrazine (UDNH). - The two are miscible in all 
proportions but, if mixing is not thorough, layering will take place, 
If the mixture freezes, the UDMH and hydrazine will separate into two
 
layers that will not blend again without a mixing operation. 
The two components have the following Vapor pressures: hydrazine,
 
0.31 psia at 80' F and UDMH, 3.1 psia at 800 F. The order-of-magnitude­
higher vapor pressure of the larger molecular weight substance can be 
explained on the basis of hydrogen bonding. The hydrazine molecules 
are more strongly held to one another by the greater availability of 
hydrogen atoms to form hydrogen bonds with the unshared electron pair 
on each of the nitrogen atoms. Methyl substitution decreases the hydro­
gen bonding capability of the UDMH in comparison with hydrazine. 
As a result of the relatively high vapor pressure, UDMH will form 
°explosive mixtures at 7 F and hydrazine will do likewise at 1040 F. 
The mixture is unstable in the presence of some metals and metal oxides. 
In a series of stability tests, Aerozine-50 and hydrazine ignited in 
single drop tests in powdered Fe203 at 1200 to 1250 F, and in multiple 
drops on rusty iron at 2350 to 2450 F (ref. C-19). The Bureau of Mines,
 
in a series of tests with hydrazine, found that ignition in air occurred
 
approximately at room temperature (ref. C-21).
 
Hydrazine vapor can be exploded by a spark or flame if it is in the
 
flammable limits,-which at 2120 F, are the following: lower limit, 4.7;
 
upper limit, 100 (percent by volume). Thus, the vapor can be exploded
 
by a spark over a wide concentration range. For UDMH, the flammability 
limits at 770 F are the following: lower limit, 2.3; upper limit, 80 
(percent by volume). 
Aerozine-50 is hygroscopic and absorbs water rapidly from the air. 
Slight wetting of hydrazine appears to decrease the sensitivity of the 
material decomposition; but unfortunately, the water degrades propel­
lant performance. 
Both components of Aerozine-50 are powerful reducing agents, strong 
bases, and hygroscopic. As a result, Aerozine-50 absorbs water rapidly
 
from the air, reacts with oxidizers in air (such as oxygen), and reacts
 
with acidic gases such as NO2' C0 and HC1. Inert gas blanketing is
 
required. to protect Aerozine-50 from reactive constitutents in the
 
atmosphere. Nitrogen is inert in this application and is an excellent
 
blanketing gas.
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Hydrazine exhibits more material incompatibility than UDMH. As a 
result, the compatibilities must be the guide for material selection. 
Materials are listed in table C-X. Titanium is not listed and is an 
exception, as the suitability of titanium has been established by tests. 
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Aerozine manufacture.- Both components of Aerozine generally are
 
made by the Raschig or modified Raschig process. Either ammonia or urea
 
is reacted with hypochlorite; the resultifig chloramine is then reacted
 
with ammonia to produce hydrazine or with dimethyllamine to form UDMH.
 
There are other methods of production, but these are the most 
common.
 
The products will carry the byproduct impurities characteristic of the
 
processes for both components.
 
Impurities in Aerozine-50.- Very little work has been done on the
 
chemical analysis of Aerozine-50. Generally, the analysis is carried
 
out on the individual components and then the components are blended
 
carefully. The usual contaminants found in hydrazine are listed in
 
table C-XI, with a typical analysis (ref. C-22). In addition to the
 
reactivities noted previously, UJDMH readily undergoes autoxidation
 
(ref. C-23). Major products are methylene-l, 1-dimethylhydrazine (for­
maldehyde dimethylhydrazine), nitrogen, and water. 
Minor products are
 
ammonia, dimethylamine, dimethylnitrosamine, diazomethane, nitrous oxide,
 
methane, carbon dioxide, and formaldehyde. The reaction is catalyzed by

metals and metal salts, accelerated by ultraviolet light, and inhibited
 
by 1,3-butadiene. Copper, molybdeum and iron oxide catalyze hydrazine

decomposition at room temperatures.
 
The components of Aerozine-50 can react with several types of mate­
rials to form impurities in solution. When Aerozine-50 is brought in
 
contact with C02' products form, but they are not solids 
as are the prod­
ucts that form when C02 comes in contact with 100 percent fUDMH. Thus,
 
C02 is to be considered a source of chemical contamination but not of
 
particulate contamination in Aerozine-50. Both components will react
 
readily with carbonyl compounds (ketones and aldehydes) to form azomethine
 
type of materials.
 
CH3 /CH3 CH3 C CH/0H
 
C 
-/ 3 \C CH/ \H3 2 
Acetone UDMH
 
As a result, all common solvents such as methylethyl ketone and acetone
 
should be excluded from use on the Aerozine-50 system. A qualitative

observation (ref. C-20) indicates that metal surfaces cleaned with halo­
gen solvents such as trichloroethylene are reactive to Aerozine-50.
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Specification for Aerozine-50.- The regjuirements for Aerozine-50
 
are listed in table C-XfI. The specification is for procurement.
 
Conclusions.- The UDMH and hydrazine components of Aerozine-50 are
 
very reactive and must be isolated in unreactive vessels under inert
 
gas blankets for safe storage. The components will react in the follow­
ing ways.
 
1. Reduction of oxidizing agents
 
2. Neutralization of acids
 
3. Dessication of gases
 
4. Reaction to form azomethines of the hydrazone type
 
Most of the impurities found present in Aerozine-50 are products of hydra­
zine reactivity. Metal impurities listed above can cause catalytic
 
decomposition with presstre buildup, and rust can cause oxidative decom­
position with the liberation of heat.
 
Helium
 
Characteristics, chemical reactivity, and incompatibilities.- Helium
 
is colorless, odorless, and tasteless. 'It is inert and compatible with
 
all materials of construction. It is a monatomic compound with completely

filled electron orbitals. As a result of the small molecular size and
 
lack of reactivity, it is difficult to contain.
 
Helium preparation (separation from natural gas).- The only helium
 
plants now in operation are run by the Bureau of Mines. 
The helium is
 
produced by cryogenic distillation to 99.995 percent purity from natural
 
gas. The few impurities are characteristic of the source and separation
 
process.
 
Impurities in helium.- The usual impurities are listed below in
 
order of decreasing amounts (ref. c-24).
 
1. Nitrogen
 
2. Hydrocarbons
 
3. Water
 
4. Oxygen
 
5. Argon
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6. Carbon, dioxide 
T. Carbon monoxide 
The purpose of helium on board the spacecraft is as pressurant for fuel
 
systems. While the presence of hydrocarbons in helium is not dangerous,
the hydrocarbons can be carried into the oxidizer tanks during pressuri­
zation. Care must be taken that hydrocarbon lubricants used for equip­
ment hookup also be excluded from the system.
 
From a practical standpoint, particulate and aerosol contaminants
 
in helium pose more of a problem than impurities. The gas generally is
delivered with purity exceeding 99.99 percent. 
The largest percentage
 
of impurities consist of nitrogen and argon. 
These are inert and will
 
cause no trouble. Particulate contamination is capable of plugging
 
filters and causing improper valve action.
 
Specifications.- The requirements for helium are listed in
 
table C-XIII. 
Procurement shall be to specification MSFC-SPEC-364B.
 
Conclusions.- Helium is used to pressurize propellant tanks. 
The
 
important requirements for helium are that it contain an insignificant
 
amount of compounds capable of reacting with either fuels or oxidizers
 
and that it contain insignificant amounts of particulate.
 
The only impurities of consequence are hydrogen, oxygen, and hydro­
carbons. Each is stringently controlled, and no problem is anticipated
 
when th6 helium is sampled properly.
 
In a cryogenic helium tank, every impurity present will be in solid
 
particulate form. All substances with the exception of hydrogen have
 
larger specific gravities than helium. In a quiescent tank, segregation
 
can occur, and the impurities in any given sample withdrawn from the
 
container will depend upon the level from which the sample was taken.
 
Agitation should be employed wherever possible before sampling, and
 
the analysis should encompass aliquots from top, middle, and bottom por­
tions of-the sample.
 
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY SURVEY 
Descriptive data on the high-pressure systems and the information
 
obvious from the Apollo 13 accident required a physical chemistry survey

of the several tank systems. This survey indicated the following results.
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Polytetrafluoroethylene Reactivity
 
Polytetrafluoroethylene when heated decomposes (unzippers) into the
 
monomer (C2Fu), elemental fluorine (F2), fluorotmethane (CF4), and other
 
fragments (ref. C-25). If oxygen is present, the monomer oxidizes-to
 
C0F2 (ref. C-26). If metals in suitable physical state for reaction are
 
present, the metal is converted to its fluoride (and oxide if oxygen is
 
available) (ref. C-27). If ceramics, such as silicates and glass, are
 
present, reaction to silicon fluoride-and-metal fluorides occurs
 
(ref. C-27). Oxygen, fluorine, and hydrogen all react with polytetra­
fluoroethylene at approximately 6500 C (12020 F) for virgin unfilled
 
° 
polymer and at approximately 430' C (8o6 F) for filled polymer, depend­
ent on fillers used. The basic reactions are as follows.
 
(-CF2-)n C2 F4 + (F2 + CF4 + C) Unzippering
 
(-CF2 -)n + 02- COF2 Oxidation by oxygen
 
(-CF2-)n + H2 -s HF + C Hydrogenation 
(-CF2-)n + F2-- CF4 Incipient combustion from pyrolysis
 
(-CF2-)n + OF2 -- CF4 + 02 From sparks and arcing 
(-CF2- )n + Al -- AIF3 + CF +0C 
Electrostatic Charging of Surfaces in High-Pressure Fluid Systems
 
The question of initiation of chemical breakdown of materials in
 
high-pressure oxygen atmospheres caused by surface charging has been
 
raised by Dr. George Yeh, Villanova University (April 22, 1970).
 
The problem of surfacec charging remains. The charging of a surface
 
caused by a flow of fluid over it depends on the velocity of the fluid,
 
the electrical resistance of the fluid, and the presence of ions in a
 
diffuse double layer on the surface.
 
A double layer should not form on pure PTFE. It does not show con­
tact electrification (ref. C-28). Even a clean (oxide-covered) metal
 
surface should not form a diffuse double layer, because there are no
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ions in pure oxygen. Therefore, any charging must be caused by impurity
 
ions either from the solid surface cr from the oxygen. Adsorption of
 
these ions can form a double layer, the outer layer of which can be swept
 
away by the motion of the fluid,
 
An additional mechanism of charging would be caused by the presence
 
of particles in the fluid that would impinge on the surface and exchange
 
charge. This should not happen on pure PTFE unless mechanical damage
 
occurs, but it is possible on metal surfaces.
 
Water is one of the likely contaminants, in that it is ubiquitous,
 
could form a double layer, and could form ice particles in cryogenic 
systems. There are two possible effects caused by a charge on the sur­
face. One is to produce an electric discharge in the fluid and the other 
is to activate the molecules and reduce the reaction energy. Because 
the electric field needed to initiate discharge in gases is approximately 
10 -105 volts/cm and because activation of molecules by high field alone
 
takes more than 106 volts/cm, as shown by field ion microscopy, the dis­charge mechanism would occur first.
 
Harper (ref. C-28) states that surface-charge densities of 1 to
 
10 esu/cm2 are possible by contact and frictional electrification. This
 
leads to fields of as much as 3 x 10 volts/cm. This is enough to cause
 
at least local electrical breakdown. The ions produced can attack the
 
solid and initiate combustion. In oxygen, this also could produce ozone
 
which could react elsewhere in the bystem.
 
In the case of metal surfaces, the potential over the surface remains
 
constant (unless covered by an insulating oxide). This would cause charge
 
to flow away from regions of high fluid flow but also to flow to asperi­
ties where higher local fields could result.
 
The question, then, is why this does not happen often, because it
 
is essentially impossible to keep th& systems pure enough to prevent any
 
contamination of the surfaces. The answer must be that the kind of con­
taminants'necessary to produce a diffuse ionic double layer or to pro­
duce proper particles is not present, or that the flow velocity does not
 
become high enough to cause charging of the surface. The latter seems
 
more likely, especially if any region of high flow rate over a metal sur­
face would be connected electrically to large areas of metal where the
 
flow rate is low. The negative and positive charge carriers would tend
 
to coibine over the whole surface and thus reduce the surface charge.
 
Isolated metal parts should certainly be avoided where fast flow is
 
occurring.
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Polytetrafluoroethylene valve seats are knowm to decompose by flow­
ing oxygen contaminated with Lubriseal and garnet (ref. C-29). In this
 
case, both the mechanical damage caused by the garnet particles and the
 
lower ignition temperature of the Lubriseal may have been necessary.
 
For electrostatic charging of surfaces in a high-pressure fluid
 
system to present an ignition or explosion hazard, there must exist an
 
explosive mixture, a charge generator, and a sufficient spark intensity.
 
If the system (PTFE:oxygen), is considered to be a potentially flammable
 
system, then a charge generator would require a~fluid flow greater than
 
1 meter per second (ref. C-30) and a fluid conductivity of
 
-10 ohm cm . For conductivities much less than this, there are 
insufficient ions present to build up a charge; and, for flows greater
 
than this, the conductivity is too high. The presence of a second phase,
 
however, (particularly water as ice crystals) can be dangerous from
 
standpoint of inducing electrostatic effects. A spark intensity of more
 
-
than 2 x 10 4 joules generally is necessary to initiate an explosion
 
(ref. C-30). If flow rates can attain as much as 1 meter per second and
 
if the conductivity of the fluid is much less than 10 ohm cm or
 
if ice crystals may be present in the fluid mass, then experimental
 
studies should be carried out to assess the chance of discharge.
 
Polytetrafluorothylene Degradation
 
Polytetrafluoroethylene polymer, (-CF 2-)n, is a granular polymer
 
containing 1- to 3-micron-size granules with discontinuities between
 
them. Electron microscope studies (ref. C-31) reveal that the polymer
 
PTFE consists of spiral helices arranged in lamellar construction as
 
folded-over chains. Fillers and coloring agents, as well as impurities
 
(such as OH and C00H fragments), remaining from polymerization are con­
centrated between the lamellae. High temperatures on the polymer
 
(greater than 5000 C (9320 F)) or pressure-induced shock stresses cause 
degradation, as evidenced by growth of holes and void places in the 
polymeric structure. Regions surrounding these voids become crystalline 
and provide focal points for combustion activity. Folytetrafluoroethylene 
is known to disappear in high-pressure-oxygen-gas systems because of the 
action of oxygen gas flow under pressure and heating. The National 
Bureau of Standards (ref. C-32) made disks; placed these in an oxygen 
bomb, and admitted gas to various pressures from 1620 to 2537 psig. 
Samples of PTFE that reacted did so starting at approximately 7330 C, 
and it was found that the PTFE simply had disappeared completely. The 
following proportion of samples run reacted as follows: 1 percent of 
PTFE,samples reacted at 1620 to 1790 psig; 2.7 percent of PTFE samples 
reacted at 1620 to 2537 psig. 
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The following substances *comonly~are used to fillrP-.TFE and to. 
color code parts... 
Color. Material ,,used 
.Blue Cobalt, chromium, aluminum oxides
 
Red Cadmnum-an&' selenium sulfides 
Black Manganese, copper,, iron ,,:and-.chromium: >-.
 
oxides
 
Brown 1-ron, and, zinc oxides, 
Violet Cobalt and silicon oxides
 
Filled and colored materials shojuld not be used in'PTFE for high­
pressure ozygen. gas-.systems, 
-or in,wires carrying electrici-ty-in- such. 
systems. Rocketdyne reports that PTFE in high-pressure oxygen reacts 
starting at 4309 C -(806' F)-over-the pressure range from.2000-to 7500 psig. 
Nitrogen tetroxide, N204, does not react with PTFE, and use of PTFE
 
with wet (less than 0.1:'percent wate-)'or-dry N204 is 2eportedto be safe
 
(ref. C-33). Therefore, polytetrafluoreet-hylene is completely compatible
 
with N20 , and is the most unreactive polymer with N204 known. The fore­
going reports-appli hbwever, only"to virgin PTFE in dry madhined or 
extruded form, free of foreign material and structural damage. Nitrogen' 
tetroxide is so unreactive chemically with PTFE because N204 cannot be 
reduced to lower oxides of nitrogen (i.e., to N203 ) as long as any N204
 
is present to oxidize the trioxide back to the tetroxide. However,
 
caution should be exercised to maintain PTFE free of foreign materials.
 
Coatings of PTFE fabricated from powders particularly are susceptible
 
to contamination in the micron-particle size. Use of chlorinated sol­
vents on PTFE coatings should be forbidden because the chlorine cannot
 
be removed from PTFE surfaces by conventional means and the polymer
 
thus treated and used in oxidizers and liquid fuels can be hazardous
 
(ref. C-33).
 
Safe usage of Teflon involves preventing high temperature levels
 
(greater than 500' (9320 F) for unfilled virgin Teflon and above 4300 C
 
(8o6° F) for filled Teflon) from occurring within the polymeric struc­
ture between the lamellae. This means prevention of excessive heating
 
on the outside surfaces of the polymer and elimination of mechanisms for
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sparking,or arcing or high-pressure induced shocking. Because fillers
 
and coloring agents used in making Teflon components usually are semi­
conductors of electricity, avoidance of arcing situations is particularly
 
important in preserving the integrity of Teflon parts. Rapidly shocking
 
the Teflon component, such as happens on a "chattering" high-pressure
 
gas valve, is to be avoided, because rapid cycles of adiabatic compres­
sion build up ,heat within the polymer. 
Extent of polymer degradation upon exposure (1) to high-pressure
 
shock treatment, (2) to oxidation, or (3) to hydrogenation can be followed
 
by employing electron-microscope techniques (ref. C-31). Degradation
 
induced by fillers or coloring agents, as tell as by aging, similarly can
 
be delineated using the proper electron-microscope techniques. Such deg­
radation would be indicated by enlarged pore spaces. Correlation of the
 
size and numbers of voids in the Teflon structure with known histories
 
of the specimens, compared to virgin polymer samples, would provide in­
sight to incipient reactivity.
 
It is concluded that no .hazard is expected in using PTFE polymer in
 
high-pressure .oxygen gas systems provided the following maintain.
 
1. Unpigmented virgin Teflon is used wherever physical conditions
 
permit.
 
2. Temperatures are not permitted to rise above 4300 C (8060 F).
 
3,. Electric sparks or arcing at polymer sites cannot occur.
 
4. Halocarbon cleansing agents are removed completely.
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CATALYSIS AND CHEMICAL REACTIVITY
 
The possibilities of catalytic acceleration of chemical reactions
 
it the spacecraft pressurized containers have been reviewed. The fol­
lowing have been identified as reactions where significant catalytic
 
action may occur.
 
Reactive Degradation of PTFE
 
It has been pointed out previously in this report how the rsactivity

of PTFE varies markedly. Polytetrafluoroethylene component tarts, 
.s
 
received, vary in the amounts of fillers,'fibers, residual -pblyJmer'izatin
 
catalysts, dyes, decomposition products, contaminants, crystallinity, and
 
porosity (refs. C-7 and C-34). Teflon-impregnated fiberglass ma"be
 
catalysed and made more reactive because of the dispersent used in ap­
plying it (ref. C-35).
 
These variables can all act as catalysts and thus affect combustion
 
of PTFE. Metals that come in intimate contact as in valve seats may
 
also act as catalysts.
 
The effect is not limited simply to oxygen, because fluorocarbon
 
polymers (PTFE) can react with other fluids, such as 
impute nittogen
 
tetroxide, or with hydrogen, hydrazine, and its derivitives. The re­
action of a fluorocarbon lubricant with hydrazine in the presence'of

stainless steel is known ('ref. C-2), Systematic study of PTFE polymer
 
degradation in spacecraft service appears needful.
 
Decomposition of Hydrazine and Derivitives
 
This catalytic reaction is well known (refs. C-2, C-16, C-36,--and
 
C-37>. Many metals, (molybdenum being perhaps the most sensitive) and
 
certain nonmetals are mentioned. Catalysts tend to fall into two
 
categories: (1) those multivalent metals that influence oxidation­
reduction and (2) the acid-base catalysts that influence cracking and
 
rearrangement reactions. 
Both types seem effective for decomposition
 
oft hydrazine.
 
Heterogeneous catalysts are exceedingly sensitive to surface treat­
ments. The optimum treatment to desensitize metal surfaces towards
 
hydrazine is a mildly alkaline treatment (hydrazine itself in aqueoucs
 
solution) (ref. C-37).
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Reaction Between Fluids and Impurities
 
The oxidants, 02 and N can react with reductants,.such as organic
 
molecules. The reductants H 
and N2H 4 can react with oxidants, such as
 
02 and CO2,
 
Conclusions
 
Highest attention to standards of purity in the fluids and fluoro­
carbons is important. Attention to surface treatment of metals that
 
should leave them smooth and passive also is important.. Passivation,
 
is largely empirical at present. It would seem that rigorous applica­
tion of present knowledge to purification and surface preparation would
 
increase safety, and research into reaction mechanisms would be bene­
ficial and desirable for long-range improvements.
 
POLYMER INVOLVEMENT
 
Supercritical Hydrogen Tank
 
An examination was made of the materials used in construction of
 
the supercritical hydrogen tank. A list of' materials was obtained for
 
that purpose from North American Rockwell.* The complete list of materials
 
as per NR ME282-0047 Tank, H2 Cryogenic Storage Subsystem, is not repro­
duced here. 
However, materials that can, under certain circumstances, be
 
incompatible or combustible are listed in table C-XIV. 
The combustible
 
materials present in the assembly are listed and the material location in
 
the storage system is given. Most of the materials are polymeric in
 
nature, but there are a few, such as Drilube, that are not. It is em­
phasized that "combustible" as used here means materials that will react
 
exothermically (liberation of heat) with an oxidizer such as 
oxygen. They
 
are not materials that will necessarily react exothermically with hydrogen
 
to give flames or an explosion.
 
A material that will react with hydrogen to give an exothermic re­
action must function as an oxidizer. Materials that are capable of sup­
porting combustion by acting as the fuel are listed in the table. 
One
 
of the materials (PTFE) can act as the source of an oxidizer, fluorine (F2)
 
(ref. C-25), under certain circumstances. Polytetrafluoroethylene will
 
react oxidatively and in an exothermic manner with hydrogen (ref. C-26).

The product of the reaction is hydrofluoric acid, HF.
 
*Data from NE were obtained through the efforts of General Electric,
 
Houston.
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Supercritical Oxygen Tank 
An examination was made of materials 'used in construction of the
 
supercritical oxygen tank in the service'module electrical power system.
A list of materials was obtained for that purpose from North American

Rockwell.* The polymeric materials 
 found in the supercritical tank
 
assembly per ME282-0046 are listed in table C-XV.
 
Only polymer involvements are discussed in this section. 
The ma­jority of the polymeric parts used in the tank are PTFE. 
The PTFE
 
purity and composition varies over wide ranges. 
Bleached and clear,

clean virgin polymer is used in some parts,; and, although it will corn­
bust in oxygen, it has passed L02 impact sensitivity tests when free
 
of surface contamination such as fingerprints. Other parts made of
 
PTFE are filled and dyed and must be considered L02-impact sensitive,;
 
therefore, they are high risk items and should not be used.**
 
Minimal amounts of other organic materials possibly could be present,

such as flux residue remaining from motor wire hookup. If present, they

should be considered contaminants and not materials present. Rosin flux
 
reacts readily with oxygen and could be a possible ignition source.
 
In addition to polymers and organic materials inside the cryogenic

tank, there are several,materials between the cryogenic tank and the

outer-shell tank that are capable of combustion. For example, the 
Dexiglas-aluminum insulation is LO 
sensitive in the as-received con-,
 
2
ition. ~When loose particles are removed, it becomes relatively insen­
sitive (ref. C-38). Owens-Corning E glass with 3 percent 
4700 binder
 
also is used in the between-tank area. 
The binder is unsaturated,

uncured polyester resin, which is combustible in oxygen. Thus, rupture

of the inner tank will expose reactive polymers at ambient temperature
 
(approximately 700 F) to oxygen.
 
It should be pointed out that there are several inorganic materials

used inside the tank that 
can react with liquid oxygen. Drilube 822 is

used as a thread lubricant for the quantity gage, and excess material
 
is supposbd to be removed. The material is LO2 -impact sensitive and any 
unremoved excess could react. Aluminum is L02 compatible unless it is 
*Data from NR were obtained through the efforts of General Electric,
 
Houston.
 
**See the section entitled "Physical Chemistry Survey", in this
 
report.
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abraded and fresh, clean surfaces are exposed to L02. It is then
 
reactive. Tin-lead solder (60040) also is used; this particular type
 
of solder has failed Army Ballistics Missile Agency (ABMA) LO2 impact
 
sensitivity tests (ref. C-7).
 
Nitrogen Tetroxide Tank
 
An examination was made of materials used in the nitrogen tetroxide 
tanks. The oxidizer is used on the command module, service module, and 
lunar module. A list of materials for that purpose was obtained from. 
North American Rockwell.* The polymeric materials found in the nitrogen 
tetroxide tanks per ME 282-0O04 and ME282-0006 are listed in tables C-XVI 
and C-VII. A detailed list of materials for the lunar module tanks is 
not available at this time. All identified polymeric materials are
 
Teflon or Rulon-A in the lunar module tanks (ref. C-39).
 
Polytetrafluoroethylene is considered compatible with nitrogen
 
tetroxide. However, PTFE has a tendency to swell in liquid nitrogen
 
tetroxide (ref. C-17). The tendency is indicative of a physical absorp­
tion process, and the question arises whether long-term exposure to N2 04
 
will make.PTFE impact-sensitive to N20 For comparison purposes, Mylar
 
film becomes more sensitive to ABMA LO2 impact after immersion in LO2 for 
8 hours rather'than the usual short time used in the standard test. It
 
is not known at the present time whether the same is true of PTFE. 
When a comparison is made of the compatibility of materials with
 
N20 it is immediately evident that several factors control the effect
 
observed. For example, water exerts a significant effect on most mate­
rials. Aluminum is compatible for use in dry N204 (H20 content 0.2 to
 
1.0 percent); but, with larger percentages of water (3.2 percent), alu­
minum cannot be used. The excess water produces significant amounts of 
-IO and aluminum loses compatibility because of corrosion. 
Comparing PTFE in dry N2O4 in static and flowing condition, it is 
rated class I and is compatible under static conditions, but it is
 
downrated to class IV in flowing N204 (ref. c-16).
 
The type of nitrogen tetroxide used plays a decisive role in com­
patibility. Titanium is incompatible in "red" nitrogen tetroxide
 
*Data from NR were obtained through the efforts of General Electric,
 
Houston.
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(uninhibited) and cannot be used. 
However, it is rated compatible in

"green" nitrogen tetroxide (inhibited with nitric oxide, NO), which is
 
the type of N204 used on the spacecraft..
 
Conditions of test produce varying effects. For example, titan­
ium 6A1 4V is reported to be impact insensitive (ref. C-16) in N204, 
but it is reported (ref. C-18) to be very sensitive to vibration in
 
N204. Most data available on reactions in N204 are in the presence of
 
an impact energy source and do not take into consideration other energy 
sources that are capable of producing more harmful results.
 
Material compatibility in nitrogen tetroxide is dependent on diluents
 
and additives in N204 on the of energy inthe and means deposition the 
test material. 
Each material must be tested under conditions approaching
 
as closely as possible those conditions that will exist in use. 
Monomethylhydrazine and Aerozine-50
 
An examination was made of materials used in construction of the 
monomethylhydrazine and Aerozine-50 tanks. list of materialsA was ob­
tained for that purpose from North American Rockwell and Grumman Aerospace
Corporation. Data were obtained through the efforts of The Boeing Com­
pany and General Electric Company, Houston. 
Monomethylhydrazine.- The monomethyhydrazine tank contains only
tetrafluoroethylene polymer (Teflon, TFE) and fluoroethylene polymer
(Teflon, FEP). They are used as gaskets, bladders, spacers, bushings,

and pads. Teflon is the only nonmetallic material present, and it is 
compatible with monomethylhydrazine. It has been reported that Teflon
 
possibly shows some reactivity (decomposition), with MMH at 1600 F 
(ref. C-2).
 
There is no oxidizer present, and no electrical wiring is present.

The tank operates considerably below Teflon-MMHany possible decomposition 
temperature, and no problems are foreseen.
 
Aerozine-50.- The polymers present in the Aerozine-50 tank are Tef­
lon TFE and FEP, epoxy fiber glass, and epoxy polymer used at a Kovar 
glass seal. All are on the fuel-probe assembly. Teflon TFE is rated
 
compatible and satisfactory for repeated short time use to 1600 F. The 
FEP is not as stable, but can be used at approximately 600 F. However,
the epoxy resins generally are unsatisfactory above 600 F in Aerozine-50. 
A potential compatibility problem exists with the epoxy resin, and testing
is required to determine whether epoxy resin should be used in this
 
application.
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Fuel and Oxidizer Tanks - Service Propulsion System
 
An examination of the sump-tank fuel and oxidizer tanks showed no 
reactive polymers in use directly in the tanks. Both the fuel and ox­
idizer tanks use butyl and Teflon O-rings in connections. The nitrogen 
tetroxide is capable of oxidizing the butyl rubber, and the Aerozine-50
 
will dissolve the butyl rubber. In approximately 1 hour, some reaction
 
is evident. As a result, the butyl rubber must be classed as imcompatible
 
and should not be used in this application.
 
Environmental Control System Oxygen
 
Tank - 900 psi Pressure
 
The cabin repressurization assembly contains three polymeric and
 
organic materials. They are a butyl rubber O-ring, Teflon TFE retainer,
 
and Krytex 240 AC lubricating grease. The surge tank assembly uses a
 
butyl rubber 0-ring as a seal.
 
It is understood that the nonmetallics passed the AiResearch surge 
test, but organic materials should be avoided with both liquid and 
gaseous oxygen because of the possibilities of explosions. The use of
 
Teflon TFE as a retainer material appears to be acceptable, but the
 
butyl 0-iing appears questionable.
 
Gaseous Nitrogen Pressure Vessels
 
Gaseous nitrogen pressure vessels for docking ordnance and recovery
 
systems and for the electrical power system (fuel cell blanket and purge)
 
were examined. The only polymers used are butyl rubber in a bladder and
 
an adhesive in the nitrogen system of the electrical power system. Both 
are inert to nitrogen in the temperature and pressure ranges used. No 
incompatibilities were found. 
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TABLE C-I .- LIQUID HYDROGEN INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS
 
(CLASS IV) 
Metals Nonmetals 
Aluminum 40-E Natural rubber 
Magnesium Neoprene rubber 
Lead Cork 
Zinc Wood 
Iron Polyvinyl chloride 
High carbon steel Saran 
Polyvinyl alcohol 
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TABLE C-II.- LIQUID HYDROGEN
 
[Procured to specification MSFC-SPEC-356A]
 
Characteristics Requirement as delivered to 
spacecraft interface 
Purity, percent by volume, minimum . . . 99.995 
Gaseous impurities, ppm by volume, 
maximum ................. 
..... 50
 
Selected impurities, ppm by volume,
a 
maximum ........ ........ ...
 9.0
 
Nitrogen, ppm by volume, maximum . . . 2.0
 
Methane, ppm by volume, maximum 
 . . 2,0 
Specific impuritiesb....... ...... 
Oxygen and argon, ppm by volume, 
maximum ............... 
........ , 0 
Helium, ppm by volume, maximum , . . . . 39.0 
Carbon monoxide, ppm by volume, 
maximum. ..... ........ 
 ... 1.0
 
Carbon dioxide ..... ...................
 
aRestricted sample analysis.
 
bsample subjected to complete analysis.
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TABLE C-III.- OXYGEN CONTAMINANT CONCENTRATION EFFECTS 
Impurities, concentration, ppm 
Composition 
cH C=CH CH2=0 CH3=C 3 c4 N3 c °2 
Original 15 Trace 0 0 0 0.6 Trace 
composition 
After 25 refills 62 0.05 Trace Trace Trace 12 5 
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TABLE C-IV.- PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATI N FOR LIQUID OXYGEN 
[Specification MSFC-SPEC-356A] 
Requirement as delivered to 
Characteristic spacecraft interface - grade A 
for fuel cells 
Purity, percent by volume 99,995 
Total hydrocarbons, ppm as 
methane ......... ............ 14 
Methane, ppm ..... .10 
Ethane, ppm ..................... 2 
Propane and higher hydrocarbons, 
ppm as propane . ; ... . 1 
Alkyne hydrocarbons, ppm as 
acetylene .... ........... 0.05 
Moisture, ppm ..... ....... 3.0 
Nitrous oxide, ppm . . . . 1.0 
Halogenated hydrocarbons, ppm . . . 1.0 
Odor ....... ........... None
 
CO and CO2 total ppm ....... 1
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TABLE C-V.- CHARACTERISTICS OF HYDROCARBON IMPURITIES FOUND IN LIQUID OXYGEN
 
Impurity Melting
point, 
OF 
Boiling
point, 
OF 
Critical 
temperature, 
OF 
Critical pressure, 
psi 
Criticaldensity 
Methane 
-296 
-258 -116 673 0.162 
Ethane 
-278 
-127 90 709 .21 
Propane 
-306 
-44 2o6 617 
- -
%cetylene 
-115.6 
(10 psig) 
-118 
(sublimes) 
97 907 .231 
Halogenated hydrocarbons 
(methyl chloride) 
-144 -11 289 969 .37 
TABLE C-VI.- SPECIFICATION'FOR GASEOUS AND LIQUID NITROGEN
 
[Procured to specifleation MSFC-SPEC-356A]
 
Characteristic 	 Requirement as delivered
 
to spacecraft interface
 
Purity, percent by volume, minimum . . . 99.983
 
Total impurities, ppm by volume, 
maximum .. .. ......... .. .... 170 
Oxygen, ppm by volume, maximum .... 150 
Total hydrocarbon content (as methane),
 
ppm by total volume, maximuma . . . .	 5' 
Moisture content, ppm by volume, 
maximum ..... ............ .11.5 
a 
SpecificationMBFC-PROC-404 shall be used to test total hydro­
carbons, moisture, and particulate of gases as delivered to spacecraft.
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TABLE C-VII.- SPECIFICATION FOR MONOMETHYLHYDEAZINE
 
[Procured to specifi6ation MIL-P-27404]
 
Characteristic Requirement as deliveredto spacecraft interface 
MM assay, percent by veight, 
minimum ............ 98.0 
Density at 77' F (25' C), 
g/ml .................... 0.872 + 0.0o4 
Transmittancy ...... (a) 
Water plus soluble impurities, 
,ercent by weight, maximum . 2.0 
Total filtrable solids, mg/liter 
maximum ...... 1 
aEngineering evaluation only.
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TABLE .C-VII "NITROGEN TETROXIDEL "IMITED7'SERVICE
 
AND -INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS -LIST
 
Metals 
2b24 aluminum 
K-Monel 

Brass 
Bronze 

Silver 

Copper
 
Titanium 
Zinc
 
Cadmium 
Nickel 
Mild steels 

Polymeric and Organic Materials 
Incompatible
 
Micarta 
Mylar
 
Buna N 
Hypalon
 
Oxylube
 
Limited Servioce 
LS-53 fluorosilicone rubber
 
Polyethylene
 
Koraseal
 
Saran
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TABLE C-IX.- SPECIFICATION FOR NITROGEN TETROXIDE 
[ProCured to specification MIL-P-27404]
 
Requirement as delivered 
Characteritic to the spacecraft interface
 
Nitrogen tetroxide assay (N204) , percent
 
by weight, minimum ... .. .... .98.50
 
Nitric oxide (NO) assay, percent by
 
.
weight, minimum to maximuma . ... 6 
Water, equivalent, percent by weight,
 
maximum ..... ........... .. 0.20
 
Chloride as nitrosyl chloride (NOCl),
 
percent by weight maximum ... . 0.08
 
Density, lb/gal (g/cc) at 680 Fb . . . 12.08 (1.205)
 
Total filterable solids (TFS), mg/i
 
maximum ..................... .. 10
 
aNitric oxide content is controlled to 0.7 to 1.0 percent when
 
delivered to the GSE. Nitric oxide content can be increased by the
 
addition of MON-10. (MON -mixed oxides of nitrogen (N2 04 + NO)).
 
bDensity to be determined to a precision of +0.003 g/mc.
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TABLE C-X.- MATERIALS' FOR HYDRAZINE
 
Metals. 1Nonmetals, 
Allowable 
Stainless steel - 303, 304, 316, Teflon
 
321, 347 Polyethylene; high density
 
Kel-F, unplasticized
 
Nickel
 
Aluminum, 25 and 35 
Prohibited 
Hastelloys Lead 
Monel Copper 
Aluminum 40E Iron 
Magnesium Copper alloys 
Zinc S.S.. more than 
0.5 percent
 
molybdenum
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TABLE C-XI.- CONTAMINANTS FOUND IN HYDRAZINE
 
Impurity Concentration in UDMH,percent by weight Concentration in hydrazine,percent -byweight 
N2 0.o4 0.09 
NH3 .02 .15 
H20 .33 .68 
Dimethlylamine 
-- .03 
OH3 
H2C = N-N C 3.2 
CH7 
3 
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TABLE C-XII.- SPECIFICATION FOR PROPELLANT, 50 PERCENT HYDRAZINE/50 PERCENT
 
UNSYMETRICAL DIMETHYLHYDRAZINE
 
[Procurement to specification MIL-P-27402A]
 
Characteristics Requirement as delivered to
 
the spacecraft interface
 
Aerozine-50 N2 Hh, percet. ............................ . ± .
 
UDMX plus other amines, percent, minimum .. .... ... ... 47.0' 
'Water plus other soluble impurities, percent, maximum . . . . 1.8
 
N2H4-UDMH plus other amines, percent, minimum . ..... 98.2
 
Conductivity, mhos/cm at 40° F (minimum) ...... ...... ...... 	 10
 
w 	 Density, gm/nil-required precision . . ... .. ±0.003 
Transmittancy .......... ..... I......... .) 
TFS, mg/maximum......... ...... .. ..................... 10 
aMILP-27404 will be used for engineering evaluation only.
 
TABLE C-XIII.- SPECIFICATION FOR HELIUM
 
Characteristics Requirement as delivered to
 
spacecraft interface
 
Purity, percent by volume, minimum .. ........ 
....... 
.99.990 
Total impurities, ppm ............ 
...... .. . 94 
Hydrogen content, ppm by volume, maximum ... 1 
Nitrogen content, ppm by volume, maximum ... 50 
Other gases, ppm by volume, maximuma . . . . . . .... .19 
Oxygen and argon, ppm by volume, maximum .... ... .. .l.O.10 (oxygen only) 
Moisture content, ppm by volume, maximumb .. . 9 
.Total hydrocarbons, ppm by volume, maximum 5 (as methane) 
Should hydrogen, nitrogen, moisture, total of oxygen and argon, and total hydrocarbons be
 
at the maximum permissible values, then only 19 ppm of other gases could be permitted.

bSpecification MSFC-PROC-404 shall be used to test total hydrocarbons, moisture, and
 
particulate matter of gases as delivered to spacecraft. Normally, liquid helium is not filtered. 
C-XIV.- COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS IIN 
Part name Part number 
Insulation, H2 tank 13532-3523 
Insulation strap 13532-3512 
Insulation spider 13532-3567 
Washer-radiation shield 118708-1 
Insulation shield 13532-3539 

Washer, Teflon 13532-3520 

Adapter, Teflon 13532-3525 

Heater assembly fan motor 13532-2052 

'' 	 Heater assembly fan 13532-2052-17 
Heater assembly fan 13532-2052-47 
Teflon bar stock 398386 
Plug inner tube 	 398387 

Sleeve insulation - 398184 
bottom 
Tubing, Teflon 	 398157 

Spacer, sleeve 398173 
Spacer 398172 
od, Teflon 398155 

Rod, Teflon 398161 

od, Teflon 398192
 
SERVICE MODULE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM CRYOGENIC 
(NR part ME282-0047] 
Material 
0.0005 gold-coated Kapton-type "H film" 
Type E glass fiber and type 700 binder 
0.0005 gold-coated Kapton-type "H film" 
DuPont "Vespel" SP-i polyimide resin 
Type E glass fiber and type 700 binder 

Teflon rod Mil-P-19h68 

Teflon rod Mil-P-19468 

Drilube 

Teflon rod 

Teflon TFE, AWG 14 

25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

HYDROGEN-TANK ASSEMBLY 
Location Combustible 
Between tanks Yes 
Between tanks Yes 
Between tanks Yes 
Between tanks Yes 
Between tanks Yes 
Between tanks Yes 
In tank Yes 
In tank Yes 
In tank Yes 
In tank Yes 
Simonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Simmonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Simmonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Simmonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Simmonds prob Yes 
in tank 
Simmonds probe Yes 
in tank 
TABLE C-XIV.- COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS IN SERVICE MODULE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN-TANK ASSEMBLY - Continued 
Part name 
Grommet 

Solder flux 
Sleeve 

Flux, rosin 

Electrical plug 

Seal, Vacco filler 

Wiring harness tubing 

Wiring harness wire 
insulation 
Wiring harness plug 
Wiring harness boot 
Wiring harness boot 
Wiring harness potting 
compound 
Probe and heater 
installation 
Part number 
398218-G01 

-002 
398263 

398283 
398288 

13532-h509 

13532-45o4-5 

23532-2709 

13532-1709 

13532-2709 

13532-2709 

13532-2709 

13532-2709 

13532-2801 

[NR part ME282-oo47] 
Materials 
25 percent glass-fiber-filled TFE Teflon 

Core 66 flux 44 

ASTM saze-D thin-wall extruded TFE 
Teflon 

Rosin-base Type-A, Mf1--l4256 

Teflon 

Teflon TFE Type E AWTG l4 heat-

shrinkable tubing 
Teflon-coated wire 

PTSO6A-19-915 (Bendix Corp.) 

Potting boot for receptacle - nylon 

Apiezon M 

RTV 108 silicone polymer 

Drilube, MMS-N306A, type 822 
Location Combustible 
Sinmonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Sammonds probe Yes 
an tank 
Simonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Simmonds probe Yes 
in tank 
Outside tank 
In line (out- Yes 
side tank) 
In tank Yes 
In tank Yes 
Outside tank -
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
In tank Yes 
TABLE C-XIV.- COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS IN SERVICE MODULE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
[NR part M5282-OO7] 
CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN-TANK ASSEMBLY - Concluded 
Part name 
Miscellaneous materials 
Miscellaneous materials 
Tie, self-locking 
Part number Material 
Stycast, 2850 ft 
Lacquer, red-MIL-L-7178 509 
MS17821-4-9 
Location Combustible 
Yes 
Yes 
..]
.4 
TABLE C-XV.- POLYMERIC MATERIALS IN SERVICE MODULE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN-TANK ASSEMBLY
 
[NR part ME282-0046] 
Part name 

Solder flux 

Solder flux 

Solder flux 

Lubricant 

Insulation 

Co 

Insulation 

Upper insulation 

Electrical tubing 

Electrical tubing 

Electrical tubing 

Lacquer 

Magnet wire 

Material 

Flux fed 0-0-499 

Flux Mil-F-14256 

(Alcoa)AMS-3412
 
Liquinite FEP Teflon, powdered 

dispersion
 
Teflon - Rulon "A" 

Teflon-impregnated glass cloth ­
"Armalon"2 

Teflon TPE, 25 percent glass filled 

Virgin Teflon - MIL-P-19462 

Teflon, heat shrinkable, AWG 14 

Teflon, heat shrinkable, clean, 

white AWG 9 

Teflon, heat shrinkable, red 

Duco 9P-16 

Teflon overcoated (copper on ceramic) 

Location 

In Lo2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO tank 

2-

In LO2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO2 tank 

In LO tank 

Remarks
 
Combustible
 
Combustible
 
Combustible
 
Combustible
 
Bleached - passed

Unbleached - failed 
Will decompose 
Combustible 
Combustible 
Bleached - probably safe, 
but test
 
Filled or colored Teflon is
 
generally LO2 sensitive,
 
Combustible
 
Combustible
 
TABLE C-XV.- POLYMERIC MATERIALS IN SERVICE MODULE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN-TANK ASSEMBLY - Concluded 
[iNE part ME282-0046] 
Part name Material Location Remarks 
Conductor wire Teflon-coated silver-plated copper AWG 20 In L0 tank 
2 
Insulation is color 
coded - sensitive 
Conductor wire Teflon coated: AWG 20, 22, 2h, 26 In LO2 tank Combustible 
Conductor wire Teflon coated MIL-W-168T8: black, 
orange, green, yellow, red, white, 
blue 
In LO tank 
2 
Colored Teflon ­
generally L02 sensitive 
Tank insulation 
Tank insulation 
Aluminiied Mylar 
Owens Corning E glass with 
M 700 binder (3 percent of 700 binder 
is uncured polyester resin) 
Between 
tanks 
Between 
tanks 
Mylar - Combustible and 
LO2 sensitive 
Resin - combustible 
Insulation - LO sensitive 
2 
C 
TABLE C-XVI.- POLYMERIC MATERIALS IN COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES NITROGEN TETROXIDE TANKS
 
[NR parts ME 282-0004 and -0006] 
Part name 

Vent line 

Eyelet 

Retaining gasket 

Pad 

Bladder 

Pad 

Gasket 

Spacer 

Bushing 

Gasket 

Gasket 

Part number 

8271-471127 

8271-471131 

8271-4711i0 

8271-471132 

8271-471148 

8271-471246 

8271-471225 

8271-471236 

8271-471213 

462-4 

8271-471045 

Materials 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE/FEP 
Teflon, TFE/FEP 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Teflon, TFE 
Location 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

In tank 

Remarks
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
TABLE C-XVII.- POLYMERIC MATERIALS IN SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM NITROGEN TETROXIDE PROBE
 
Part name 

Ring support 

Washer 

Bushing, split 

Spacer, Ed. shield 

Spacer, collar 

Ring mount 

Insulated collar 

Half collar 

Scuff cap 

Lock pin 

Part number Material 	 Location 

386548 Teflon TFE MIL P-2296 Oxidizer probe 

389679 Teflon, TFE - type 2 class "G" Oxidizer probe 

389650 Teflon, TFE - type 2 class "G" Oxidizer probe 

389683 Teflon, TFE - type 2 class "G" Oxidizer probe 

389682 Teflon, TFE 
389695, Teflon, PEP 
389696 
389682 Teflon, PEP 
389681 Teflon, FEP 
386432 Teflon, TFE 
386941 Teflon, TEE 
- type 2 class "G" 	Oxidizer probe 

Pt. sensor assembly 

Oxidizer probe 

Oxidizer probe 

Oxidizer probe 

Oxidizer probe 

Remarks
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
Combustible; heat source 
required; will swell 
Combustible; heat source
 
required; will swell
 
SECTION D - THERMODYNAMICS RESTRICTIONS ON 
ENERGY PROCESSES IN THE
 
APOLLO 13 CRYOGENIC OXYGEN TANK NUMBER '2 
INTRODUCTION
 
The purpose of this -report is to specify limitations on energy
 
processes which may have occurred in the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen tank 
number 2 prior to the incident of apparent tank'failure. Limitations 
are established on the basis of thermodynamics and the recorded pressure
 
history. Ultimate and reasonable limitations have beefn established for
 
the energy added to the oxygen. The primary conclusion of this analysis
 
is that the electrical energy supplied to the 'tank, in the significant
 
time period, is insufficient to explain the observed pressure rise;
 
therefore, a chemical reaction must have occurred within the tank. 
Al­
though the analyses provide guidance for the assessment of propigation
 
paths for potential reactions, verification of a particular path requires
 
experimental data at simulated conditions for each significant event in
 
the assumed propagation.
 
DATA AND ASSU'PTIONS 
The pressure and temperature data 'during the time of interest are 
shown in figures A-1 and A-2. The mass of oxygen in the tank was taken 
to be 242 pounds at time t. Additional assumptions are (1) the mass 
loss 'from-the tank is that caused by a nominal usage ,of1.8 lb /hr;, ­
(2) the mass lost is at bulk-cryogenic-fluid conditions; '(3) the'pres­
sure from flight data corresponds to the actual tank pressure; (4,) the
 
bulk temperature at the time t was 2700 R; (5) the oxygen was uniform
 
. 0
 
and homogeneous at time t0 . The work done on the tank by the,fluid is
 0*
 
included, along with a nominal heat leakage. Energy which 'is potbntially
 
lost to heating up the'structure or components is not -included. Thermo­
dynamic properties of supercritical oxygen were obtained from Stewart
 
(ref. D-l) and checked with the independent results of Weber (ref. D-2).
 
83 
pRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILM ED 
THERMODYNAMIC MODELS
 
Two models are proposed to represent the absolute minimum and maxi­
mum energy requirements for the pressure rise The maximum limit is
 
established by assuming that the energy added is distributed uniformly 
throughout a homogeneous (constant density) fluid. The minimum is ob­
tained by assuming an isentropic compression of the bulk fluid by a 
negligible mass of infinitely hot fluid. The cumulative energy addition 
for these two limits are shown in figure D-3. The bulk-fluid tempera­
tures calculated for these two limits are shown compared to the tempera­
ture data in figure D-2. It is noted that the temperature datum is a 
point measurement and generally is not equal to the bulk-fluid tempera­
ture. The.energies that all required to reach a pressure of 1008 psi
 
(time t 5 ) are (1) isentropically, 10.2 Btu, and.(2) uniform heating, 
139 Btu. These include approximately -1 Btu for nominal heat leakage,
 
1.5 Btu for work on the tank, and 3 Btu lost because of nominal usage. 
The accuracy of the isentropic case is 'very sensitive to the initial 
condition. If the temperature at t is taken to be 270' +50 R
0 -150
 
the rbsulting cumulative energy additibn for the lower limit is+8;7'

10.2 -4.6 Btu. Also, this small energy change associated with the lower 
limit case is within the accuracy of our knowledge of the thermodynamic 
properties of oxygen at these conditions.
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ENERGY
 
Although the limitations established for energy addition are only 
a fraction-of the total fluid energy, the upper and'lower limits are an 
order of magnitude apazt. However, because supereritical oxygen has a 
very low thermal conductivity and because-the tank is in a zero-gravity 
state, it is possible to establish much more restrictive limitations 
for the energy addition caused by a chemical reaction. Basically, the 
uniform heating limit is inconsistent with the lack of free convection 
which would be present in a gravitational.field, and the isentropic 
limit is inconsistent with the source of energy being a chemical 
reaction.
 
At any given time the thermodynamic state of the fluid is con­
strained by the pressure, tank volume, mass in the tank and the minimum 
possible entropy. If the fluid is completely mixed, the entropy is 
highest, but the average fluid temperature is too low to support a pos­
sible chemical reaction. Consider the total fluid mass MT to be di­
vided into two parts. Fluid 1 (mass M1) contains the source of energy
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addition, all irreversible effects and the highest entropy. Fluid 2 is
 
at the lowest possible entropy corisistent'with an iseAtropic compression
 
from the state at time tO . Fluid 2 is representative of'the bulk of,
 
the fluid, whereas fluid 1 is-a hot bubble which is defined by an imag­
inary adiabatic surface. This adiabatic- surface could assume any. geom­
etry and is not constrained to be -like any physically observable, surface. 
At a given time the energy in the fluid is uniquely constrained by 
the distribution of mass b'etween these two fluids. The net energy added 
to'the total fluid as a function of the mass ratio'of hot fluid 1 to the 
total fluid mass is shown in figure D-3. The ratio of energy added to 
the maximum energy addition limit as a function of the same 'mass ! 6tio 
is shown in figure D-4. Also shown in figure D-h i's the relative ihas' 
of orgen consumed for a complete combustioh of Teflon. For mass ratios 
-4 
of greater than 10 the mass of oxygen in fluid 1 always is more than 
an order of magnitude'greater than the mass of oxygen consumed in this 
reaction.- Therefore, itis concluded that the approximation that the 
hot fluid 1 has the thermodynamic characteristics of oxygen is reason­
4
 
able for mass ratios of greater than 10
-

The energy distributions in a two-fluid model were considered at 
times t2 and t . The volume of fluid V1 relative to the total vol­
ume VT of 4.735 ft and the average temperature of fluid 1 are shown 
as a,function of mass ratio in figures D-5 and a-6, respectively . The
 
most significant point in these results ,is that-the~temperature pf
 
fluid 1 is very sensitive to the mass ratio. The average temperature
 
of fluid 1 for times t2 and t5 as a function of the net energy added
 
to the oxygen-is shown in figure D-7. If it is assumed that the energy 
source is oxidizing Teflon, there are two restrictions which can be put 
on thepeak temperature of fluid 1. The lower limit is thatTeflqn .-­
first must depolymerize-before reacting-with oxygen, and-this does not, 
occur appreciably below a Teflon temperature of'5000-C (13910 R). The, 
upper limit on temperature results from equilibrium calculations of C F 
2 4 
in an adiabatic closed system with a starting mol ratio, 02/C2F4 , of 1.0.
 
This gives, a maximum peak temperature of 48340 R. Because this tempera­
ture decreases with increasing 02 /C2F4 ratio, and because this r'atio.in
 
fluid I certainly is greater than 1.0, this is the maximum flame tempera­
ture to be expected. To relate these peak-temperatures to the average 
temperature of fluid 1, generally it is necessary to consider a.particu­
lar geometry of: fluid 1, To avoid this-restriction, it was assumed.-that 
the temperature profile of fluid 1 .was symmetric about the average tem­
perature and between the peak and fluid 2 temperatures. Thus, the two 
limits for fluid 1 average temperature are 8300 R and 25500-R. These' 
8
 
two limitations imposed by a Teflon source restrict the energy input to
 
a fairly narrow region as shown in figure D-8. Although these limits 
are established on the basis-of Teflon ,combustion, they represent a­
factor of 3 in fluid 1 average temperature; therefore, the energy input
 
is'not very sensitive to a particular reaction selection. It'is noted
 
that the-temperature measui'ement shown in figur! D-2 would indicate that
 
fluid 1 came in contact with the temperature sensor at time
 
There are several factors which can provide potential sources of
 
error in, the specification of energy addition limitations. These are
 
potential errors in the pressure data, the initial-conditions, the
 
thermodynamic properties of oxygen, the calculated characteristics of
 
fluid 2 and in the assumed temperature profile of fluid 1. There is a 
distinct possibility of at least one fan motor running in the time 
interval between t and t (ref. D-3). Considering all of these po­0. 1­
tential sources of error, it is estimated that the energy addition limi­
+6
 
tations shown in figure D-8 should have an error band of +6 Btu for all

-0
 
times shown. Also as noted previously, energy potentially lost to beat­
ing the structure has not been included. 
MASS LOSS EFFECTS
 
The ene'rgy addition rates associated with the two thermodynamically
 
limiting lrocesses and'the two energy distribution limits ate shown in
 
figure D-9. At the times t2 and- t there are rapid drops in the
 
rate of energy addition. The calculations to this point have neglected
 
mass loss above the level -of a nominal usage rate; however, a rapid
 
change in-energy addition could be explained by a mass loss. If the 
energy addition rates are extrapolated as shown in figure D-9, the maxi­
mum resulting mass-loss-rate requirement can be obtained from an energy
 
balance. The maximum mass loss rates for times t and t are shown
 
2 5 . 
'in figures D-10 and D-11 for the two limiting thermodynamic processes. 
It is noted for the isentropic energy addition case that the required 
.flow ,rates are significantly less than the calculated capability of the 
vent valve, whereas, for the constant density case, the required flow 
rates are comparable to the calculated capability of the vent valve.
 
In addition, if the gas flowing out of the tank is at a'bigher tempera­
ture than the bulk fluid, the mass-loss rates required to cause the
 
pressure transients at these times would be reduced because of the highler
 
energy content of this hot venting gas. This would require combustion
 
oecurring in the vicinity of the tank exit at time t There is no
 
known reason for the vent valve to open at time t2.
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CONCLUSIONS
 
Thermodynamic limitations on the net energy added to.the cryogenic 
oxygen in the Apollo 13 number 2 tank have been established under the 
constraints of the measured pressures and temperatures, and tank volume, 
and the oxygen mass. The calculations include nominal mass usage, nomi­
al heat leak, and the work the fluid performs on the tank. These&limits
 
are above the available electrical energy and are below the potential
 
energy released by a combustion of all the available Teflon in the tank.
 
Consideration of possible distributions of energy within the tank and
 
the combustion characteristics of Teflon has led to an extremely narrow
 
limitation on the net energy added to the oxygen. Including an estimate
 
of potential error, the energy required to raise the oxygen pressure to
 
a peak of 1008 psi was between 23.5 and 38.5 Btu. This does-not include
 
energy which may have-been lost to.heating the structure of components
 
in the tank. The pressure drop after peak pressure is consistent with
 
opening of the vent valve for the narrow limitations on energy addition.
 
GENERAL POINTS AS RESULT OF THEEMODYNAMIC STUDIES
 
In the initial organization .of this investigation it was decided 
that a completely independent evaluation of thermodynamic aspects of 
reactions in the Apollo high-pressure fluid systems would be of consid­
erable,value. Arthur D. Little, Inc., was provided with only basic 
guidelines and general infornation on the Apollo high-pressure fluid 
systems for this independent assessment. The results of these investi­
gations are given in Appendixes D to G. 
In general, high-pressure and zero-gravity effects were found to be 
of greater importance than the particular thermodynamic state of the
 
fluid. Although all of the high-pressure -fluid systems were investi­
gated, considerably more experience and information were found for
 
high-pressure oxygen. Basically, pure pxygen and a container are incom­
patible, and, in the opinion of Arthur D. Little, Inc., the hazards of 
pure oxygen traditionally have been underestimated by designers, There 
is a rather extensive history of' unanticipated reactions in pure oxygen 
systems which fall generally in the category of thermal initiation 
(although there is dome history of pressure surge initiations). Addi­
tional significant findings are as follows.
 
1. Generally, isothermal fluids do not have mechanisms for spon­
tanous redistribution of energy into catastrophic modes; however, 
 non­
isothermal fluids are potentially much more dangerous. 
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2. Spacecraft accelerations do not pose a significant hazard to
 
the high-pressure fluid systems.
 
3.- The ignition temperature of potential reactions generally
 
varies as the inverse of the pressure squared.
 
4. The combination of aluminum and Teflon in oxygen is extremely 
hazardous. 
5. Teflon is incompatible with pure hydrogen. 
6. Stable performance of the cryogenic oxygen systems requires
 
mixing of the fluid.
 
7. It is conceptually possible to measure density by the use of 
a suspended sphere in the fluid. The effective mass of the sphere for 
the natural frequency of oscillation includes a virtual-mass term which 
is related uniquely to the displaced fluid density. 
8. Cryogenic fluids can be mixed by the use of a suspended dia­
phragm driven by an isolated solenoid.
 
9. In the handling and storage of liquid oxygen, it is recommended 
that storage tanks be warmed periodically to eliminate contaminants, and 
that liquid be withdrawn from storage through a molecular sieve filler 
prior to filling spacecraft. 
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SECTION E - SUMMARY
 
SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
 
Descriptive data for all tanks on the Apollo command module, ser­
vice module, and lunar module have been collected, collated, and tabu­
lated. A listing was made of tank numbers, locations, and dimensions. 
Construction materials, design pressures, normal operating pressures, 
actual operating pressures, temperatures, and fluid flow rates have been 
tabulated for all tanks in the spacecraft. 
The oxygen tanks, hydrogen tanks, and hypergolic-propellant tanks 
have been examined in detail for contaminants and incompatibilities that 
could be potentially dangerous. Mechanisms for failure by contaminants, 
incompatible materials, and physical processes have been postulated for 
the supercritical hydrogen tank, supercritical oxygen tank, propellant 
tanks, and oxygen ground service equipment. The mechanisms considered 
are (1) brittle fracture failure (below material yield strength) caused 
by preexisting flaw (mode-fragmentation or leakage) and (2) tank rupture 
at material ultimate strength caused by pressure increase where the mode 
is fragmentation resulting from combustion of polymeric and metallic 
materials interior to the tank, from combustion of fluid impurities 
after segregation and concentration, and from catalytic decomposition
 
of tank contents.
 
M4ETALLURGY SURVEY
 
Metallurgical assessment involved consideration of inherent metal­
lurgical characteristics of the various tank materials with respect to
 
metal combustion, stress corrosion, and fracture-mechanics evaluation
 
of tank integrity. Assuming the fabrication and use specifications of
 
the tanks are not violated, and provided approved fluids and procedures
 
associated with the tank usages are maintained, unexpected combustion
 
of metals from impact or abrasion appears remote, and stress corrosion
 
appears unlikely. The only instance of metallurgical incompatibility
 
noted is in the hydrogen tanks where tin-lead solders and brass (con­
taining zinc) and iron in the fan assemblies are of doubtful service
 
in liquid hydrogen. These metal systems require further investigation,
 
because it is known that lead and zinc are incompatible with liquid
 
hydrogen, but no known data exist which can resolve the questions of
 
the solder, brass, or iron compatibilities.
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PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY SURVEY
 
Descriptive data on the high-pressure systems and the information 
obvious from the Apollo 13 accident required a physical chemistry survey

of the tank systems. This survey resulted in information that is sum­
marized as follows.
 
Polytet rafluoroethylene Reactivity
 
Safe usuage of polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) involves prevention
 
of high-temperature environments (greater than 5000 C (9320 F) for un­
filled virgin polymers and 4300 C (8060 F) for filled polymers) occurring 
within the polymer structure. Polytetrafluoroethylene is a thermody­
namically reactive material and can react rapidly and destructively with 
a variety of materials dependent on only a few triggering mechanisms. 
Knowledge of the triggering mechanisms is imperative. Prevention of
 
excessive heating on external PTFE surfaces and elimination of mecha­
nisms for sparking, arcing, and high-pressure-induced shocking is man­
datory for the safe use of PTFE in high-pressure systems.
 
Electrostatic Effects in High-Pressure Fluid Systems
 
To avoid chemical reactions caused by surface charging inside high­
pressure tanks and plumbing, impurities (e.g., water as ice crystals) 
and high flow rates must be excluded from oxygen systems where potential 
combustibles such as PTFE exist. Only an experimental program can es­
tablish the magnitude of the limits of impurities and flow rates in 
critical systems well below those which, by experience, have not been 
sufficient to cause difficulties. 
Polytetrafluoroethylene Degradation
 
Polytetrafluoroethylene is degraded for electrical and chemical
 
service when the polymer contains inorganic chemical fillers, fibers,
 
and coloring agents to the extent that its resistance to thermal effects 
may drop as much as 3000 C (from 7330 C to 4300 C, 13510 F to 8060 F). 
Treatment of PTFE parts with halocarbons will degrade the polymer for 
nitrogen tetroxide (N204) service. No hazards are expected in using 
PTFE components in high-pressure oxygen or N 0 service provided the 
following conditions are maintained. 2 4 
1. Unpigmented virgin polymer is used where physical conditions
 
permit. 
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2. Temperatures are not permitted above 4300 C (8060 F).
 
3. Electric sparks and arcing at polymer sites cannot occur.
 
4. Halocarbon cleansing agents are removed completely.
 
Catalytic Effects
 
Catalytic acceleration of chemical reactions in the spacecraft
pressurized containers has been reviewed, and the following areas have
 
been identified as regions wherein significant catalytic action may occur.
 
Reactive degradation of fluorocarbons.- It has been noted that the 
reactivity of PTFE varies significantly, dependent on the fillers, color­
ing dyes, and contaminants that are contained in the structure. Such 
fillers and dyes may act catalytically to induce decomposition of the 
polymer. This is the case with metals which may come in intimate con­
tact with PTFE and with particulate contaminants which can impinge the 
surface of the polymer. For spacecraft systems, the use of halocarbons 
for cleaning high-pressure PTFE parts for N204 service should be avoided
 
because of catalytically induced reactivity.
 
Reaction between fluids and impurities.- Strict attention to stand­
ards of purity in the fluids and in the fluorocarbons is important to
 
avoid unexpected catalytic effects. Rigorous application of present
 
knowledge to purification and surface preparation would increase safety,

while research into reaction mechanisms would be desirable for long
 
range improvements.
 
Catalytic effects of impurities on crack propagation.- Liquid
 
oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen have very low dielectric constants. They 
are not electrolytes and the effect of dissolved impurities is expected 
to be additive. The results of a recent NASA-sponsored research program 
point out that Ti-5A1-2.5Sn is affected adversely at ambient tempera­
tures by the hydrogen environment. Although, obviously, the risk has 
been considered before the selection of this particular alloy for the
 
hydrogen tanks, this alloy and its surface treatment should be reviewed. 
The hypergolics are electrolytes, and impurities in this case must be 
expected to act as powerful catalysts. Some research on impurity effects 
on the corrosivity of N204 was done and was incorporated in the speci­
fications. The influence of impurities on corrosivity and crack
 
propagation in the case of monomethyl hydrazine and Aerozine-50
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apparently has not yet been investigated. However, each flight batch
 
is tested with surface-flawed specimens to indicate no metalic-fluid
 
incompatibilities.
 
Electron Microscope as an Engineering Tool
 
The extent of polymer degradation upon exposure to high-pressure­
shock treatment, oxidation, catalytic influence, and hydrogenation can
 
be followed by the use of electron microscopic techniques. Degradation
 
induced by fillers, coloring agents, and aging can be delineated by
 
correlating size and numbers of voids in PTFE structure with known
 
histories of specimens of virgin composition.
 
Thermodynamic Restrictions on Energy Processes
 
in Apollo 13 Oxygen Tanks 
The thermodynamic limitations on the net energy added to the oxygen 
in the Apollo 13 number 2 tank are shown in figure D-8. The limits have 
been established under the constraints of the measured pressures and
 
temperatures, the tank volume, and the oxygen mass. The calculations 
include nominal mass usage, nominal heat leak, and the work which the 
fluid performs on the tank. The ultimate limits of uniform heating and 
an isentropic process have been reported previously. The isentropic
 
limit has been lowered because of increased accuracy obtained in the 
calculation procedures. However, this lower limit is within the accu­
racy of knowledge of the thermodynamic properties of supercritical 
oxygen. Because of the extremely low thermal conductivity of super­
critical oxygen and the zero-gravity state, it is reasonable to describe
 
the distribution of energy within the oxygen by a two-fluid model. The
 
two-fluid model establishes very sensitive temperature distributions,
 
which, in turn, allow a very close specification of the energy added to
 
the oxygen. Because the ultimate limitations are well within the energy
 
available from the PTFE combustion, the characteristics of PTFE burning
 
have been used to establish peak-temperature limitations, and (therefore)
 
energy addition. The lower limit is obtained by assuming that the peak
 
temperature in the reaction zone is equal to the theoretical limiting
 
flame temperature for a stoichiometric reaction. The upper limit is 
established by the constraint that the peak temperature had to be high 
enough to allow the PTFE to undergo depolymerization. This is only a 
limit to the energy added to the oxygen and does not include energy which 
may have gone into heating structural components of the tank. Details of 
this analysis are presented in the final report.
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SECTION F - FINDINGS
 
As long as the accepted standards for fluid purity, high-pressure­
container and related plumbing specifications, and qualification and 
acceptance testing are maintained rigidly for the Apollo spacecraft sys­
tems, a delicate balance of conditions exists which can assure flight 
worthiness of the structures and systems. The Apollo 4 to 12 flights 
indicate this overall condition.
 
However, as a result of this investigation, there have come to light
 
some findings relative to reaction processes in the high-pressure systems
 
which appear significant to increased safety of manned space flight.
 
These findings are tabulated as follows.
 
1. Particulate contaminants in the fluid system (ice crystals from
 
moisture contamination) are hazardous because they can induce catalytic
 
effects and shock fatigue in polymers exposed in high-pressure systems.
 
2. Analysis of liquid aliquots from liquids yields a more accurate
 
result than analysis of gaseous aliquots from liquids or gaseous aliquots
 
from gases taken from above a liquid.
 
3. Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) polymers are combustible in high­
pressure oxygen systems, and the reaction process is dependent upon a
 
triggering mechanism which can be an electrical wiring anomaly, a static­
charge buildup, or shock impact at high flow rates.
 
4. Polytetrafluoroethylene polymers may be a fuel for reactions
 
with high-pressure hydrogen by a process of hydrogenation, and this re­
action would be dependent on a triggering mechanism (electrical or high­
presbure shock treatment).
 
5. Polytetrafluoroethylene polymers are found to be degraded 
substantially in their chemical, electrical, and thermal resistance prop­
erties when the polymer is filled or is color coded. 
6. Polytetrafluoroethylene polymers which are filled should not be
 
subjected to a thermal environment exceeding 4300 C (8060 F).
 
7. Halocarbon fluids are found to degrade PTFE polymers for chemi­
cal and shock impact resistance, and for nitrogen tetroxide (N204) serv­
ice.
 
8. Electron microscopy studies of virgin PTFE polymer and filled
 
PTFE polymer components are a plausible tool for delineating high-pressure­
induced incipient-failure modes for spacecraft parts.
 
105 
9. High purity levels for hydrogen are important for spacecraft service.
 
Howzever, a certain low level of impurities (e.g., 100 ppm oxygen) in hydrogen is
 
necessary to prevent crack growth in titanium tanks for hydrogen service.
 
10. Tin-lead solder is found to be incompatible for liquid-oxygen service
 
under impact conditions.
 
11. Hydrazine in aqueous solution is found to desensitize metal surfaces
 
used in hydrazine service.
 
12. Electrical discharge through PTFE polymer will induce high-energy
 
reactivity of the polymer in supercritical oxygen and reactivity occurs at liquid
 
nitrogen temperature.
 
13. The influence of impurities in monomethyl hydrazine and Aerozine-50
 
on corrosivity and crack propagation in titanium alloys is found to be unknown, but
 
no adverse effects from these impurities in spacecraft tanks have been experienced
 
and each batch of fluids is tested prior to flight for compatibility.
 
14. Thermodynamic limitations on net energy-additions to supercritical
 
fluids are found to be very small.
 
15. Polytetrafluoroethylene is found to have a tendency to swell in N204;
 
possible effects of this property have not been assessed.
 
16. Isothermal high pressure fluids cannot redistribute energy catastrophic­
ally; non-isothermal fluids may do so.
 
17. Stable performance of cryogenic supercritical oxygen systems requires
 
stirring of some nature.
 
18. Ignition temperatures of potential reactions vary as the inverse of
 
the pressure squared.
 
19. Spacecraft accelerations pose no hazards to high pressure systems.
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COMMAMD AND SERVICE MODULE FLUIDS ON'SPACECRAFT 109 
APPENDIX A
 
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE FLUIDS ON SPACECRAFT 109 
The matrix presented in table A-I is the sample analysis data on 
fluids used on Spacecraft (SC) 109. The data were compiled from SC 
records, analysis reports, and reviews of ground support equipment (GSE) 
records by cognizant GSE engineering personnel. 
The waiver written on the electrical power system (EPS) hydrogen
 
was the result of the selected impurities analysis. The specification
 
calls for a maximum not to exceed 9.0 ppm by volume. The analysis as
 
made was
 
Nitrogen < 2 ppm
 
Methane < 1 ppm 
Water = 6.5 ppm 
Total = 9.5 ppm 
The total selected impurities expressed to two significant numbers 
exceeded the allowable amount, but the combined nitrogen-methane analy­
sis was known to be less than 3 ppm. Under the circumstances it was 
reasonable to accept the analysis and write a waiver on the material.
 
The same analysis and procedure was used for both liquid and gaseous 
hydrogen because the same source is used for both. 
This circumstance points out a weakness in the quality control (QC)
 
of cryogenic liquids. At the present time, the analysis of a cryogenic
 
liquid is not a liquid analysis. The sample for analysis is obtained
 
in the liquid form according to the applicable NASA specification. How­
ever, the actual analysis is made on gases taken from above the analyti­
cal sample. As a result, each analysis reported is on a material that
 
has had one additional purification step.
 
The additional purification step is the distillation of the liquid 
analytical sample to the gaseous state which is actually sampled. The 
process will always yield a purer sample for two reasons. First, frac­
tional distillation yields a purer gas phase because high boiling im­
purities are concentrated in the remaining liquid. Second, nonvolatile 
impurities remain in the liquid phase and do not enter the gas phase. 
Thus the analysis will show fewer impurities, and an impure liquid could 
apparently meet specification requirements. 
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TABLE A-I.- SAMPLE ANALYSIS DATA
 
Fluid Specification Filter size, Sample Sample Remarks/waiver no.
 
F i ji 	microns type Resultsj 
Electrical Power System 
H2 YiSFC-SPEC-356A 15 Chemical Failed Samples 60-6162 and 
60-6163/Waiver 109­
PO-Oa4 
GH2 MSFC-SPEC-356A 10 Particle and Failed Same as above 
Chemical 
02 MSFC-SPEC-399A 15 Chemical Passed 
Environmental Control System 
02 MSFC-SPEC-399Aj 25 Chemical Passed 
Reaction Control System
 
MMa :IL-P-27404 15 Chemical Passed
 
N204 MSC-PPD-2B 15 Chemical Passed
 
Service Propulsion System
 
N204 MSC-PPD-2B 15 Chemical PassedParticle 
N2 MSFC-SPEC-234A 15 Chemical Passed
 
Aerooine-50 MIL-P-274O2A 15 Chemical Passed
 
a,. = monomethylhydrazine.
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CONTAMINANTS DETECTED AND IDENTIFIED IN
 
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
 
APPENDIX B 
CONTAMINANTS DETECTED AM IDENTIFIED IN 
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
In each documented case of contamination found in plumbing equip­
ment leading to the command and service module (CSM), there have been
 
one or more materials present that were capable of causing pressure
 
buildup as a result of instability in liquid oxygen (LO2). Instability 
in this case is judged on the results of the Army Ballistic Missile
 
Agency (ABMA) Impact Sensitivity Test (ref. B-1), Oxygen Bomb Test
 
(ref. B-2), and Promoted Ignition Test- (ref . B-3).
 
The products of the possible reactions ,are condensable at liquid
 
oxygen temperature, but the reactions are exothermic. The liberation of
 
heat during localized reaction between the, contaminants and liquid oxygen 
will cause pressure buildup caused by vaporization of oxygen and products
 
of the reaction around the hot spot.
 
In addition to the postulated reactions (table B-I) which can occur
 
in the metallic state, additional reactions can occur with the other
 
metals if they are present as metal salts. Metal halides are particu­
larly sensitive to oxidation in liquid oxygen. 
Table B-I lists location of the contaminant and when it was detected,
 
identification of the contaminant, anid reactions that can occur between 
the contaminants and the liquid oxygen of the system. The contaminants 
listed vere separated by filters from the fluid that filled the vehicle 
tanks because the particle size was too large to pass the mesh size of 
the filter. However, all of the contaminants could enter the spacecraft 
tanks in the smaller particle size. 
Table B-II lists the generalized results of liquid oxygen compati­
bility tests for materials related to those found as contaminants in this 
system. Compatibility tests have not been.run on all materials and cer­
tainly not on all material combinations, but they are complete enough to
 
make an estimate of the hazards involved with particular &ontaminants in
 
contact with liquid or gaseous oxygen.
 
The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) Liquid Oxygen Impact Sensi­
tivity Test (ref. B-l) is based on the fact that many materials react 
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when impacted in contact with liquid oxygen. The material may do the
 
following:
 
1. Detonate
 
2. Give off flashes of light
 
3. Show evidence of burning (oxidative decomposition)
 
4. Become discolored
 
The above are the only criteria for failure of the Liquid Oxygen Impact
 
Sensitivity Test.
 
The test procedure involves dropping a standard plummet of known
 
weight, 20 ± 0.05 pounds (9.4 kg), from known heights up to 43.3 ±
 
0.2 inches (1.1 meters) under nearly frictionless conditions.
 
MSFC-SPEC-106B (ref. B-4) states that the material shall be subjected
 
to 20 successive tests at 72 foot-pounds (10 kilogram-meters) using equip­
ment and procedures described in the specification. No reaction must
 
occur during 20 successive tests at the 72-foot-pound level of test before
 
a material can be accepted for use. If more than one reaction occurs in
 
20 tests, the material is rejected. If one reaction occurs during the
 
20 tests, the material is subjected to an additional 40 tests. If any
 
reaction occurs during the 40 tests, the material is rejected.
 
As a general rule, organic materials (plastics and polymers) are
 
extremely sensitive to impact in liquid oxygen. Exceptions are the per­
fluoronated carbon compounds such as Kel-F, Krytox, FEP Teflon, and TFE
 
Teflon. However, Teflon samples contaminated with extraneous materials,
 
and even fingerprints, have failed the ABMA tests. There were two re­
corded cases where pigmented or treated Teflon did not pass the test
 
(ref. B-2, pp. 35, 36).
 
With a few exceptions most metals are satisfactory for use with 
liquid oxygen. However, the state of division and surface coating play 
a decisive role in metal reactivity. For example, aluminum fabricated 
in test sheets or hardware passes the test satisfactorily. The lack of 
reactivity can be traced to the hard, dense, tightly held aluminum oxide 
coating that protects the pure aluminum metal underneath. When the 
Al 203 coating is abraided or removed, oxygen reacts violently with the 
fresh aluminum surface.
 
The results obtained in the ABMA tester are the reaetivities of
 
clean, uncontaminated materials, and they do not generally reflect re­
activities of impure, contaminated, or finely divided samples except in
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very few cases. Most operators caution against any type of contamina­
tion in the tester. Adherence to the highest cleanliness standard is
 
required in order to obtain reproducible results, which is another way

of saying impurities and contamination on otherwise insensitive mate­
rials will increase their sensitivity to 'reaction in liquid oxygen.
 
The Oxygen Bomb Test (ref. B-5) is used to determine the spontaneous
 
ignition temperature of organic materials in 2000-pS 1 oxygen. .Aspeci­
men of the test material is heated in the bomb in a 2000-psi atmosphere
 
of oxygen until spontaneous ignition of the sample occurs or until the
 
temperature reaches 5000 C, whichever occurs-first. This is considered
 
an excellent rating test for thread lubricants, thread sealants, and
 
fluorocarbon plastics. 
The "effect of oxygen pressure on spontaneous
 
ignition temperature can be determined by comparing tests at different
 
oxygen pressures.
 
The Promoted Ignition Test (ref. B-5) is designed to determine the 
resistance to ignition and the amount of burning after ignition of the 
more resistant metals. The test is made.by.subjecting the metal speci­
men to the energy released when a promoter material (neoprene is com­
monly used) is subjected to its spontaneous ignition temperature in
 
oxygen. The test has considerable flexibility because the weights of
 
both metal and promoter can be varied as can metal specimen configuration.
 
Reactions were postulated in table B-I whenever that type of mate­
rial was impact tested and found to be unsatisfactory, or whenever it 
was tested by other means and reaction occurred at a comparatively low 
temperature. Thus, the reaction equations in table B-I are based on 
results tabulated in table B-II.
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TABLE B-I.- CONTAMINANTS DETECTED IN GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
CARd EIb Name Date CSN Wheredetected Remarks Contaminants Reactions possible 
61219 S14-132 LC39-FS 3-21-69 ao6 n273-0038 
-0010 
() of 1 
(2)'of 2 
Both fill 
disconnects 
contaminated 
Fe-major 
Cr-minor 
Ni-minor 
Zn-minor 
Ti-minor 
S-minor 
Mn-minor 
Mo-minor 
2S0 + 30 -+2S03 + Heat 
Fe0 + 0 -- Fe203 + Heat 
Cro + 02-Cr20 + Heat 
H 
61701 S14-132 LC39-fDS 3-24-7 109 15241-637 
Filter of 2 
Particle 
size generally 
below 500p 
Glass beads 
in filter 
pads 
Fe-major 
Al, Cr-light major 
Ni-heavy minor 
Fe3 04, Fe203 , FeO, 
Auntinite, Ti, 
Si-minor 
Mg, Mn-light minor 
Glass beads 
Cryotec 
CF3 (CF2 ) - CF3 + 0-- XcOF 
o + x-o 
COP + 0 F20 + C02 + Heat 
Fe 0 -­ 2Fe203 + Heat 
Al' + O--2A1 0 3 + Heat 
Mg0 + 0---MgO + Heat 
Al'+ Mg0 + Fe203_A203 + 
Cryotec on fil-
ter (Cryotec 
is an epoxy 
patch 
component) 
MgO + Feo + He&t, 
Glass beads can abrade pasiL 
vated Al surface (A12 0 3 ) 
and expose fresh metal sur­
face. The clean surface can 
then react explosively with 
LO. 
Epoxy + 02--C02 + H20 + Heat 
61041 S14-0oS MSOB-FDS 10-30-69 104 ME273-0038 
-0001 
POD of 2 
1/4 inch sliver 
from 0-ring 
Buna-N rubber Buna-N rubber + 0-­
2 + K 2 + Heat 
2 2 
aCAR (Corrective Action Request). 
bEI (End Item). 
TABLE B-I.- CON§MITNATS DTECTED IN CROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT XP IENNEDY SPACE CENTER - Concluded 
CARS ExtCAR
& Elb Nameame DateDate 0WOSM Wheredetected Remarks Contaminants Reactions possible 
A1225$3 S2.4-082 DOW-WDS 5-01-69 1i0 ME273-0038 
-0003 
7 particles 
>100i (0 allow-
able) 
e-ma or 
Cr-minor 
Ni-light minor 
Cu Ft-trace 
As-trace 
Acetate fiber 
Acetate fiber + 
C02 + H20 + Beat 
Feo + Oi --- 2e 3 
a3 
Cr + OF:-?- r203 
pbo + 02---rbO 
+ Heat 
61123 Sib-aS 
i 
N0Bf-lDS 12-19-68 104 ME273-0038
-0003 
POD-HVI 
Ai-naerAS-major
Austaita-minor 
Fe'si, ca-minor 
2Pe0 + 301--P'e203 Heat 
O 
6-725 Sl4-041 LC34-FDs 9-23-6$ 101 M273-0038
-0001 
POD-OF 
Considerabletazination 
visally 
verified, 
con- No anlysis UMown 
61162 14-132 L039-FDS 2-21-69 104 M273-0038 
-0003 
POD-Hr. 
Fe-major 
Cr-heavy minor 
7e2 03-light minor 
Iron oxide-minor 
Ni ,Mo-minor 
Butyl rubber 
Butyl rubber + 0 --
CC + H0 Rea 
2 2 
Pe0 + O -+reaO3 Heat 
&Ak 
bE 
(Corrective Action Request). 
(End Item), 
TABLE B-I. - CONTAMINANT MTERIALS - OXYGEN COMPATIBILITY 
[References B-2, B-3, B-5, B-6, and B-T] 
AM 
Materials impact 
test 

Iron, fabricated 	 S
 
Eron. powder 	 V 
Chromium 
Nickel 
 G 

Titanium U 
Sulfur U 
Manganese
 
Molybdenum 
Aluminum, fabricated S 
Aluminum, powder U 
Teflon, virgin S 
Teflon, contaminated U 
Silicon 
Silica (glass beads) 
Epoxy (cryotec) U 
Bsna-N Rubber U 
Lead U 
Silver, pure and hard alloy S 
Silver, soft 	 U
 
Cellulose acetate (fiber) U 
Gold S 

Butyl Rubber U 

aRating code: 	 U - Usatisfactory 
- - Testable but no 
information 
Oxygen bomb test Promoted ignition 
ignition temperature test temperature 
(2X 103 psi 0 ) (2x 103 psi 02) 
304 0 C (Monel) 
4690 C 
2o0 C 
3490 c 
3690 C
 
2000 C
 
S = Satisfactory 
Blank = Ho information 
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APPENDIX C
 
HARDWARE ANALYSIS OF P/N 15241-637
 
APPENDIX C
 
HABDWABE ANALYSIS OF P/N 15241-637
 
Test Report TR-220 furnished information about hardware analysis
 
of Wintec filter assembly P/N 15241-637, S/N 001. This filter assembly
 
was in use during the apparent system malfunction during the unloading
 
of a liquid oxygen tank on Apollo 13. This unit was also used for
 
servicing the Apollo 12. Wintec filter assembly P/N 15241-637, S/N 001,
 
is welded into a Consolidated Precision Corp. vacuum jacket assembly,
 
PIN 05475, S/N 1120.
 
Examination of the hardware after differential pressure tests of
 
the element disclosed three contaminants.
 
1. Three glass beads found collected on the filter from the efflu­
ent flowing from the spacecraft (flow direction "B" nut to bayonet)
 
2. A quantity of lubricant on two of the filter pads, from the
 
same liquid as in item 1
 
3. One fiber (65 by 500 microns, approximate dimensions)
 
The glass beads per se cannot cause pressure buildup or adverse reac­
tions. However, they axe capable of abrading inert or passivated sur­
faces. 'Whenthe protective oxide coatings are removed, fresh reactive
 
metal surface is exposed, and in the case of the oxygen tank, the re­
action can be rapid, with the liberation of substantial amounts of heat
 
(exothermic reaction) (ref. C-1).
 
The aluminum alloys in the supercritical oxygen tank are listed by
 
alloy type and amount present. Five aluminum components inside the
 
oxygen tank have been identified by alloy type and also a fifth identi­
fied aluminum part. If any of these could be abraded to start a reac­
tion, the smallest amount of heat liberated, assuming complete reaction,
 
would be 312 Btu. This energy release is sufficient to cause a pressure
 
buildup in the tank.
 
The colorless lubricant was not identified in TR-220, but a portion
 
was saved for infrared analysis. The analysis proved the lubricant to
 
be Krytox 240 AC grease, which is a relatively new fluorocarbon grease
 
that offers acceptable resistance to liquid oxygen sensitivity tests.
 
This lubricant was apparently present as a result of excessive lubrica­
tion during filter assembly connection prior to tank pumpdown. The
 
presence of the lubricant is undesirable because lubricants can vary in
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PRECEDlNG PAGE BLANK NOT PILMED 
composition as a result of manufacturing procedures. Any given batch 
of lubricant should be accepted for use in a liquid oxygen environment 
only after that batch has been tested and found satisfactory. 
The fiber was not identified, and its composition is unknown. Or­
ganic fibers as a class should not be brought in contact with liquid
 
oxygen, as judged by the 10 kg-m impact-sensitivity test. Generally,
 
inorganic fibers are acceptable, but they offer abrasion problems rather
 
than inherent reactivity. Thus, a fiber collected at this point repre­
sents a potential hazard, because it indicates the possible presence of
 
other fibers in the tank.
 
REFERENCE
 
C-1. Biehl, W. A.; and Nunnelley, J. E.: Investigation of LOX Filter
 
Explosion. Rept. IN-M-S&--M-61-4. Aug. 17, 1961.
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TABLE C-I.- ALUMINUM 
Aluminum Weight 

material available, oz 

2024 A1 4 
3003 AL .5 
1100 Al .2 
Al 8 
6061 Al 
2117 Al 
2 
3 
ALLOYS IN THE SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN TANK 
Ratio of reaction product and Heat released,
 
heat of reaction, Btu/Mole Btu
 
Al03, 1545 6 500 
AlO 1545 803 
Al203, 138 321 
AlO 1545 12 848 
A12 03, 1545 3 250 
A120 1545 4 900
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APPENDIX D 
THE POSSIBILITY OF A CATASTROPHIC PRESSURE FLUCTUATION
 
IN A NEAR-CRITICAL-POINT FLUID
 
The question has been raised as to whether a pressure fluctuation
 
large enough to rupture the container could occur in a contained super­
critical gas because of some form of excess energy storage or instability 
associated with the peculiar properties of gases near their critical
 
points. To answer this question, the following four possibilities will
 
be examined.
 
1. Spontaneous fluctuations about the equilibrium state of the gas
 
2. Fluctuations caused by a nonequilibrium state of the gas re­
sulting from the operation of withdrawing some gas from the tank 
3. Fluctuations induced by acceleration during launch or maneuvers
 
4. Fluctuations caused by a combination of acceleration and a
 
nonequilibrium state of the gas.
 
SPONTANEOUS FLUCTUATIONS
 
It is well known that local fluctuations in the density of a gas 
occur near the critical point. The nonuniform density produces the 
phenomenon of critical point opalescence, in which the gas acts like a 
pigment and scatters light strongly. Opalescence proves that the density 
of the gas is nonuniform, at least on the scale of the wavelength of 
visible light. The cause of the relatively large density fluctuations 
is the high compressibility of the gas near the critical point. If we 
consider the fluctuations in the gas as a superposition of the normal
 
modes of sound waves in the container, then we must allot an average
 
energy of L kT per mode. Under conditions of high compressibility, the
 2
 
mode amplitude corresponding to this energy is high also.
 
However, the question of importance here is whether a fluctuation
 
is possible on a large enough scale to break the wall of the tank. 
Because the tanks have a safety margin of several hundred psi in excess
 
of their operating pressure and because this excess pressure would have
 
to be sustained for an appreciable time to rupture the wall, the
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spontaneous fluctuation would have to take the form of a low-frequency
 
standing wave in the gas with a pressure amplitude of several hundred
 
psi. Because the oxygen and hydrogen tanks are well insulated thermally 
(and therefore have a fixed total internal energy E), such a fluctua­
tion would involve spontaneous conversion of a sizable fraction of the 
random thermal energy E into coordinated energy. This means that the 
entropy of the gas would spontaneously decrease by a large amount in 
defiance of the second law of thermodynamics. Therefore, it is con­
cluded that no such fluctuation is even remotely possible. 
FLUCTUATIONS CAUSED BY A NONEQUILIBRIUM STATE OF THE GAS
 
A nonequilibrium state of the gas in the container can produce
 
coordinated (as opposed to random) motion of the gas. The situation
 
will be considered that exists in an oxygen tank immediately after
 
operation of the heater to drive some gas to a fuel cell. Let m0 be
 
the original mass of gas in the tank, at pressure p0 and temperature
 
To, and let the mass of gas removed be fm Assume that the mass
 
(1 - f)m0 remaining in the tank consists of a portion still at
mI 

pressure p 0 and temperature T0 , and a portion m2 surrounding the 
heater that has been heated to a higher temperature T2 but still is 
at the original pressure p0. Let V0 , VI , and V2 be the specific
 
volumes of the masses m l, and m2, respectively. Then, from 
conservation of mass and volume
 
m 1 + m2 = (i - f)m0 (D-1) 
m2V + m2V2 m0V0 (D-2) 
from which can be obtained
 
an1 
1 + f­2 2 ( 3)
v0 1-f(-)
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It will be assumed that the fraction of gas removed from the tank is 
f = 1/50, and that the fraction of the remaining gas that is expanded 
by the beater is m2 /m = 1/50. Then, equation (D-3) gives 
V2 
-= 2.00 (D-4)Vo
 
At the start of the mission, the specific volume of the oxygen is
 
V 0 =1.0 cm3 /g. Therefore,-from equation (D-4), V2 = 2.00 cm3 /g.
 
Taking the tank pressure as pO = 60 atmospheres, then, from the equa­
tion of state chart for oxygen, it is found that the temperatures in 
the two regions of the tank are T = -153' C and T2 = -l14 C. 
Ordinarily, the stirrer will mix the gas and bring it to a common tem­
perature. However, it will be supposed that this step is not carried 
out; therefore, it is asked: how much coordinated energy could be 
extracted from this nonequilibrium state of the gas by any conceivable 
process? The answer is that the maximum amount of coordinated energy
 
is what one would get from an ideal heat engine operating between the
 
temperatures T2 and TO .
 
The maximum energy W is related to the heat Q that flows from 
the warmer to colder gas by the Carnot efficiency of the heat engine.
 
Thus 
where the factor of 1/2 arises because, as the cycle proceeds, the
 
temperature difference across which the engine operates does not stay
 
constant but decreases from T - T to zero.
 
2 1 
The value of Q can be taken as approximately equal to the heat
 
that.flows from the warmer to the cooler portions of the gas when the
 
gas is merely stirred until the temperature becomes uniform. To de­
termine Q, first the final equilibrium temperature and pressure of
 
the gas must be calculated. To do this, the conservation equations
 
for energy and mass are used.
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mlVo + m2V2 = (ml + m2)V (D-7) 
The enthalpy equations are used also. 
Hl 1= E + p0Vl (D-8) 
H2 = E2 + poV2 (D-9) 
H = E + -pV (D-1o)
 
From these five equations it may be shown that 
H- pV = (HI - PoV)+ 2 (H2 -PoV2 (D-i) 
ml ++72 m + 2
 
V = l , + " 2 = 1V f (D-12) 
ml + t2 0 l +fm2 i 
All quantities on the right-hand sides of equations (D-l) and 
(D-12) are either known or determinable from the p, H chart of the 
equation of state of the oxygen. Therefore, equation (D-I2) immediately 
gives V; then, equation (D-I1) becomes a straight line on the p, H 
chart. Therefore, H and p are determined by the point where this 
line intersects the value of V given in equation (D-12). The value 
of T can then be read off from the isotherms. On carrying out this 
procedure, the following data are found for the initial and final 
states of the gas in the tank. 
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Region I 	 Region 2 Final state
 
V = 1.00 cm3/g V2 = 2.00 cm3/g V = 1.02 cmB/g
 
T1 = 120 0 K T2 = 159 0 K T = 1210 K
 
= 	 =
P 0 60 atm P 0 6o atm p = 28 atm 
= 6.0 jou e/cm3 = 6.o joule/cm3 2.8 joule/cm
3 
= 

H1 	= 13 cal/g 42 = 39 cal/g H = 13 cal/g
 
= 52 joule/g = 156 joule/g = 52 joule/g
 
ml 	= 1.2 Y0 g m2 = 2.4 x iO3 g m = 1.2 x 105 g 
The heat that flows from region 2 to region 1 is approximately
 
=i	 M2 [(H2 - - (H - pV) -' (4r2+p1) (V2 - V)] 
= 2.4 x lO5 joule 	 (D-13)
 
The Carnot efficiency is
 
iT - T1
 
12 1 1 (D-14)
 
Therefore, from equation (D-5), the maximum possible coordinated
 
energy that can be generated is W = 3 x 104 joule.
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First, it will be assumed that this energy appears in the form of
 
a standing sound wave in the tank. The relation between the pressure
 
amplitude Ap of such a wave and the energy is
 
2c 
Ap m (D-15) 
where c, the speed of sound in the gas, is given by
 
= 
= O (D-16)
 
For the final state conditions just given, c is approximately
 
2 x lO4 cm/sec. Then, equation (D-15) gives Ap = 6.4 x 107 dyne/cm
2
 
64 atm.
 
Owing to the part of the internal energy converted to wave energy,
 
the static pressure in the gas falls below the value of 28 atm re-.
 
sulting from mixing. The new thermal internal energy is
 
(H - pV) - = 49 joule/g - 0.25 jouie/g
 
which indicates that the static pressure actually is lowered by an
 
insignificant amount. It is remarkable that such a small fraction of
 
the internal energy, when converted to wave energy, can produce a wave
 
pressure amplitude that is even larger than the static pressure.
 
The total peak pressure on the wall is the sum of Ap and the
 
static value of 28 atm which is 92 atm or 1500 psi. However, it is to
 
be noted that because the wave pressure amplitude is larger than the
 
static pressure, the assumption of sinusoidal waves in a linear medium,
 
on which equation (D-15) is based, is rather approximate. However,
 
the analysis does show that the potential energy represented by the
 
temperature gradient in the tank is great enough to produce dangerous
 
oscillating pressures if an efficient mechanism exists for converting
 
part of the nonequilibrium thermal energy to wave energy.
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Another type of coordinated motion consists of mass circulation of
 
the gas in the tank. If the available thermal energy W is converted
 
into mechanical energy of this kind, the velocity u of the gas is 
given by
 
1 
Emu 
2 
=W (D-17) 
and the incremental pressure on the wall is
 
Ap = pu2 = 2p W (D-18) 
m 
3On taking W = 3 x 104 joule, m = 1.2 x l05 g, and p = lg/cm as 
before, Ap = 75 psi. Therefore, generation of the maximum possible 
circulatory motion, which is a more likely form of motion than com­
pressional waves, does not produce a dangerous pressure increase. 
A certain way to avoid any pressure increase caused by mechanical
 
motion of the gas is to maintain efficient stirring at all times to
 
prevent any temperature gradients from arising.
 
FLUCTUATIONS CAUSED BY ACCELERATION
 
Acceleration of the spacecraft causes gradients of pressure, density,
 
and temperature in the gas tanks. A steady acceleration a in the
 
x-direction produces a pressure gradient given by the force-balance equa­
tion 
-ap (D-19") 
ax
 
where p is the gas density. To get an equation in terms of p alone,
 
the expression for the speed of sound is used.
 
(-&) = c2 (fD-20) 
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From equations (D-19) and (D-20), equation (D-21) is obtained.
 
p= a
 
- (D-21)
 
c 
Therefore, the difference in density across the diameter D of the
 
tank is 
Ap = a-p (D-22)
2 
C 
From equation (D-19), the difference in pressure across the tank
 
is
 
Ap = aDp (D-23)
 
For the case of oxygen, it is assumed that p = 1 g/cm , p = 
6a atm, c = 2 x 104cm/sec, D = 60 cm. Then, for an acceleration 
= 5x 103 cm/sec2 a 5g 
3 
Ap = 8 10-4g/cm
Ap = 5 psi 
Therefore, the incremental pressure on the wall is negligible. When the
 
acceleration ends, the static distribution of density and pressure turns 
into a compressional wave that, has a maximum pressure- amplitude of only 
5 psi. 
It is worth noting from equation D-22) that because c approaches 
zero at the critical point, Ap becomes large under near-critical con­
ditions. However, it is seen from equation (D-23) that Ap remains 
small at the critical point. Therefore, it is concluded that accelera­
tions cause no direct hazard. 
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FLUCTUATIONS CAUSED BY COMBINATION OF NONEQUILIBRIUM
 
STATE AND ACCELERATION
 
Although acceleration alone causes very little static or dynamic
 
excess pressure, the question'arises whether it can provide an efficient
 
mechanism for conversion of nonequilibrium thermal energy as discussed
 
in the second section of this appendix.
 
The same nonequilibrium state as in the second section in which
 
there is a warmer mass of 2.4 x 103 g and density 0.5 g/cm3 and a cooler 
mass of 1.2 x l05 g and density 1.0 g/cm3 . Under these conditions, the 
3
maximum change in potent'ial energy would occur if the 2.4 x lo g of 
warmer gas exchanged places across a diameter of the spherical tank 
with a mass of 4.8 x 10 g of colder gas of the same volume. If the 
spacecraft acceleration is 5 x 103 cm/sec2 and the diameter of the 
sphere is 60 cm, the amount of potential energy converted into kinetic 
33 '2 
energy is 2.4 x l03 g x 5 Y 10 cm/sec x 60 cm = 72 joules. In this
 
calculation, the effect of expansion and contraction of the displaced
 
masses has been neglected because the density difference caused by the
 
acceleration is much less than that caused by the temperature difference
 
(as seen in the previous section).
 
The energy of 72 joules appears in the form of circulatory motion
 
of the gas, and, by equation (D-18), produces an excess pressure of
 
only 0.2 psi. It is concluded that acceleration does not enhance
 
significantly the pressure excess resulting from a nonequilibrium state
 
of the gas.
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COMMENTS ON GROUND TESTING OF APOLLO 13
 
Introduction
 
During one of the briefings at NASA, Houston, we learned that one
 
of the heaters in No. 2 oxygen tank had remained in continuous operation
 
during a three hour period in the preflight checkout. This memorandum
 
purports to examine the heating of the lead wires that would result from
 
this event.
 
We make the simplifying assumption that radial flow of heat away 
from the tube which carried the lead wires would be negligible in the 
evacuated and insulated dome. We assume that flow of heat takes place 
only along the wires and the enclosing tube. We assume that the elec­
trical.terminal was at 20' C and that the temperature of the tube rises 
through a maximum and declines again to 20 C about 70 cm from the con­
nector and attains the temperature of the oxygen where the tube enters 
the tank. The tube was assumed to be 20-mil stainles steel of 0.5-inch 
diameter. 
Because the resistance of the lead wires varies with temperature,
 
it is necessary to analyze this problem by an iterative process. First,
 
the temperature distribution is established for the case of constant re­
sistance. This distribution is then substituted in the differential
 
equation which is solved for a new distribution. The form of the equa­
tions is such that this can be repeated.
 
Numerical Data
 
We find a thermal conductance KA m 0.125 W-cm/0 K. This is com­
posed of the following.
 
Heater leads* 0.0783
 
Tube 0.0202
 
Temperature-sensor leads 0.0102
 
Quantity probe leads 0.008P
 
Motor leads 0.0082
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Each heater yields 417 watts from 65 volts. This implies a current
 
of 6.4 amps in each lead. We assume only one heater remained on and we,
 
neglect all other heating of leads. At 20 C the resistance of #20 AWG
 
copper is 10.15 ohms per 100 feet. We find the I2R heating for the four
 
=
heater leads is q. 5.5 x 10-2W/cm at 200 C. For copper wire the coef­
ficient of resistance is 0.004 per 'G. The thermal conductivity does
 
not vary significantly over the temperature range of interest.
 
Constant-Resistance Case
 
The heat-flow equation is
 
i2T 
KA dx2 = -qm 
where qm is some mean heating rate to be established. If the origin
 
is taken midway between the two points 70 cm apart at which the tempera­
ture is assumed to be T. = 20' C, then this equation integrates to
 
KAT- T0) =,nq (X2 - Y2) (D-24) 
Variable-Resistance Case
 
The actual heat-flow equation is
 
d2T 
KA a- -q (D-25)2= 

where 
q.= q[l + a(T - T0)j (D26) 
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In this we substitute for (T - T0 ) from the solution for the constant­
resistance case and obtain 
)
- = - o + ( -x c-72X CD-27)
 
- .q*>s2 (D-28) 
where 
qO [ + a: (D-29) 
and 
= q (D-30) 
2KA + (n-so 
Equation (D-28) integrates to 
T{A(T - TO0) = f (9 - 2)u4 q** (D-31) 
We require that qm be chosen so as to present the correct total
 
wattage. This requires
 
%X = oVqO[l + a(T - To)])dx (D-32) 
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wherein we substitute for (T - TO ) from equation (D-24) and obtain 
qmX = qoX + aqqX -(D-33)
3KA 
whence 
q X 2lo 	 1 -a
_ o
 (D-34) 
"qm 3KA 
Numerical Results
 
On substitution of the numerical quantities in the formnlae just 
mentioned we obtain 
(a) 	from equation (D-34)
 
5.5 	 x 10-2 0.004 x 5.5 x 10 - 2 x 352. 0.596 
mQ 3 x o.125 
whence
 
qm = 9.23 x 10-2
 
(b) 	from equation (D-29)
 
4 x 10 - 2 x 35 )+ 000 x9.23q* = 5.5 x 10-2 
-

= 1.57 x 10 1 
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(c) from equation (D-30)
 
9.23 x 10 -
2
 
o.0o4 x 

2 x 0.125 + 0.004 x 9.23 x 10 x 35
 
x lo - 4 
= 5.26 
(d) from equation (D-31)
 
4 )

x x 10-4 (4

-0.125(T - To) = 1.57 x 10-1 (C2 - 1-57 x 10-1 1526 ­2 /12
 
4
(T- T o ) = 0.628(9 - 2)- 5.5 10-5,( - x4) 
From this we conclude
 
Tmax - T0) = 0.628 x 352 - 5.5 
× 0- 5 x 354
 
= 768 - 82.5 
= 6860 C 
This is to be compared with
 
- T = 9.2 0.125 = 5650 C 
obtained on the assumption that the resistance of the wire was indepen­
dent of temperature.
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Pressure Blowoff
 
If 834 watts of heating persisted over a period of 3 hours, then

there would have been a pressure blowoff unless enthalpy was removed
 
from the tank by gas flow.
 
14h; 
ON THE BEHAVIOR OF SUPERCRITICAL GASES
 
Introduction
 
The behavior of supercritical gases has been explored in consider­
able detail. In the case of the supercritical tanks of Apollo, no un­
usual behavior of engineering importance can result from the phenomena
 
which are observed only in the immediate vicinity of the critical point.
 
In the highly densified state, major departures from the ideal gas law
 
result in some surprising behavior vhich is understandable from the
 
thermodynamic data and the Van der Waals equation of state. Some of the
 
unusual features which can be understood from a careful examination of
 
the thermodynamics will be examined.
 
The Critical State
 
At the critical point the fluid undergoes a transition from the
 
gaseous state where the molecules behave as independent particles to the
 
liquid state in which substantial order prevails. The liquid state con­
sists of a close-packed aggregate of molecular clusters in which each
 
molecular cluster may contain some 108 molecules in greater order than
 
prevails in a gas. At the critical point the liquid attains its maximum
 
permissible temperature - at any greater temperature the ordered struc­
ture of the molecular cluster cannot be realized regardless of how great
 
a pressure is applied and regardless of what increased densification is
 
achieved.
 
Thus, at the critical point the transition between gaseous and
 
liquid state entails a small change of entropy associated with the form­
ation or dissolution of the molecular clusters. Thus, at the critical
 
point a finite Tds occurs without change of temperature; this implies
 
that both C and C will become infinite at the critical point.
p v
 
Experiments to investigate the appearance and dissolution of molec­
ular clusters must be carried out very slowly; temperature changes at
 
the rate of 0.010 K per hour do not lead to reversible results. A
 
brief summary of behavior in the vicinity of the critical point is found
 
in "Molecular Theory of Gases. and Liquids" by Hirschfelder, Curtiss, and
 
Bird.
 
ENERGY ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSITIONS IN THE CRITICAL REGION
 
The fact that Cp and Cv become infinite at the critical point
 
does not imply that large amounts of energy are associated with
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transitions in the vicinity of the critical point. The important con­
sideration in this respect is the value of the integrals
 
fdv dT or fp dT 
in a narrow temperature range in the vicinity of the critical point.
 
In an associated essay, it is shown that these integrals are finite and
 
relatively small (appreciably less than 1 cal/g) from which it is clear
 
that there can be no mechanism for the release of significant amounts
 
of energy by any unusual phenomenon in the vicinity of the critical
 
point. One should attribute the singularity of C and C at the
p v
 
critical point to the vestige of the latent heat of vaporization as the
 
difference between liquid and gas phase becomes vanishingly small.
 
Velocity of Sound in the Vicinity of the Critical Point
 
The velocity of sound Co at zero frequency satisfies
 
2 2 (LP

C, 

-V 
 '
 
One may establish readily that
 
C2 = T T
2 [Q7p)2 (al P)]=L v +3W)Po)
 
In the vicinity of the critical point p 0, and this reduces to
 
1
Co 2 
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In the gas phase immediately above the critical point, Co is finite,
 
having a value of approximately 210 m/sec. In the immediate vicinity of
 
the critical point, the singularity in C implies that C, should
 
vanish.
 
Experiments on sound propagation in the vicinity of the critical
 
point are very difficult to perform. The adiabatic assumption (zero
 
frequency) requires that heat not flow from condensation to rarifaction
 
during the propagation of the sound. As the velocity of propagation
 
declines, the wavelength A = C/f becomes increasingly long. The "zero­
frequency" condition will be satisfied only provided that a quarter wave­
length is small compared to the dimension of a molecular cluster. Any
 
disturbance produced by the propagation of the sound wave is likely to
 
displace the system from its critical state and will result in an in­
crease in sound velocity. If the velocity of sound fluctuates, the
 
medium will be highly dispersive. The fact that substantial differences
 
in density can result from infinitesimal pressure fluctuations also
 
accounts for the anomalous attenuation of acoustic waves in the vicinity
 
of the critical point.
 
ON THE NEED FOR STIRRING IN SUPERCRITICAL TANKS
 
The need for stirring the contents of tanks containing fluids in
 
supercritical states can be demonstrated most convincingly from the
 
following argument. Consider the tank filled with supercritical fluid
 
.
in a state characterized by PIV -Now imagine a fraction B of the
 
mass to be heated without mixing, and let this serve to expel at constant
 
pressure P1 a fraction a of the mass in the state characterized by
 
P1V1 . For each gram initially within the tank, one will have in the un­
mixed state a mass (1 - a - ) in a state characterized by P1V and
 
a mass a in a state characterized by PIV2 where
 
= VV2 
 2 1 
Let us now cease the heating, close the vent, and mix the contents.
 
The mixing of the contents is equivalent to placing the tank in thermal
 
isolation and separating the two states in the tank with a thermally con­
ducting barrier which moves so as to maintain zero pressure gradient
 
across the barrier. As thermal equilibrium is established, one will find
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at each infinitesimal step the internal energy of one region will 
change in accordance with
 
dE1 = 
dQ1 - p6V 1 
while that of the other region will change in accordance with
 
dE2 = dQ2 - pdV2
 
But dQ1 = -dQ2, because this is the heat flaw through the barrier, and
 
dV1 = -dV2 because the barrier moves in a tank of constant total volume.
 
Thus, dE1 + dE2 = 0 at all infinitesimal steps in the process. Thus, 
the total internal energy is conserved as the fluid is stirred, a conse­
quence which stems clearly from the fact that the tank does not interact
 
with its surroundings.
 
The total internal energy before mixing is given by
 
1 a [(1 - ) (H1 - Iv1).+ P1v2)] { (HE1sQH2 ­ -
+ (1-' -0 a[(E2.H) Pl(v2 vl)]} 
(The factor 1/(l - a) is required to normalize to unit mass.) This
 
is also the internal energy of the uniformly mixed fluids.
 
Consider now the case of a = 6 = 0.02; we use 2 percent of the 
mass, expelling this by heating 2 percent of the mass without stirring. 
Then we mix the fluids. We examine the effects on the pressure assum­
ing- V1 = 1.0 -cc/g and P1 = 60 atmospheres (900 psi). 
In this case V2 V = 2.0cc/g, whence, P (V2 - V ) 
1.41 cal/g. We compute a total free energy, before and after mixing of
 
E = 12.93 - 1.41 + 0-9 39.42 -'12.93) - 1.41 = 12.03 cal/g
 
(Here the enthalpies are read from the Enthalpy/Log-of-Pressure plot.)
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One seeks to establish the state after mixing. To do this, one
1i.0
 
must assume a pressure, calculate H3 enter the chart at V3 1.0
 
1.02 and determine the pressure. By-an iterative process, one finds
 
that the consistent P3 is approximately 28 atmospheres or 420 psi.
 
One may readily verify that this is consistent because P3V3 = 
27 X x 1.41 = o.67 cal/mole. Thus H = 12.03 x 0.67 = 12.70 and 
0 0983 
V3 = 1.02. Corresponding to these values of H3 and V3 , we find 
=P3 28 atmospheres.
 
Operational Significance
 
If the fluid were not stirred in use, then, when rocket thrust is
 
used, convection will occur in the fluid. This can lead to partial
 
mixing and the associated loss of pressure. If the convection carries
 
the heated gas to the exit port and consumption of oxygen continues
 
during the thrust phase, the source of pressurization may be burned in
 
the fuel cells. Either of these events could lead to electrical failure
 
in a thrust phase. The situation becomes more serious if a is larger
 
than 0.02. Thus, one is led to the inescapable conclusion that tempera­
ture equalization is essential to assume reliable fuel-cell performance.
 
Physical Explanation of the Phenomenon
 
When the gas is at a high density corresponding to V = 1.0 cc/g, 
the Van der Waals forcesoplay a very significant role in maintaining
 
the density. 'When the temperature is uniform throughout the fluid, the
 
increase of specific volume requires an expenditure of work to increase
 
the mean molecular distance against the strong Van der Waals forces.
 
These forces fall off as V21 thus, when V1 = 1.00 changes to V3 
1.02, the Van der Waals force falls by only 4 percent. By contrast,
 
when the small region of mass fraction 6 = 0.02 is expanded from
 
V1 = 1.00 to V2 = 2.00, the Van der Waals forces will have fallen to
 
25 percent of their initial'value. Clearly, less work will be expended
 
against the Van der Waals forces when the same volume increase is
 
achieved by expanding a lesser mass by a greater fraction than by
 
expanding the total mass by a lesser fraction.
 
An approximate quantitative understanding of the energy deficit
 
that can result from local heating and subsequent mixing instead of
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uniform-,heating can be gained thtouth dgsiudZf the' Van der.-Waais' 
equation.
 
e +-)GV RTx.2
\-e V.. b) (D-35) 
Where the subscript e 
is the externally observable pressure. The
 
constants a and b are evaluated at the critical point
 
LV
 
c 

.13
 
where the subscripts c refer to the-ciitickal point'.
 
For oxygen one obtains
 
a = 19.9 cal/cm3 (D-36a)
 
b,. 0.,785 cm.3g (D-36b) 
One may 'regard the Va'nder Waal$ equation, as. 
(p + Pv) = T ­
where. p is the observable pressure that.the.gas exerts.on the outside
 
world and p is an equivalent "Van der Waals pressure'! which tends to
 
reduce the volume of the fluid because of dipole-dipole forces which fall
 
off as the inverse-sixth popwex of the center-to-center separation.
 
We consider a process in which .p.- is-maintained constant as the gas is
 
heate&. Then,
 
"'RT- a
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and we require that changes in temperature and vo4-umebe such.asoto
 
satisf dpe= 0; i.e. ,we'require
 
R dT RT dV: ." 2a dV' 
(-v-b .2' 2
(V-bY + V 
whence
 
aT = dV -2a(V - b) (D-37) 
For any thermodynanc process we-require
 
dQ p e dV + dE (D-38)
 
'Where pe dV 
is the work the gas does on its surroundings and dE is
 
the increase in internal energy. In the ideal gas dE is a function
 
of temperature only, and is equ&l1 to:ll2 kT per degree of freedom. In
 
the Van der Waals gas we have departures from ideal behavior. We vis­
ualize the process of expansion at constant external pressure as being
 
one in which the addition of'-heat: es three 'thin'gs.
 
1. It increases the kinetic energy of the molecules with an energy
 
of 1/2 kAT per degree of freea6oj.
 
2. It does work peAV on the external world
 
3."*It, expands--,thL. gas'against'the donfiiihg,Vdn der Waals forces;
 
this work is .p-A­
constant]Increasing KE
 
o of molecules and
 
decreasing pv
 
deran increasing free volume

_J
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Under these assumptions, equation (D-38)'becom6s'
 
dQ = pe d +[ -RdT + pdV] 
In this we substitute for dT from equation (D-37) and obtain
 
dQ = pe dV RT 5a(v-b) + dV 
And for the first terh'Tfn the bracket \#e sub'stitut from'equatidn (D-35)
 
to obtaih
 
dQ p dV e2(pe +'L-2 _a2 + 5A3 +a 2d
 
3 5P

-~~~ Ped ab ~ 
-p v + 2a dV (D-39) 
It is instructive to write equation (D-3.9) as
 
dQ p d e+
ea+[P ( TV v2 
10 
from which it is clear that so long as V is less than - Vc the heat
 
9

requirement to produce expansion at constant pressure will be greater
 
than that for an de'al ga . For V greater than'L- 'Vc, this situation
 
9.
will be reyersed. Clearly for a given volume expansion less energy will
be required if a lesser mass is expanded to a greater specific volume.
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Equation (D-39) integrates at once to
 
(D-4o)
 
Here, the first term in the bracket is simply the increase iii kinetic
 
energy of the ideal gas.
 
We now compute the difference, caused by nonideal behavior, between
 
the amount of heat required to. heat 'the entire mass, uniformly to, achieve 
a 2-percent expansion and that required to double the volume of.2 percent
 
of the mass leaving the remainder of the gas at the initial temperature
 
and specific volume. In each case we allow expansion to occur so as to
 
maintain constant pe. We begin with.
 
Vl = 1.f0 cm3/g.
 
We substitute for a and b from equations (D-36(a)) and (D-36(b)) and find
 
that for each gram contained this difference is'
 
- 29'8[1.oo - a.98] + 39.0[1.00 - 0.96]
 
+ 0.596[1 - 0.50] - 0.780[i.00 - 0.25] 
= 0.975 cal/g 
Enthalpy-pressure charts'are available fot oxygen. For hydrogen, nitro­
gen, and helium, the charts are in the entropy-temperature format. In
 
the high-density supercritical region it is not possible to estimate the
 
pressure drop with any precision. However,-we see no reason to assume
 
that 'stirring will not'be equally important in the case of the hydrogen
 
tanks.
 
The question of using heaters without simultaneous mixing raises a
 
number of serious questions. One relates to the rate at which the heat
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will be conducted away from-the'source d!r heat. In this regard the dom­
inant term for the flow of heat away from an instantaneous line source
 
Exp (-'r2'/4Kt) 
where K , is the diffusivity. .As,a means of.estimating the-order of mag­
nitude'°of 1 K, we note'that at STP for air O.1T'T 2 /se. Iri the 
'
 diffusivity K = K/c, ib -find K 'the c6ndudtivitY-of the gas, is ia'dpen­
dent of-presbur6; the specifitheat ' is fndependent of the density.
 
We refer-to the enthalpy-pressute &hart-and-borr~ct for"density p only
 
and 'conclude that at 00 C'an'd 900 -psi 
K-0.18 3.3 >lO0 cm,sec,
 
At lower temperatures, K ili tend t6dbre tv!n io e,'-at 900 ps., On
 
setting -t'± 3600"seconds '(i.e., lhur) we find that he'teperatnre
 
rise will be li/e of the axial rise at a radius r = 7 cm. The conclu­
sion is that if.one does not stir',hot gas will accunilate-aThund-the
 
heater.
 
Consid'er the--consequences of failure-to mix.' 'As heat'fl6bshway 
from thbiheater its effediiveness'in maintainiing pr ssurization falls
 
off. One can imagine a situation half way through the mission in which
 
half the oxygen has been used and in which the bulk of the tank is char­
acterized by a specific volume of 2 cm3 /g. If local beating of 2 percent
 
of the volume is then used to expel 12 percent of the remaining volume
 
(equivalent to 6 percent of the initial contents) over a period of a few
 
hours, the temperature of the gas around the heater will be approximately
 
+200 C.
 
If the thrusters are now used, the gases will move convectively in
 
such a direction as to bring this oxygen at 900 psi and 200 C into direct
 
contact with the Teflon in the dome. This would be a very dangerous
 
event, and there is no assurance that even hotter oxygen might not be
 
encountered in practice (if 8 percent rather than 6 percent of the origi­
nal filling were expelled in this fashion, the temperature of the hot
 
oxygen bubble would be about 1000 C).
 
It is certain that any attempt to dispense with mixing would be to
 
court disaster. The more thorough and continuous the mixing can be, the
 
more stable performance one can expect.
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An Absolute-Density Gage
 
At Arthur D. Little, Inc., we have explored rather thoroughly the
 
feasibility of measuring fluid density by a technique which is indepen­
dent of gravitational effects. The principle invoked in these studies
 
is to note that when a sphere is vibrated in a fluid it behaves as though
 
its inertial mass is equal to fis own mass plus exactly half of the mass
 
of the fluid it displaces.
 
The excitation of the system is done by means of a servocontrolled
 
frequency which forces the ball to oscillate in a resonant state where
 
resonance is defined, not in terms of the amplitude maximum but rather
 
in terms of having zero phase difference between the oscillating motion
 
and the driving force. For this condition the density of the fluid is
 
uniquely and sensitively related to the resonant frequency and the,reso-,
 
nant frequency is independent of the viscous forces.
 
We have studied both transverse and torsionally-driven oscillations
 
as candidate density gages. Both approaches can lead to satisfactory
 
instruments.
 
Should this matter of a density gage which is independent of gravity
 
be of interest to NASA we will be happy to provide further details.
 
Experiments to investigate the appearance and dissolution of
 
molecular clusters must be carried out very slowly; temperature changes
 
at the rate of 0.010 K per hour do not lead to reversible results. A
 
brief summary of behavior in the vicinity of the critical point is found
 
in "Molecular Theory of Gases and Liquids" by Hirschfelder, Curtiss, and
 
Bird.
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THE'MINIMUM ENERGY REQUIRED TO 'IGNITEA COMBUSTIBLE
 
GAS MIXTURE IN ZERO GRAVITY
 
In'view of the possibility of combustible mixtures, such as oxygen
 
and Teflon vapor, it is of some interest to know what minimum energy
 
must be supplied to such a mixture, for example in the form of a spark,
 
to cause ignition. .This.memorandum is",based on-ideas contribdtedby
 
Dr. W. E. Gordon of Pennsylvania State College in..atelephone 
conversa­
tion on May 20, 1970.
 
Two 6nditions are necessary for ignition: the energy supplied must 
raise the temperature of a volume of the mixture above the? ignift'iion 
temperature, and the heated volume must exceed a certain critical size. 
.. The critical volume V ,must have a radius comparable with the 
thickness of the flame front'., that develops after ignition. Thus, 
v= (n-hi 
The -reason for this requirement" s that -if the heated volume were smaller, 
the additional heat developed by'th6 reacting gases would flow away so
 
quickly from the hot spot by conduction that the rate of heat loss would
 
be larger than the rate of heat generation and a propagating flame would
 
not develop. 
The magnitude of the- -flafie fr6nt thiekriebs' '- -is 6- that the 
0 
forward heat flow by conduction into the cold unreacted gas at tempera­
ture T is just enough to raise -its temperature to the flame tempera­
ture Tf, i.e.,
 
S 7(T 
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where vf is:the flame velocity.,,and K, C, .p are-the conductivity, 
specific heat, and density of the unreacted. gas. Therefore,
 
K 
0(D-43)
K
' no 

The flame velocity I depends on the tate of'heat generation ifi the
 
reaction and on the thermal mass of,the gas.
 
The energy., E. needed for ignition is the energy to raise the 
temperature, of the Volume""V fr6m' T to Tf 
It CpV( 
- 0) 
From equations (D-41) and (D-42), this becomes
 
; - 4r K3(Tf - ) ­
± - 2 2 3. 
Since the quantities Tf, vf, K, and C vary only slowly with pressure 
p and 'Varies directly with pressure, we see that 
F. - (n-h .), 
i 2 
p 
This relation shows that at 60 atmospheres pressure the energy 
needed to initiate a flame in a dombustible niEtiire is a factor of 
3600 less than at 1 atmosphere. 
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The 1/p law derived here agrees with experimental data on ignition 
by sparks reported by Lewis and von Elbe, Combustion, Flames, and Explo­
sions of Gases (Academic-Press, Inc., New York, 1961) p. 328, at the low 
end of their pressure range, where the conditions should approximate 
those of zero gravity because buoyant forces are relatively less important 
at low pressures. 
ON THE MYTH OF LARGE ENERGY STORAGE AND 
RELEASE AT THE CRITICAL POINT
 
orThe purpose of this memorandum is to dispel the myth that"fluids 
at or near their critical points can store tremendous amounts of energy 
that can be released explosively by means of a suitable trigger. 'This 
belief seems-o have arisen from such critical-point phenomena"as opal­
escence, zero velocity of sound, infinite specific heat, and hysteresis. 
In discussing this question, we must distinguish clearly between 
equilibrium and nonequilibhxium states of the fluid. The case of non­
equilibrium states is discussed in the memorandum entitled-"The Pos­
sibility,of a Catastrophic Pressure Fluctuation in a Near Critical
 
Point Fluid."
 
An equilibrium state is. one that has a single well-defined tempera­
ture and maximum entropy for the given value of the internal energy. 
Spatial fluctuations of thermodynaiic variables, such as density, take 
place as the fluid changes from bne to another of the vast number of 
states having the same energy.'
 
Fluctuations of density are relatively large, both in magnitude 
and in cell size because the compressibility, (V/ap)T/V is infinite 
at the critical point; i.e., the critical isotherm is horizontal at
 
this point on the p, V diagram.
 
The infinite compressibility means that if a'movable piston is.
 
inserted in a vessel containing gas at the critical point do as to
 
separate the gas into two regions, the'piston can be mored a small
 
distance with zero force.. The result is that the density of the gas
 
is increased in one region and decreased in the other, but the total
 
internal energy of the system is unchanged and the temperatures and
 
pressures in the two regions are unchanged. However, the internal
 
energy in the compressed gas is increased and that of the expanded
 
gas decreased by the same amount. This is essentially the process
 
that occurs spontaneously in a gas at the critical point but in a
 
multitude of cells. The situation can be described as one of neutral
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equilibrium in which displacements call for no application of force,
 
and from which ofle cannot extract useful energy. In fact, the change
 
in free energy AF in each cell of the system is zero because AF =
 
VAp - SAT and Ap, AT are both zero along the critical isotherm at
 
the critical point.
 
A mechanical system of two equal weights suspended on a friction­
less pulley is a close analogy to the critical point system with two
 
compartments and a piston. The weights can be moved up and down with­
out effort, but the gravitational potential difference between the
 
weights cannot be converted into work.
 
The various configurations of cells of differing density and
 
specific internal energy but essentially the sane pressure and tempera­
ture can be called quasi-static states of the gas at the critical point.
 
These quasi-static states all have the same total: internal energy and 
change slowly from one to another because of the condition of neutral
 
equilibrium of the system in which there is no driving force. This
 
circumstahce accounts for the hysteresis effects that are observed
 
near the critical point.
 
We have been discussing effects that arise from small displacements
 
along the critical isotherm on the p, -V diagram. We now consider
 
whether large amounts of energy 'can be absorbed or released in small
 
displacements from the critical points at right angles to the critical
 
isotherm, i.e., along the constant volume line passing through the
 
critical point. The quantity of interest here is C the specific
 
v 
heat at constant volume.. Measurements by Bagatskii, Voronel', and
 
Gusak (Soviet Physics JETP 16, No. 2, pp. 517-518, Web. 1963) for argon
 
show that C is infinite at the critical point, which might lead one
 
v 
to think that infinite energy storage is possible at the critical point. 
What matters however is not 'C 
V 
itself, but the area under the C 
V 
compared with T curve, which gives the increment in internal energy.
 
On determining the area under the graph of the spike, published by
Cv 

the Russian authors, from 10 C below the critical point up to the 
critical point, we find that the change in internal energy of argon is 
AE = 0.09 cal/g. From the critical point to 10 C above it, we find 
AE = 0.04 cal/g. These values show that although C is infinite at 
the critical point the energy differences involved in heating the.fluid
 
through the critical point are quite negligible.
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TEERATURE CORRECTION OF QUANTITY GAGE AMD 
PRESSURE PULSE ON INITIATING STIRRING 
It is not possible, with the limited amount of information available
 
to us, to account in a quantitative way for the required 150 addition to
 
the measured temperature in determining the content of the tank from the
 
quantity gage under zero-g conditions. However, it would appear that
 
this may be a very real effect attributable to heat leakage along the
 
quantity probe. As the oxygen supply becomes depleted, the heaters will
 
be turned on at more frequent intervals; thus, there will be a shorter
 
time for the temperature to build up between successive periods of mix­
ing. This will tend to compensate for the fall in heat capacity of the
 
fluid contained in the probe. Any heat leakage along the probe will
 
also tend to raise the temperature recorded by the thermistor, because,
 
in the absence of convection, local temperature rise can be appreciable.
 
The fact that the pressure exhibits a sharp drop of the order of 
12 psi each time the stirring motors are turned on is compatible with 
the hypothesis that local heating occurs within the bulk of the liquid. 
One could perform a fairly accurate check on this hypothesis by 
examining the recorded temperature which produces the 900 psi pressuri­
zation at various stages of depletion during the flight. Early in the 
consumption when the specific volume is 1.2 cc/g, an error of 100 K in 
the temperature would imply an erroneous specific volume of 1.44 cc/g. 
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CHEMISTRY AND THERMOCHEMISTRY OF FLUIDS IN THE CRITICAL
 
AND SUPERCRITICAL REGIONS
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
The purpose of this memorandum is to consider the possible effects 
of space-related conditions on the hazardous behavior of fluids carried 
aboard the Apollo and LM spacecraft. Special regard is given to chemical 
behavior as it may be modified by critical or supercritical conditions, 
This scope
by zero-gravity, or by combinations of hazardous materials. 

corresponds to Part B of the task outline contained in the letter of
 
May 12 from R. C. Ried, Deputy Director, Panel 7, to E. S. Shanley.
 
The bulk of this discussion covers the behavior of the supercritical
 
o0ygen storage system. The nitrogen tetroxide, Aerozine-50, and monomethyl
 
hydrazine systems are not near the critical point, although some of the
 
remarks about behavior in zero gravity may apply also to these materials.
 
Hydrogen is considered with reference to possible combustion reactions
 
with Teflon. Helium, nitrogen, and water are considered inert for the
 
purpose of this discussion.
 
In addition to various members of the Arthur D. Little,, Inc., staff,
 
we are grateful to Professor William E. Goidon of Pennsylvania State
 
University, Professor George B. Kistiakowsky of Harvard, and Professor
 
Regio Pelloux of M.I.T. for their contributions and discussion.
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II. SUMMARY 
We find that the major hazards of these systems are associated with
 
potential chemical reactions in the oxygen system and possibly also in
 
the hydrogen-system. In the oxygen system, both the Teflon insulation
 
and many of the metals used are potential fuels; only an ignition source
 
of sufficient energy is required to start combustion.t In the hydrogen
 
system, the Teflon insulation is.thermodynamically unstable with respect
 
to hydrogen fluoride and carbon. The monomer of Teflon,. C F is known
 
2
4'
 
to burn with hydrogen.
 
The fact that these fluids are near critical conditions poses no
 
special hazard peculiar to these conditions. Both the high pressure and
 
the gravity-free environment, however, probably will increase the ease
 
of ignition of Teflon in.these environments. In addition, there is
 
evidence to indicate that Teflon may be a particularly efficient source
 
of ignition for aluminum and other metals, because the decomposition
 
products of Teflon tend to remove the protective oxide from these metals.
 
Several mechanisms exist for rapid flame propagation even in a gravity­
free environment.
 
We recommend that both fuels and potential sources of ignition be
 
removed as far as possible from these fluid systems. If these hazards are
 
retained, testing should be done in a gravity-free environment, and with
 
the particular combinations of material (especially Teflon with metals)
 
used in the spacecraft systems.
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III. 	 EFFECTS OF CRITICAL OR NEAR CRITICAL CONDITIONS
 
ON CHEMICAL REACTIONS
 
Since the effects observed in the critical region of oxygen (and
 
other fluids) are a function of relatively weak intermolecular or
 
van der Waals forces, no direct effects of criticality are to be expected
 
on its chemical reactivity, which involves much more energetic primary
 
chemical bonds. We have obtained no indications of any such effect
 
either from the literature or from discussion with a number of qualified
 
physical chemists.
 
One possible physical effect which we have considered is the very
 
large coefficient of thermal expansion of a gas in the critical region.
 
It has been suggested that, in a gravity-free environment, this expansion
 
may tend to create forced convection or increased mixing which would
 
increase the combustion rate in the critical region. It should be noted,
 
however, that in this same region the specific heat of the gas also
 
becomes very large (1 ) , so that a given heat input will produce only a
 
small increase in temperature. Thus, the two effects tend to cancel
 
and no markedly different combustion behavior is to be expected in the
 
critical region even in the absence of gravity.
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IV; EFFECTS OF HIGH-PRESSURE ON ACTIVATION ENERGY
 
As is well known, pressure will shift the equilibrium of a chemical
 
reaction during which a volume change takes place. Also, pressure can
 
change the effective concentration of'a gaseous reactant, and thus alter
 
its reaction rate. There is little information, however, about possible
 
(2)
effects of pressure on the activation energy itself. Bridgman cites
 
studies of the effect of pressures up to about 500 atm. on the hydrolysis
 
of esters in aqueous acid. Increases of about 20% in reaction rate are
 
observed at these pressures but this is largely attributable to increased
 
ionization of the acid under pressure. If any change in activation
 
energy takes place at these pressures, the effect must be very small.
 
To the extent that oxygen can be considered analogous with these systems,
 
no appreciable effect on activation energy is to be expected, since we
 
are dealing only with pressures of the order to 70 atmospheres.
 
Molecular oxygen is known to dimerize to the molecule 04 under
 
high pressure. The suggestion has been put forth that this molecule may
 
.dissociate into ozone and atomic oxygen, both of which are vigorous
 
' Sidgwick(3)," 
oxidizing agents. Sidgwick however, points out that the heat of
 
dimerization is only 0.13 kcal/mole and must be due to some kind of
 
van der Waals force. Under these conditions, we consider a dissociation
 
into the highly energetic species ozone and atomic oxygen to be extremely
 
unlikely. Sidgwick points out that 0. has no more oxidizing power than
 
ordinary diatomic oxygen.
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V. EFFECTS OF SPACECRAFT CONDITIONS ON EASE OF IGNITION
 
A. 	 GENERAL
 
In this section, we consider possible special effects which
 
spacecraft conditions may have on ignition processes in fluid storage
 
systems. The possibiiity of ignition implies that these systems are
 
chemically unstable and the oxygen system is undoubtedly the greatest
 
hazard in this respect. The oxygen-system is considered in detail in
 
sections B and C helow.
 
It should be also noted, however, that Teflon is chemically
 
unstable with respect to HF and carbon in the presence of hydrogen.
 
The data of Duus (4) permit us to estimate that the heat evolution will
 
be 80.5 kcal per C2F 4 unit for hydrogenation of this polymer. Duus also
 
observed that a mixture of C2F4 (monomer) and hydrogen could be ignited
 
by a hot carbon rod, and that the subsequent reaction was complete enough
 
to provide the basis for calorimetric measurements. In the case of the
 
monomer, the heat evolved is somewhat larger, amounting to about 128.8 kcal
 
per mole of C2 F4 . These figures indicate that Teflon polymer must be con­
sidered as a potential fuel in a hydrogen environment.
 
With regard to possible ignition conditions, it should be noted
 
that the Teflon-covered nickel wires may have a catalytic effect on the
 
ignition since nickel is a well known hydrogenation catalyst. It is
 
possible, for example, to visualize a sequence of events in which such a
 
wire becomes overheated by ashort circuit and pyrolyzes some of the Teflon
 
jacket into tetrafluoroethylene monomer, which becomes ignited in the
 
presence of the hot nickel surface. As discussed in section B below,
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a gravfty-free environment may facilitate the ignition process. 
Once the
 
ignition has taken place, it is expected that the combustion may spread
 
along the wires with a'large release of energy.
 
We recommend that this potential hazard be evaluated.
 
B. 	 IGNITION OF TEFLON IN OXYGEN
 
In this and the following section, we take the point of view that
 
the most likely sequence of combustion events in'the oxygen'system is 'the
 
diredt ignition-of the Teflon components followed by the spread of the
 
combustion to the metallic components. This"is"not to say that we consider
 
the-'direct ignition of the metals an impossibility,but only that, other
 
things 	being equal, the metals will requir- higher temperatures and more
 
energy 	for ignition.
 
The mnajor factors contributing to the ignition of Teflon in the
 
spacecraft oxygen system are pr6bably the high pressure and the absence
 
of gravity.' As stated above, "the fact that'the oxygen is near its
 
critical point is not expected to have ahy ,direct effect on its chemical
 
reactivity. Some data for the ignition-of Teflon in oxygen at various
 
pressures, are available; the evidence for a possible gravity effect .on
 
ignition is indirect and is inferred-by analogy to other systems.
 
The-effect of increasing pressure in reducing the minimum ignition
 
energy of gaseous mixtures is well-known. 
For such systems the minimum­
instantaneous ignition energy varies 
as- li/p2( For the ignition of 
solids in high pressure oxygen the ignition energy is'usually,not measured. 
The ignition temperature may reach,a plateau as pressure is increased. 
* See Appendix for further-discussion of the-ignitionenergy.
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Guter (6 ) has measured the ignition temperature of Teflon (TFE)
 
At 520'C, he observed
in slowly flowing oxygen at atmospheric pressure. 

at 530'C, ignition took place in 60 to 70 seconds, and at
 no ignition; 

Nihart and Smith (
7 )
 
550'C, ignition took place in about 30 
seconds. 

observed an ignition temperature of 4690C in oxygen at 2650 PSI and of
 
Marzani(8) found an ignition temperature of 4620
4740C at 7870 PSI. 

These data indicate that TFE probably attains
in oxygen at 4025 PSI. 

its minimum ignition of around 460-470'C in the pressure region between
 
Marzani considers the ignition process to take
 atmospheric and 2000 PSI. 

place in the gas phase as a result of the reaction of oxygen with gaseous
 
pyrolysis products from the polymer.
 
An effect of gravitational field on the apparent ignition temperature
 
to be inferred from a consideration of the nature of
of a gas mixture is 

the ignition process. If we consider a small volume of gas (the ignition
 
(for example a hot wire), we may
volume) containing an ignition source 

write a heat balance over this volume in the following form:
 
Qs + Qr + Q9 
where Qs is the heat added from the ignition source, Qr is the heat
 
generated by chemical reaction in the ignition volume, and Q. is the
 
heat loss, which will occur mainly by convection of the heated gas.
 
Qr will, of course, be a strong function of temperature, and when the.
 
temperature becomes high-enough so that Qs plus Qr can overcome the heat
 
loss, the gas will ignite.
 
The important point to note hre is that both Qr and Qz are
 
are in opposite directions.
affected by convection, but that the effects 

Qr may be increased by a moderate amount of convection since fresh
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reactant§ Are brought to the reaction zone. 
'QZ always rep-reseffts a loss 
of heat and will be brought tb'a minimum in the absence of a gravitational 
field. 
The errect or convection on ignition temperatur& has been studied 
by Guest(9)..using a mixture of natural gds and air:" He finds thaf the
 
use of baff-les or downward'gas currents '(whic tend to'oppose natural
 
conve'tion) ardund-a heated bar'\4ill lower dhe apparent ignition
 
temperature, sometimes -by gdeveral handred degrees :centigrade. Under 
spacecraft conditions, especially with cold, high-densit] diygen, we 
believe that convective effects will be even more important than at 
normal atmospheric pressure. For this reason, any test program which
 
fails to take account of zero-gravity effects will probably be entirely
 
inadequate.
 
C. 
 IGNITION OF METALS BY FLUOROCARBONS
 
Because of its large heat of combustion, we consider aluminum to
 
be potentially one of the most dangerous materials used in the space­
craft oxygen system. 
Because of its protective layer of high-melting
 
oxide, however, aluminum is usually very difficult to ignite in an
 
oxygen environment. 
-For example, von Grosse and Conway (1 0 ) report an
 
ignition temperature greater than 1000'C for aluminum in air. 
 In the
 
presence of carbon, however, the ignition and combustion of aluminum is
 
facilitated because the carbon tends to reduce the refractory oxide layer.
 
The same is true of the presence of fluorides since fluorine compounds
 
tend to flux the refractory layer of Al203. It is notable that the melt­
ing point of Al203 is 2015'C vs 10400 C for AlF 3.
 Teflon, containing both
 
fluorine and carbon, should therefore be an efficient ignition source
 
for aluminum as well as 
for other metals.
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We have demonstrated that this is in fact the case by a simple
 
laboratory experiment using a natural-gas fed Bunsen burner as the
 
ignition source. If the Bunsen flame is held against a small pile of
 
aluminum powder on a firebrick for several minutes, the surface of the
 
pile becomes red hot but no ignition :akes place. If the experiment is
 
repeated with aluminum containing a little powdered Teflon, however, the
 
pile ignites with a bright flash in 5 to 10 seconds. We therefore consider
 
that Teflon in the proximity of aluminum and other metals is a particularly
 
dangerous source of ignition.
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VI. -EFFECT OF SPACECRAFT CONDITIONS ONREACTION-RATE
 
AND FLAME PROPAGATION
 
We have found no data on the combustion of fuels with oxygen in
 
the vicinity of its critical point. The reverse case, namely the burning
 
of oil drops above and below the critical point in high-pressure air, has
 
been studied by Faeth et al.'--' under gravity-free conditions in a
 
freely-falling chamber. These authors find that the droplet lifetim
 
decreases monotonically with pressure up to the critical pressure.
 
Above this point the droplet lifetime increased roughly in proportion
 
to the cube root of the pressure. It is not obvious that this case
 
applies to the spacecraft conditions, but the data at least indicate
 
that no unusual or unpredictable phenomena occur in the critical region.
 
The absence of gravity is probably the greatest factor in determin­
ing combustion behavior in the spacecraft oxygen system. It is now
 
generally recognized (12, 13) that combustion is retarded in the absence
 
of gravity due to lack of convective mixing. In the supercritical oxygen
 
system, however, there are several factors operating which tend to
 
accelerate the combustion despite the lack of gravity. The first of
 
these factors is the high pressure and density of the oxygen. Because
 
of this, only a small motion of the fluid will be required to bring in
 
enough oxygen to support combustion. Such motion could be produced,
 
for example, by the stirring mechanisms in the container or by small
 
local accelerations due to ignition.
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The second factor is that extended surfaces, such as paper, string,
 
or insulated wire, cin continue to propagate combustion because the flame
 
front moves along the surface into a region where the oxidizer is not
 
depleted.
 
The third factor is that if combustion takes place in a partially
 
enclosed space, such as a tube with one end closed, the expanding fluid
 
can produce forced convection currents which will be highly effective
 
in fanning the combustion.
 
We conclude that the gravity-free environment is no reliable
 
defense against violent combustion in these systems.
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VII. TEST METHODS FOR POTENTIALLY FLAMMABLE MATERIALS
 
IN HIGH-PRESSURE FLUIDS
 
As stated above, we consider the current test procedures to be
 
inadequate in several respects for predicting the hazards in spacecraft
 
fluid systems. In particular, we recommend the following tests.
 
1. 	 The ignition of Teflon in supercritical oxygen should be
 
studied in a gravity free environment. As stated in
 
section V above, there are reasons for believing that the
 
absence of gravity will render ignition much easier under
 
these conditions. Tests should be made of the effects of
 
heavy currents or simulated short circuits on Teflon
 
insulated wires, and of the effects of sparking such as might
 
be caused by the grounding of a wire with faulty insulation.
 
2. 	 The same type of tests should be conducted in supercritical
 
hydrogen to determine if Teflon will ignite and support
 
combustion under these conditions.
 
3. Tests should be conducted with the same combinations of
 
materials as are used in the spacecraft system. We consider
 
the proximity of Teflon to aluminum and other metals to be
 
particularly hazardous. The ignition of metals by burning
 
Teflon in oxygen should be studied. In hydrogen, there
 
appears to be little hazard of metal ignition.
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APPENDIX
 
THE MINIMUM ENERGY REQUIREDY TO IGNITE A
 
COMBUSTIBLE GAS MIXTURE IN ZERO GRAVITY
 
(The following derivation was communicated via telephone .by 
Dr. William E. Gordon. Because of the pressure of time-, Dr. Gordon has
 
not had the opportunity of reviewing this manuscript.)
 
In view of the possible formation of combustible mixtures, such as
 
oxygen and Teflon vapor in the spacecraft, it is of some interest to
 
know what minimum energy must be supplied to such a mixture, for example,
 
in the form of a spark, to cause ignition.
 
Two conditions are necessary for ignition--the energy supplied
 
must raise the temperature of a volume of the mixture above the ignition
 
temperature and the heated volume must exceed a certain critical size.
 
The critical volume v must have a radius comparable with the
 
thickness of the flame front no that develops after ignition. Thus
 
47 3 (1)V = -o 
The reason for this requirement is that if the heated volume were smaller, 
the additional heat developed by the reacting gases would flow away so 
quickly from the hot spot by conducting that the rate of heat loss would
 
be larger than the rate of heat generation and a propagating flame would
 
not develop.
 
'the magniuae or tne rame rronr tnicness po is sucn tnat rne
 
forward heat flow by conduction into the cold unreacted gas at temperature
 
T is just enough to raise its tiemperature to the flame temperature Tf, i.e.,
 
K f- ) = C p Vf(Tf - TO) (2) 
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where vf is the flame velocity, and K, C, p are the conductivity,
 
specific heat, and density of the unreacted gas. Therefore,
 
no C p v(3) 
The flame velocity vf depends on the rate of heat generation in the
 
reaction and on the thermal mass of the gas.
 
The energy Eo needed for ignition is the energy to raise the
:1 
temperature of the volume V from T to Tf
 
E, = C p V(T T (4) 
From (1) and (2) this becomes
 
E K (T - T ) 
1 3 223C p Vf 
Since the quantities T, Vf, K, and C vary only slowly with pressure p
 
and p varies directly with pressure, we see that 
Ei1 -. (6) 
P 
This relation shows that at 60 atmospheres pressure the energy
 
needed to initiate a flame in a combustible mixture is a factor of 3600
 
less than at 1 atmosphere.
 
The i/p law derived here agrees with experimental data on ignition
 
by sparks reported by Lewis and von Elbe, Combustion, Flames and Explosions
 
of Cases (Academic Press, Inc., New York, 1961) p. 328, at the low end of
 
their pressure range where the conditions should approximate those of zero
 
gravity since buoyant forces are relatively less important at low pressures.
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APPENDIX F
 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HAZARDOUS ASPECTS OF STORAGE AND HANDLING OF 
OXIDIZERS AND FUELS USED IN APOLLO AND IM SYSTEMS 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
This is a review of the materials-carried in the-Apollo and
 
Lyvehicles with regard to hazards from--inadvertent reaction. It
 
corresponds with Part C of the task outline contained in the
 
May 12 letter fromR. C.. Ried,,feputy Director, Panel 7, to
 
E., S, Shanley.
 
This discussion covers oxygen, nitrogen-tetroxide, hydrogen,
 
Aerozine-50 and monomethylhydrazine. The treatment is based on normal
 
chemical considerations without regard for any special properties
 
of critical state materials, the effects of zero gravity, or other
 
space-related phenomena.
 
Helium, nitrogen, and water also carried on these vehicles,
 
are non-reactive and of no concern for the purpose of this discussion.
 
II. SUMMARY
 
Consideration of the materials carried on Apollo and 114
 
Lndicates that the significant chemical hazards are posed by oxygen
 
and the hydrazines.
 
The,hazards of oxygen although widely known are frequently under­
stimated. Oxygen is vigorously reactive with almost all materials
 
3f construction including its own containers and piping systems.
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In the ultimate, safety rests solely in the ability to eliminate all
 
possible sources of ignition. Inclusion of electrical wiring in high­
pressure oxygen systems is an example bf extremely hazardous design.
 
Two hydrazine compositions are carried in Apollo and II: Aerozine-50
 
and monomethyl hydrazine. These-materials have a good-record of
 
safety in use. Nevertheless, each is highly unstable by itself.
 
Calculated heat of decomposition of Aerozine-50 liquid to the most
 
stable gaseous products is about 1450 BTU per pound. The value for
 
monomethyl hydrazine is almost the same. In the thermochemical sense
 
these materials are less stable than ammonium nitrate, 100% hydrogen
 
peroxide, or nitromethane. Our study thus far leaves open the possibility
 
that the hydrazines may be capable of violent decomposition through
 
the effects of some as-yet unknown initiating mechanism.
 
III. OXIDANTS
 
A. GENERAL
 
Chemical hazards, aside from toxicity, are related to uncontrolled
 
release of energy. It is a common observation that oxidants are more
 
frequently involved in accidental energy release than are fuels and
 
reducing agents. This circumstance results from the fact that many
 
oxidizing agents contain stored chemical energy which is subject to
 
rapid release under some conditions. Beyond this, oxidizing agents
 
are reactive or potentially reactive with many structural materials.
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Virtually all metals, organic compounds, polmers and plastics are
 
subject to oxidation accompanied by more or less substantial energy
 
release. Accordingly, a system composed of an oxidizing agent and its
 
container is usually thermochemically unstable and subject to.spontaneous
 
reaction. 
 At the present state of the art, it is not possible to build
 
tanks, gauges, and piping systems of unoxidizable materials such as
 
glass or ceramics. 
Recourse must be had to selection of materials which
 
are relatively difficult to ignite and which react least vigorously with
 
theioxidant. 
 Beyond thisy means are adapted to eliminate ignition sources.
 
Given this sort of evolution, oxidizing agents are handled with relative
 
safety. However, the history is generously sprinkled with accidents of
 
greater or less severity. It is salutory to bear iii mind that every
 
metallic or plastic container filled with an oxidant is an energetic
 
reaction 'system in a meta-stable condition. Each such system is capable
 
of mor& or less rapid energy release aicompanied by destruction of the
 
container i'f a suitable ignition source is provided.
 
It is not possible to specify exactly the nature or magnitude
 
of a suitible'ignition source. 
Ease of ignition is not an intrinsic
 
property bUt depends on state of sub-division, presence of foreign
 
materials; and on other circumstances. For example, structural metals
 
generally burn in oxygen only after heating to relatively high temperature.
 
However, iron, lead, nickel, and many other metals ignite spontaneously
 
in Air if sufficietly finely divided. 
Foreign materials frequently
 
exert a profound effectr oh the rate*ofoxidation reactions. Metals and
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metal oxides frequently increase the rate of reaction between oxidants
 
and combustible matter and can lead to spontaneous reaction at room
 
temperature.
 
We have found little information on the effect of foreign
 
materials acting as catalysts for the oxidation of metals. However,
 
it is prudent to assume that such effects may exist. Accordingly,
 
one should design containers for oxidizers in a-way that facilitates rigorous
 
cleaning. Further, the number and variety of materials exposed to the
 
oxidant should be held to an absolute minimum, since the possibility of
 
unanticipated cooperative reactions can.not be ruled out.
 
B. 	OXYGEN
 
The literature on oxygen hazards is very extensive and not
 
reassuring. Oxygen handling systems are plagued by accidental fires.
 
Most of these occur in the gas as opposed to the liquid. The combustion
 
process frequently involves the materials of construction of the.handling
 
system. Organic contaminants in trace amounts are frequently cited as
 
intermediate, easily ignited fuel which served asa sort of kindling.
 
Table 1 contains information on the heat of reaction of oxygen
 
with various materials, together with other information. In general,
 
materials with low heats of combustion are to be preferred to those with
 
higher heat release. Materials with high ignition temperatures are at
 
least somewhat safer from accidental ignition. Materials which melt
 
before reaching ignition temperature are considered safer than materials
 
which hold their shape and position until ignition occurs. Ignition
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TABLE 1
 
Oxidation Properties of Some Common Materials
 
Oxidation 

Material Product 

Aluminum Al203 

Copper CuO 

Iron 
 Fe203 

Nickel, NiO, 

Lead PbO 

Palladium PdO 

Platinum YtO 

Tin SnO2 

Titanium TiO2 

Silver Ag20 

Zinc ZnO 

Teflon CO + CF 

Heat Released
 
BTU/lb. of 

Material Burned 

12,650 

1,100 

3,200 

1,800 

450 

167 

81 

2,110 

8,200 

115 

2,280 

2 4-19098 
Hydrogen H20 (g) 52,000 
Fuel Oil H20(g) + CO2 18,000 
Coal CO2 14,000 
Ignition* 
Temp.0F 
M.P. 
OF 
>183*k 1220 
1982-** 1982 
1710 2885 
-- 2642 
1600 620 
-- 2822 
-- 3254 
1590 448 
1130 3272 
1742 
1650 786 
985
 
1085
 
500 (approx)
 
500 (approx)
 
* Data for metals mostly taken from von Grosse, Ind. Eng. Chem., 50, 663(1958).
 
Values are somewhat variable.
 
**Variable figures are reported for aluminum.
 
***An oxygen at 1 atm. Graves, W.E., Iron and Steel Engr., 988 (Jan.-, 1965).
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temperature, as noted above, is highly dependent on state of subdivision,
 
purity, and presence of foreign materials. The values quoted in Table I
 
are for relatively pure, massive material.
 
Oxygen systems are actually designed on the basis of empirical
 
information and experience. However, history indicates that designers
 
continually underestimate the hazards of oxygen. Perhaps familiarity and
 
non-toxicity lead easily to relaxation of vigilance. Also, oxygen and
 
combustible materials frequently exhibit no signs of reaction at all until
 
some initiation is provided. Once started, the reaction often proves
 
to be violent and destructive. In this connection it is necessary to
 
continually stress the vulnerability of organic materials in oxygen.
 
Organic compositions almost without exception are subject to spontaneous
 
reaction with oxygen. Ignition temperature may be low or moderate.
 
Small quantities of organic matter have frequently served to initiate
 
reaction betweeh oxygen and structural elements. It is worth noting
 
that even poly(tetrafluoroethylene) one of the most chemically inert
 
of organic compositions, burns rather readily in oxygen and releases
 
as much heat as many metals.
 
High oxygen pressure lowers the ignition temperature of many
 
materials. Outbreak of fire is infrequent in completely static systems.
 
The initiation process-is usually associated with some change, such as
 
first pressurization of a pipe or vessel, pressure surge leading to
 
adiabatic compression and high temperature in the gas phase, high
 
velocity impact due to particulates in the gas stream, static discharge
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or inadvertent-external heating. C. H. Reynales (2) has cited eight
 
more or less well-established causes of accidental fires in oxygen
 
equipment of which the above are typical.
 
There is no dependable standard procedure for testing materials
 
in oxygen. Rather, it is necessary to devise tests which simulate normal
 
use conditions,and also the worst anticipated conditions. To the extent
 
possible, whole configurations should be tested, since it is not
 
possible to anticipate all of the interactions that may occur. In thinking
 
about test methods, it is useful to bear in mind-that most initiation is
 
ultimately thermal in nature. Thermal excitation can be provided in
 
various ways as by adiabatic compression, a shock wave, 'an electric
 
spark or short circuit, and so on. The rate of temperature rise and
 
the amount of initiating energy delivered are the most important
 
distinbuishing factors.
 
The Apollo EPS oxygen system inevitably involves most of the
 
usual hazards of high pressure oxygen ,systems. Much of the system is
 
cold, which provides a certain.amount of protection against -local
 
hot spots. Important increases in safety margin will depend upon
 
the following changes:
 
- Rigorous limitation of the amount and variety of material
 
exposed to high pressure oxygen.
 
- Exclusion of possible sources of high temprature in the high
 
pressure oxygen system. Electrical power wiring in an
 
oxygen container is an extreme example of hazardous design.
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- Exclusion of relatively easily ignitable materials,
 
such as Teflon, other polymers or plastics, and all
 
other organic materials. All such materials may serve
 
as starter fuels whose ignition may lead to combustion
 
of the oxygen-containing structure itself.
 
- Careful attention to the design of reducing valves,
 
shut-off systems, pop-off valves, and the like, to
 
minimize the possibility of pressure surges and other
 
mechanical effects which may lead to high temperature.
 
C. 	NITROGEN TETROXIDE
 
Nitrogen tetroxide, N204, is a thermochemically stable
 
material; therefore, it has no potential for spontaneous decomposition.
 
Spontaneous fires or violent reaction can result on -mixingor contact
 
between nitrogen tetroxide and combustible materials. Inadvertent mixing
 
with hydrazine-type fuel would of course lead to spontaneous violent
 
reaction. Spillage on combustible insulating material or other organic
 
matter can lead to high fire risk.
 
Trace quantities of organic material are far less dangerous
 
in N204 than in oxygen. Most lubricants, many polymers, and other
 
organic materials likely to be found as contaminants are soluble in
 
N204 and therefore experience dilution and dispersion in contact
 
with this oxidizer. Further, most organic materials are oxidized
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or nitrated more or less rapidly on contact with N204 leading to an
 
automatic cleaning process. By contrast, organic material can accumulate
 
in oxygen systems, only to react violently upon some later initiation.
 
Nitrogen tetroxide in a metal container constitutes a thermo­
chemically unstable system. However, common materials of construction
 
such as stainless steel, plain steel, nickel and aluminum alloys do
 
not seem to be subject to fast reaction with N 0 even under adverse
 
2 4'
 
conditions. We have found no record of accidents involving rapid reaction
 
of structural metals with this oxidant. The Apollo N204 tank is of a
 
titanium alloy. Titanium is known to have excellent corrosion resistance
 
to N204 and to nitric acid. It is highly probable that titanium is not
 
subject to fast reaction with this oxidant, although we have not found
 
documentation on this point.
 
The relatively low hazard potential implied above is borne
 
out by many years of essentially incident-free experience with nitrogen
 
tetroxide. Aside from-mechanical failure of the tank or handling system,
 
the nitrogen tetroxide poses no special safety problem in the Apollo
 
system.
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IV. FUELS
 
Most fuels are not capable of spontaneous decomposition.
 
Thus hydrogen gas, hydrocarbons, arid most combustible materials liberate
 
heat only through reaction with oxygen or some other oxidizing agent.
 
Further, such materials are not subject to reaction with common materials
 
of construction. Tanks containing ordinary fuels including hydrogen
 
are accordingly relatively free of chemical hazard. Fire risk of
 
greater or less degree arises of course if leaks occur. Other than
 
this and the usual mechanical hazards of pressure vessels, fuel tanks
 
in general and the Apollo hydrogen tanks in particular are relatively
 
free from chemical hazard.
 
The hydrazine family of fuels is exceptional in the fact that
 
they contain a substantial amount of stored chemical energy. Table 2
 
below contains information. Decomposition to the elements results in
 
substantial energy release, as indicated by positive values for heat of
 
formation and free energy of formation.
 
It is likely that all of these materials decompose spontaneously
 
to yield ammonia and/or ammonia derivatives, rather than the elements.
 
Below are listed the energetically most favorable decomposition reactions
 
together with estimates of heat yield.
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TABLE 2
 
Properties of Hydrazine and Hydrazine Derivatives
 
Heat of Formation* Free Energy of* Formation
 
'of the-Liquid'From 
 of the Liquid from its
 
its Elements Elements
 
Composition Formula K Cal/K-mol BTU/Ib. K Cal/g mol BTU/Ib.
 
Hydrazine ±N2H4 + 675 + 2135
12.0 + 38.0 

5 N ­
hydrazine H 
Monomethyl NH2 + 12.7 + 496 -- --
Dimethyl CH3
 
hydrazine - N - + 12.74 + 381NE2 

CH31
 
UDMH 

Aerozine 50 50% N 2 4 + 12.25 + 527.6
 
50% UDMH
 
*Positive sign indicates absorption of energy on formation of the compound.
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Hydrazine
 
3N2 H4(t) - 4NH3 (g) + N2 (g) 
AH = -.837 Cal/g
 
- 1445 BTU/lb. of hydrazine decomposed
 
AF = - 1310 Cal/g
 
of hydrazine decomposed
 
- 2260 BTU/lb. 
Dimethyl hydrazine
 
cH 3 "SC N NH22C 
C - - 2C 4 (g) + N2 ( g) 
AR = - 810 Cal/g 
Of UDMH decomposed
 
- 1460 BTU/lb. 
Monomethyl hydrazine
 
6 N - N) - 6CH 4 + 4NH ± N 
4HH 3 2 
AH = - 823 Cal/g
 
of monomethyl hydrazine decomposed
 
- 1480 BTU/Ib.
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The reaction wrftten ae tfie m:646 energetically 'favorable ones. 
Actual decomposition may not follow the suggested paths. Nevertheless, 
materlals'with'such substarital'possible heats of decomposition (and at 
least in'the case of hydrazine, free energy of decomposition) must be viewed 
with some concern, regardless :of the results of empirical tesiing. 
For example, TNT releases 'about 1000 cal/g on dxplosion. Solid ammonium 
:Kitfate has a calculated heat of decomposition of about 355 cag to yield
 
gaseous products. Hydrogen peroxide 100% yields'about 370 cal/g on
 
decomposition to gaseous products. Nitromethane yields a calculated heat
 
of decomposition of about 630 cal/g. All of these materials can be
 
brought to detonation, although some of them require strenuous initiation.
 
All have been involved in highly destructive accidents.
 
It may be possible to develop additional understanding of
 
hydrazine-family compounds by calculation of entropy changes in the
 
explosion state. For example, it appears that explosion may fail to
 
occur in some energy-rich materials because the entropy of the products
 
in the explosion state would be less than that of the original compound.
 
The entropy effect in question can occur only at extreme pressures and
 
therefore pertains only to condensed-phase materials. The known
 
detonability of hydrazine vapor is compatible with this idea but not
 
diagnostic. The vapor would be expected to be considerably more sensitive
 
than the liquid because the heat added in vaporization is large, i.e.,
 
10.7 K cal/g mol '(600 BTU/lb.).
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It would be possible to explore the entropy concept only
 
through a considerable computation program.
 
We have not been able to search the hydrazine literature
 
with great thoroughness. However, information on handling the
 
hydrazines is based on a relatively limited number of original studies
 
and a great deal of successful handling experience. This does not preclude
 
the possibility that some unexpected initiation mechanism could exist
 
for these highly unstable materials.
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AP .IX G
 
During our visit to MSC n8.and,'29 Apr iwe-attended on-going meetings
 
il-we
Durin ou visit, - o M, 
of the Spacecraft Incident Investigation-Committee in Building 25, Room
 
320. A duplicate of the service module supercritical oxygen tank was
 
located in this conference area for us to look at. The domed portion of
 
the vacuum vessel was removed to pdrmit viewing of the opening into the
 
interior of the tank and the components that were located in the dome
 
space. We took paiticular noti bf the witiiig conduit which contained the
 
power leads for the fan motors and heaters,and the instrument leads for
 
the thermostats, compacitant gauge and thermistor temperature sensor.. These
 
leads feed through the vacuum shell in a hermetic seal which then pass into
 
the oxygen vessel through ,a,1/2-inch (approximately) -diameter tubing formed
 
into a 10-inch coil with approiimately d tutns. the interior of the conduit
 
is open to pressurized oxygen to the point of the hermetic seal. The conduit
 
appears td be supported only at its ends where it is attached to the vacuum
 
shell and to the oxygen inner-vessel. There appear to be no mechanical
 
supports of this conduit at intermediate locations. We were told that the
 
dome area of the vacuum vessel is filled with "chopped aluminized mylar"
 
[probably tinsel] which may have filled the spaces around the coil.
 
One possible explanation for the power short is that the insulation on
 
the power wires could have become abraded due to vibration of the conduit.
 
We can conceive that the condiuit, responding to, the -launch environment, can
 
cause the rubbing of the power leads against one another with a subsequent
 
loss of electrical insulation. This rubbing action could be enhanced if
 
the conduit wires were installed under strain. The close proximity of any
 
two power leads with reduced thickness of insulation can lead to a power
 
short.
 
P)RECDING PAGE BLANK NOT
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We feel that there are a number of unanswered questions-about the conduit
 
system. Its natural frequency, and deflections, for example, should be
 
determined both by analysis and/or experiment. It is not known what
 
dampening effect the mylar."insulation located"r ,thedone 'has'on this
 
conduit when the service module is subjected to the mechanical vibrations
 
experienced at launch. Further, it is important to study the method of
 
assembling the leads into the conduit, as the procedures may have intro­
duced strains into these wires~which cbuidcause or increase insulation
 
wear. These conditions could then have led to the situation where an
 
initiation source of sufficient energy, produced by shorting of the power
 
leads, ignited the surrounding teflon and then resulted in catastrophic
 
failure of the oxygen storage vessel.
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COMPATIBILITY TESTING OF
 
-MATERIALS FOR SPACECRAFT
 
Materials used in a spacecraft are currently being selected from an
 
approved list. Materials in this list had undergone testing according to
 
standard tests developed by or-for NASA. These tests are basically related
 
to the flammability of the material1 and/or its compatability2 with the
 
gases and liquids to which it will be exposed. We feel that the tests were
 
designed essentially for the purpose of selecting materials for use in the
 
manned section of the spacecraft where the pressure is relatively low and
 
oxygen is the only gas which is of concern. It is possible that materials
 
passing these tests have been selected and used under different environmental
 
conditions in other parts of the spacecraft and where they could present a
 
hazardous situation. For example, an insulation which may be adequate for
 
use in pure oxygen at 1 atm may be too flammable to use at high pressures
 
in an oxygen storage tank. A metal which may be compatible with liquid
 
oxygen by the standard drop-weight test at 1 atm, may fail a similar test
 
performed in gaseous oxygen at 60 atm. We believe that the material/
 
environment/test interrelationship should be examined more carefully in
 
order to arrive at a better testing program, the results of which will
 
serve as a more reliable basis for the selection of materials for use
 
aboard spacecraft in the future.
 
Examination of all likely causes of accidents aboard the spacecraft
 
should lead to a number of tests which will simulate possible hazardous
 
situations and environments. Examples:
 
1. 	For example, NASA, MSC, SN-P-003, "Procedures and Requirements for the
 
Flammability and Off-gassing Evaluation of Spacecraft Nonmetallic Materials",
 
January 15, 1968.
 
2. 	For example, NASA-MSFC-SPEC-106B, "Testing Compatibility of Materials
 
for Liquid Oxygen Systems".
 
205 
1. 	 Two materials may be individually compatible with the environ­
ment, but taken together, they may no longer be acceptable
 
(e.g., aluminum powder is difficult to ignite in air. Mixed
 
with teflon powder, it becomes a dangerous squib). Teflon­
insulated nickel and copper wires should thus be tested under
 
the environment to which they will be exposed. Since shorting
 
due to mechanical erosion is possible, the wires employed in
 
the oxygen tank should have been tested by shorting in 02 at
 
900 psi while carrying representative loads.
 
2. 	 The jet of gas, liquid or aerosol emerging at sonic velocity
 
from a crack or pinhole in the wall of a high pressure tank and
 
impinging upon insulation or other adjacent objects may cause
 
enoughheating and erosion at the stagnation point for ignition
 
to occur. A compatibility test could be easily-designed for­
checking the effect of impingement of high velocity gas And
 
liquid jets on materials.
 
3. 	 Wire bundles are widely used in spacecraft. Since ignition
 
temperatures of materials are generally lowered in oxygen
 
atmospheres and especially at high pressures, and because of
 
the absence of natural convection (cooling) currents in.zero­
gravity, it is quite possible for the-internal temperatures
 
of a bundle to rise to dangerous levels due to heat accumulation.
 
A theoretical solution of the temperature profile in a realistic
 
wire 	bundle is not easily attainable because of the complexity
 
of the wire and load distribution. In general, all previous
 
work 	has been limited to homogeneous bundles consisting of
 
similar wires carrying similar loads.
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We believe that the thermal behavior of actual wire bundles
 
should be examined more carefully, particularly in reference
 
to the distribution of high-load carrying wires. As an
 
interim remedy to a possible cause of an accident aboard
 
spacecraft, high-load carrying wires should be separated as
 
.far as possible and placed on the outside of the bundle.
 
Tests should be designed to ascertain that no dangerous heat
 
accumulation will occur in a wire bundle when each wire is
 
allowed to carry the maximum possible electric load..
 
4. 	 In going through the list of materials used in the oxygen tank,
 
we noted a number of materials which are listed by NASA as
 
noncompatible with liquid oxygen (e.g., Solder Tin-lead 60:40),
 
yet being used in supereritical oxygen at 900 psi. It seems
 
reasonable to assume that materials which are unacceptable for
 
use in liquid oxygen at atmospheric pressure will also be un­
acceptable (if not more so) in 900 psi gaseous oxygen. 
Other
 
materials which are satisfactory in liquid oxygen may prove
 
unacceptable for use with 900 psi oxygen gas. We believe
 
that the presence of such materials in the tank, even though
 
they are employed in small amounts and in stationary equipment,
 
constitutes a hazard. The- compatibility test should be ex­
tended to cover oxygen at the high pressures to which the
 
material is to be exposed.
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Background
 
It is our understanding that the supercritical oxygen storage
 
vessels in the service module are thermally protected with multilayer
 
insulation. This insulation is in the vacuum space between the inner and
 
outer shells and is used to support the inner vessel in the outer one.
 
It consists of alternate layers of aluminum foil and glass paper spacer
 
under a compressive load of the order of 1 psi. The spacer is impregnated
 
with a silicone binder to stabilize the fibers in the mechanical environ­
ments. In the evacuated dome at the top of the vessel, where the piping
 
and 	wiring conduits pass through the vessel walls, thermal insulation
 
is provided in the form of gold coated Kapton and aluminized mylar. The
 
aluminized mylar is wrapped around the wiring conduit. The gold coated
 
Kapton in strips 1 inch wide is woven among the piping and is used to
 
fill the open spaces between the inner and outer vessel walls.
 
Discussion
 
In another technical memorandum (1 ) we have made an analytical study
 
of the possible temperature conditions which could arise from the leakage
 
of oxygen into the insulation space and its subsequent pressurization.
 
The results indicate that temperature of the order of 1100'F are possible.
 
It is a well-known fact that most organic materials ignite at temperatures
 
between 400 and 500'F in air and that this ignition temperature is lowered
 
as the total pressure and partial pressure of oxygen are raised. While
 
there is little data on the ignition temperature and burning behavior of
 
the organic and silicone materials found in the insulation space of the
 
oxygen tanks, we believe that these materials should be treated as hazardous
 
until their benign nature can be demonstrated.
 
For 	many years, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy have had
 
standard specifications for liquid oxygen storage tanks for use at bases
 
and on shipboard. A significant feature of these specifications is the
 
requirement for inert, non-flammable insulation for use in the vacuum
 
space of the storage tank. Definitive tests are delineated to prove non­
flammability of the insulation in a pure oxygen atmosphere in the presence
 
of a hot wire or spark.
 
(1) 	J.C. Burke, Analysis of Thermodynamic Temperature Rise Resulting
 
from Pressurization of Insulation Space by High Pressure Oxygen
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We recommend that comparable tests be specified by NASA which will
 
be a requirement of any future procurement for oxygen.storage vessels.
 
The maximum pressure obtainable in the insulation spade of the vessels
 
can be specified, and proof of the safety of the insulation should be
 
obtained.
 
Alternately, we recommend that all Mylar and Kapton materials be
 
removed from the dome area of the storage vessels. The void spaces in
 
this region should be filled with unbonded and unlubricated, type B,
 
glass wool fibers. Several radiation shields of aluminum or gold foil
 
can be easily combined with the glass wool to achieve thermal conductances
 
that are comparable to the present system. 
The elimination of combustible
 
materials from the dome region,.where oxygen leakage source-s are probable,
 
will greatly improve the hazardous dondltions and will mitigate against
 
catastrophic failure of the storage system.
 
Further we recommend the removal of silicone binder from the spacer
 
material. 
We have no information concerning the manufacturing procedures
 
and techniques used in producing and applying the multilayer insulation
 
to the oxygen tanks. We believe, however, that it should be possible to
 
remove the silicone binder from the glass spacer and replace it with sodium
 
silicate with negligible loss in mechanical and thermal properties. Glass
 
-and quartz spacers are available in which the bonding of fibers is accomplished
 
by partial sintering of the fibers. 
 Light weight woven glass fabrics are
 
also available for construction of an adequate spacer system.
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I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
We have examined the possible temperature rises associated with the
 
pressurization of the insulation space due to leakage of high pressure
 
oxygen from the inner vessel. The analysis herein deals only with the
 
overall thermodynamic effects of pressurizing the insulation space. It
 
specifically does consider the possibility of local hot spots due to the
 
impingement of high velocity flow or due to shock waves.
 
In performing the analysis we considered three analytical models:
 
1. 	 Expansion with complete mixing.
 
This is a rational model for an open tank which,in fact,has been
 
confirmed in previous experiments involving the pressurization of the
 
ullage space in a fuel tank. However it is likely to be non-conservative
 
for the insulation space passage where mixing would be inhibited.
 
2. 	 Piston-type isentropic compression.
 
This is a very conservative model in terms of the assumption of
 
piston type compression (i.e. no mixing) and especially the assumption
 
of adiabatic compression.
 
3. 	 Piston-type compression with the compressed gas in thermal
 
equilibrium with the insulation material.
 
This is a refinement of case 2 which accounts for the maximum heat
 
transfer between the compressed gas and insulation. It is probably the
 
most reasonable model, but since maximum heat transfer is assumed, it is
 
not necessarily-conservative.
 
The results show that the temperature rise in the insulation space
 
is relatively low for model 1 (mixed expansion). The temperature ratio
 
(final temperature over initial temperature) is equal to 1.4, independent
 
of pressure ratio. Using an initial temperature of 300'K, and a tempera­
ture ratio of 1.4 results in a final temperature of 420'K or about 300'F.
 
The isentropic compression model predicts very high temperatures.
 
In this case the temperature ratio is equal to the pressure ratio raised
 
to the (R-I)/K power. With the very high pressure ratios theoretically
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attainable, temperature ratios are-borrespond'itgly high. For instance
 
if the ullage is pressurized from I micron to 75 psia, the pressure
 
ratio is about 4 x 106 and the temperature ratio is 75. Starting 	at an
 
initial temperature of 3000K the theoretical final temperature would be
 
22,5000K or about 40,0000 F.
 
Model 3, (piston compression with thermal equilibrium between
 
compressed gas and insulation) predicts temperature rises s6mewhat
 
greater than model 1 but far less than predicted by the isentropic
 
compression. This model indicates that if the insulation space were com­
pressed to 75 psia, the maximum final temperature would be 4000 F; 	if
 
0
compressed locally to 900 psia, the final temperature would be ll F.
 
From this study, we conclude that if leakage of high pressure
 
oxygen into the insulation space occurs, the potential exists for sub­
stantial temperature rises, possibly approaching the ignition temperature of
 
many common insulation materials.
 
II. INTRODUCTION
 
A potential hazard in high pressure oxygen systems is the possibility
 
that temperatures may exceed the ignition temperature of materials in
 
the system. One mechanism for realizing a substantial.and perhaps "dXngerous
 
temperature.is the rapid compression of a confined volume. 
We have.
 
knowledge of a catastrophic accident of this type which occurred some
 
years ago in a gaseous oxygen pressurization line when sudden pressurization
 
initiated the combustion of a nylon valve seal. 
We have also conducted
 
analytical and experimental studies on the pressurization of fuel tanks
 
where combustion was ,apossibility.-

For the high pressure oxygen sphere in question, a dangerous situation
 
may exist if the vacuum space were pressurized due to a leak from the con­
tents of the inner vessel. Our study of the propagation of cracks in the
 
inner sphere indicate that crack leakage is very unlikely to exist for
 
any finite time prior to catastrophic failure of the inner vessel. 
However,
 
it is possible that leakage may occur from some other source such as a
 
leak in a fuel cell supply line. This leakage might not be catastrophic
 
except for the temperature rise phenomena in the vacuum space which might
 
exceed the ignition temperature of materials in the insulation space.
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III. ANALYTICAL MODELS 
The following models represent different physical descrip­
tions of the pressurization of the vacuum space due to leakage
 
of high pressure oxygen from the inner vessel.
 
In all of these models the conditions in the high pressure 
reservoir are considered constant during the pressurization. 
Further, we assume that the initial temperatures in the high 
pressure tank and the vacuum space are equal. In the analyses 
below, the subscript 1 denotes initial condition; subscript 2, 
final condition. 
Model 1. Expansion With Complete Mixing 
h, Am. a 
Assuming that the initial value of the mass of gas in the 
insulation space (m) is zero and that the entering enthalpy (h) 
is constant, the first law of thermodynamics results in
 
h =U (i1 
From the definition of enthalpy and the equation of state
 
for a perfect gas
 
h 1 u= +4RTI 
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From the above equations
 
U2 - U = Cv(T2 - T1) .= RT1 (3) 
Noting that R = Cp Cv , (or R/cv = k-i), equation (3) can be 
written as: 
T2 /T 1 = k (4) 
Taking the ratio of specific heats (k)-as 1.4 and assuming an
 
initial temperature of 300°K
 
T2 = 4200K = 296 0F 
It may be noted that in the more general case where the initial
 
mass is not zero, the temperature rise is somewhat less than
 
predicted above.
 
Model2. Isentropic Piston Compression
 
If we assume that the incoming gas does not mix with the gas
 
previously in the vacuum space, we can replace this incoming gas'
 
by'a piston.
 
P
 
If.we further assume that the compressed gas does not ex­
change heat with the cylinder walls, the compression can be con­
sidered to be isentropic. In the isentropic case, the temperature
 
ratio can be related to the pressure ratio or the volume ratio
 
as follows:
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T/T ~k-i 	 (a
 
T2/T1 	 (P2 /P1 ) k (5a)
 
T2TI (V2 /V1 )1- k 	 (5b) 
(The derivation of these equations, which is given in many
 
standard texts will not be repeated here.)
 
The isentropic compression case leads to very high theoretical
 
.temperature ratios. For instance if the vacuum space is initially
 
at one micron and is compressed to 75 psia
 
_ 75 PSIA 4 x 106
 
2 1 1 IICRON
 
6 285
T2/T1 = 	(4 x 10 = 75 
T2 = (75) (300) = 22,5000K = 40,000°F
 
Obviously we would not expect such temperatures to be real.
 
The extreme conservation of the isentropic compression model is
 
due both to the "no mixing" assumption and the assumption of
 
adiabatic 	compression. We would expect the latter assumption to
 
be particularly inaccurate at low initial pressures since the
 
thermal energy per unit volume of the gas to be compressed is
 
initially 	so low as to be readily dissipated by heat transfer to
 
the insulation. For this reason we have considered the effect of
 
insulation thermal capacitance in Model 3 below.
 
Model 3. 	Piston Compression with Thermal Equilibrium
 
Between Compressed Gas and Insulation
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PT v
- -In this model we assume that the dompre-ssed gas (or end gas) 
is in thermal equilibrimn iith the insulation materiL (or a 
fixed proportion thereof),surrounding the end gas. As indicited
 
in the sketch above, we consider the insulation mass-specific
 
heat'product (inC ) which attains thermal equilibrium with the 
end gas is directly proportional to end'gas volume (V). 
From the first law 'of thermodynamics: 
- pdV, = mC dT + m C dT (6)
v mm 
Using the lquation of, state for a perfect'gas (pV =mRT),
 
and noting that R Cp-Cv, Equation 6'dan be rewritten-as:
 
dT r k_ V (7)L 1mLmCv
 
Prior to integrating this equation we wilJ'make'the subtitution: 
mC
mm 
m 
 = al V/V1 
V
 
where
 
a 1 
Integration of Equation 7 now results in:
 
(8)
[i (V/V + '1T = 
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It may be noted that if a1 = 0, theabove equation reduces 
to the isentropic compression equation previously presented as 
Equation 5b. It is further noted that Equation 8 can be used in 
conjunction with the relationship P2 /P 1 = (T2 /T1 ) (VI/V2) to 
determine temperature ratio as a function of pressure ratio. A
 
plot of this type is presented in Figure 1. 
In interpreting Figure 1, it is necessary to evaluate the 
thermal capacitance parameter (a 1 ). For the insulation which is 
used around the spherical inner vessel, we estimate that the 
specific heat per unit volume (mm Cm/V) is about 2 Btu/ft3R. 
For an initial pressure at 1 arm and an initial temperature of 
300 0K, the specific heat per unit volume of oxygen is about .013 
Btu/ft3R. Therefore, if the insulation attains complete thermal 
equilibrium with the end gas: 
a, = 150/P 1 
where P1 is expressed in atmospheres. 
As an example of the use of Figure 1, let us assume P = 75 
PSIA and calculate T2/T as a function of PI"
 
P2 PI P2/PI ai T2/TI
 
(PSIA) (PSIA)
 
75 22 3.4 1.0 1.29 
/ 2.2 34 10 1.52 
/ .22 340 100 1.60 
/ .022 3400 1000 1.60 
/ .0022 34000 10000 1.60 
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The results show that the temperature ratio does not continue
 
to increase with pressure ratio as the initial pressure is
 
progressively reduced--as was the case with .iseitropic compression.
 
In this case the temperature ratio has essentially leveled off
 
at 1.60 by the time the initial pressure drops to-..22-psi. It
 
may be remembered that the isentropid solution predicted a tempera­
ture ratio of 75 for a pressurization from 1 micron to 75 psia.
 
In order to quickly calculate the maximumstemperatdre ratio 
correponding to ;an infinite pressure ratio, .but.,finite final 
pressure, it is convenient to rearrange Equation 8 using arthermal 
capacitance parameter defined in terms of the final gtate. 
TT2 + V2 /VI1 - k 
where
 
V2
 
a2 \tc 
Cm
7:V 
As the pressure ratio becomes infinite (or the volume ratio
 
approaches zero), the maximum temperature'tise becomes:
 
, p-=:. (10),. 
max 
Unfortunately, a2 depends on final temperature, so it is
 
necessary to define yet another thermal capacitance term, evaluated
 
at final pressure and initial temperature. (The difference in the
 
various thermal capacitance terms is of course strictly a function
 
of gas density, since a = mmC /pVCv and the specific heat per unit
 
volume of the insulation (mMCm/V) and the gas specific heat (C ) 
are taken to be independent of pressure or temperature. 
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Therefore, a n /Pn.)n nn 
mcT Ip2
 
21f= 
 2m
 
a21 v =ZyC IT 212 
 1
 
Making the substitution that a2.= a21 T2/T in Equation 10
 
results in the relationship,between T2/TI'-and a2 1 which is plotted
 
in Figure 2.
 
Using the example of a pressurization to 75 PSIA, we note
 
that:
 
a2 1  = ai P2 = (1.0) 5 = .294, 
Therefore (T2/Ti)ma = 1.6, and T = (300) (.16) = 4800K = 4050F. 
If we assume that it is possible for the local pressure to
 
rise to nearly tank pressure, then P2 900 si, and the results are
 
now: 
(1.) 2\
a 21 / 0.245
 
Therefore (T 2 /T 1 )ma = 2.9 and T2 ma (300) (2.9) =,8700K - 1110°F 
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TECHANICAL MEMORANDUM
 
POSSIBLE METHOD FOR
 
DESTRATIFICATION OF SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN
 
SUMMARY
 
Sliding and rolling contact bearing surfaces produce hazardous
 
conditions within the supercritical oxygei tank. Temperature equilibrium
 
must be obtained either with a passiva system, i.e. aluminum wool, or
 
with agitators different in design from the present stirrers. Passive
 
systems are weight sensitive. A concept for a stroking agitator without
 
slide or ball bearings is presented. This concept has been tested in the
 
laboratory using water as the test fluid and appears to produce the desired
 
mixing. A method for incorporating this concept into the supereritical
 
tanks is also suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
 
The oxygen in the Apollo fuel cell storage vessel is temperature
 
equilibrated to stabilize the pressure performance of the system and to
 
prevent unwarranted losses overboard. In the current Apollo configuration,
 
mixing is accomplished with two electric motors that spin the fluid
 
across the tank through caged impellers. Rotating components, such as
 
the motor armature, require bearings which can, under-some circumstances,
 
produce local high temperatures in those regions where the metal surfaces
 
are made to move against onet another. Specks of contaminants that
 
become caught between these surfaces can produce a particularly
 
hazardous: situation. Thus, the best approach is to remove all mechanical
 
motion from inside the storage vessel, or, as a minimum, to remove all
 
support ,surfaces in which there is sliding or rolling contact.
 
.Two methods are 
generally applicable for producing temperature
 
equilibration within the fluid. The first consists in increasing the
 
effective thermal conductivity of the fluid by the use of metal wool,
 
i.e. copper or aluminum wool filling the tank; the second is to promote
 
mixing of the stored fluids with an internal agitator. With regard to
 
agitation, this action can also be produced by shaking the-entire vessel
 
and it is' quite likely that operation of the Apollo spacecraft ACS
 
produces some temperature equilibration within the stored fluids-.
 
TMPROVEMENT OF FLUID THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY
 
The thermal conductivity of a fluid can be increased in any
 
given direction by the addition of a large number of conducting wires
 
orientated in the direction of the heat flow. The average thermal
 
conductivity of fluid and metal is approximated with the expression:
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A 
K=K +I( mA 
02 m 
 At
 
where:
 
I = Average thermal conductivity of combined system
 
in the direction of heat flow.
 
I = Thermal conductivity of oxygen02
 
K = Thermal conductivity of high conductivity material.
 
A = Cross-section area of high conductivity material.
 
A = Total cross-sectional area including both oxygen
 
and high conductivity material.
 
At the high density conditions (60 atmos, 930K), oxygen has
 
a thermal conductivity 15 x 10-4 watt/cmK. A ten-fold increase in
 
this thermal conductivity is obtained with aluminum filling 0.68 per cent
 
of the cross-sectional area of the fluid perpendicular to the direction
 
of heat flow. Considering first order effects only, approximately
 
2 per cent of the liquid volume must be filled with aluminum in order
 
to produce a ten-fold thermal conductivity increase in all directions.
 
This would result in an additional vessel weight of approximately
 
16 pounds (20 per cent).
 
We have made no attempt here to establish temperature equili­
bration criteria for the stored fluid or the thermal conductivity required
 
by the fluid to meet the criteria. Nor have we considered the hazard
 
effects of placing large quantities of aluminum surface inside a super­
critical oxygen vessel; other metals, such as copper, can be used which
 
will produce the same effect as aluminum, but with a sacrifice in weight.
 
The main result is that this equilibration method is weight sensitive.
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EQUILIBRATION BY USE OF AGITATION-

Rotating machine elements,are usually supported by bearings
 
in which there is-rolling or siiding'contact between surfaces. These
 
types of bearings can be eliminate' by producing machine elements
 
that have a stroking motion i.e., either in a linear or rotational
 
manner. This is done by supporting'and guiding the machine element
 
action by spring elements. A typical example is a mass supported from
 
a spring at both ends.
 
We have considered several concepts that -produce agitation
 
and subsequent mixing of the supercriticdl fluid. Among them includes'
 
a paddle supported withinthe vessel on an axle which is rigidly
 
connected to the paddle and rigidly supported at its-ends, such as a
 
wire under tension. The paddle is actuated by a magnetic couple which
 
drives the paddle through the tank wall. This drive causes the paddle
 
to oscillate back and forth about the support. The'paddle elements­
give a portion of the fluid a momentum which produces mixing when the
 
momentum is transferred to th& stationary fluid.
 
A similar device was also considered which produced miiing
 
by a linear'stroking action. Some brief laboratory tests have been
 
performed to-illustrat& the concept. The results of these tests and
 
the application of the concept are presented below.
 
.DISC AGITATOR
 
A disc agitator was constructed from a plastic (polyethylene)
 
sheet .030 inches thick into ,the dimensions shown in attached sketch No. 1.
 
This disc was connected to a rod at its center. It was immersed into a
 
water reservoir 5 inches deep with an area 15 x 20,inches. The disc rod
 
was stroked about 1 inch at a frequency of 3 cycles per second. Ink was
 
injected into the reservoir at various locations as a means for observing
 
the mixing action and for establishing when complete mixing had taken
 
place.
 
The peripheral segments of the disc ,produce a sculling action
 
similar to that produced by a skindiver's flippers. As the disc is
 
stroked in a given direction, the disc segments are bent backward,
 
imparting an outward and forward motion to the fluid. This action is
 
the essential characteristic of the agitator. For liquid oxygen service
 
227
 
the polyethylene disc would be replaced with one of stainless steel or
 
similar metal about .005 Inches thick to obtain the same flexibility.
 
Several experiments were performed in which the ink, serving
 
as a neutrally buoyant tracer material, was injected into the reservoir
 
in the vicinity of the disc and several experiments were performed in
 
which the ink was placed at several locations in the reservoir away
 
from the disc. In both cases the reservoir became completely mixed
 
in about 40 seconds after 120 strokes of the agitator.
 
A force of about 2/3 pounds was required to stroke the disc.
 
The power expenditure was approximately 0.6 watts and the expended
 
energy for complete mixing was 24 watt seconds. An important result
 
of this experiment is the extraordinarily small energy required to
 
produce complete mixing of water reservoir.-

We have not made any attempt to extrapolate these results
 
to the fuel cell oxygen and hydrogen storage systems. However, the
 
following comments seem appropriate. While the experiment reservoir
 
was 1/6 the volume of the oxygen storage vessel, the larger surface
 
dimensions of the water and oxygen system are comparable. Further,
 
the viscosity of oxygen and hydrogen are both significantly less than
 
water and thus a given momentum will produce a longer period of mixing
 
in these fluids than in water. The wide variations in fluid densities
 
encountered in the storage systems may require multiple discs of
 
different flexibility mounted on the same shaft to produce the appropriate
 
degree of mixing at the low and high density levels. The disc agitator
 
has the potential of acting as a density meter provided the stroke length
 
is fixed or measured and the stroke power is accurately measured.
 
The application of an agitator, similar to that described
 
above, to the supercritical oxygen tank is illustrated schematically
 
in sketch No. 2. The disc is mounted to an armature which in turn is
 
spring-mounted to a support at the top of the tank. Because of the
 
flexibility of the disc, it will pass through the existing tank opening.
 
The solenoid portion of the motor is located inside the armature in the
 
vessel vacuum space which protrudes into the storage volume.
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The heater should be IbcAted in the vicinity of the agitator,
 
and, therefore, it is shownfsehematically as located at the solenoid
 
motor (windings in vacuum space) or on the tank surface. The capacitance
 
gauge is assumed to have been removed from the tank in the configuration
 
shown. However, it is easy to conceive a configuration with the two
 
combined. We believe that the weight of the agitator will be less than
 
the weight of a single pump currently in use.
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We understand that liquid oxygen for.use on Apollo flights is 
purchased to specification,and, may be tested, for purity and contaiirnation 
at the time of purchase. This liquid oxygen is then stored in a relatively
 
large storage tank until used on demand. To the best of our knowledge,
 
some analyses for purity are accomplished on delivery, but there are no.
 
further analyses of oxygen purity or contamination levels in the liquid.
 
The liquid oxygen eventually is delivered to the storage tanks in­
the Apollo service module for various uses. Fuel cell supplies are
 
initially stored as "slush" oxygen,: and then -brought to the super-critical
 
state by the addition of heat.
 
Several sources of contamination of the liquid oxygen are possible
 
during storage and preparation for use. If we assume that liquid oxygen
 
is stored in a relatively large tank prior to use, contamination may occur
 
in the storage tank. Generally, large storage tanks are vented to atmosphere.
 
Even though the tank boiloff is flowing to atmosphere through the vent line,
 
back diffusion of contaminants does occur under the driving force of dif­
ferences in'partial pressure. Hydrocarbons can accumulate in the storage
 
tank, either in solution in the liquid oxygeh or as fiozen, crystallized
 
material dependent on solubility limits. A storage tank that has been
 
in service for a relatively long time can contain a wide variety of
 
contaminants that may initiate a later disaster. It is recommended that
 
storage tanks be periodically emptied and warmed close to ambient tempera­
ture to evaporate any contaminants contained therein. On cooling the tank
 
again for service, the rapid venting of oxygen will piovide a helpful
 
"flushing" mechanism.
 
Common practice in large liquid oxygen plants is to install a
 
silica gel or molecular sieve filter in the liquid air line to the rectifying
 
-column. This type of filter is recommended in the withdrawal line from
 
the storage tank to remove or adsorb-any hydrocarbon accumulation that
 
may have occurred.
 
Two methods generally are employed for the production of "slush"
 
cryogens; reduction in -the -vapor pressure above the liquid by use of
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vacuum pumps; or use of external refrigeration, to produce the "slush"
 
with the capability of maintaining a positive pressure above the liquid
 
oxygen.. 
The possible hazards of the use of vacuum pumps for "slush" 
production are self-evident. The ' lower-than-ambient pressures in the 
oxygen vessel creates the possibility of contaminant influx from dirty
 
lines, vacuum pumps and the surroundings in general. Acetylene, which 
may be present in the atmosphere from nearby welding, burning or cutting
 
operatings, poses a particular hazard.
 
Should refrigeration be employed to produce the "slush", care must
 
be taken to be sure that positive pressures above the liquid are maintained
 
at all times to exclude contamination.
 
Trdnsfer of the liquid, or "slush", into the service module tanks
 
should be performed through positively cleaned transfer lines, into a
 
clean storage tank.
 
Some evidence exists that, in a "zero G" field,the energy of ignition
 
in a flammable-oxidizer gas mixture may follow the relationship
 
E = A(-=---)I 
P2
 
where E = energy of ignition, A = a constant and P = total pressure of the 
mixture. Elevated pressure, therefore, can drastically reduce the energy 
required for ignition of a contaminant. Since the "slush"'oxygen is 
eventually heated to its super-critical state at relatively low temperatures, 
it is possible that some contaminant may remain in a solid or liquid 
state, and in turn, contact any electrical heater or "hot-spot" (such as 
a warm bearing or hot metal due to friction) that can provide the energy 
of ignition. Little is known concerning the dispersion of one gas within 
another gas in the super-critical state and, therefore, we cannot predict
 
accurately the location or concentration of any contaminant within the
 
super-critical oxygen.
 
For years, it has been, common practice in the cryogenic industry to
 
evacuate tanks, transfer lines and other equipment before the introduction
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of hydrogen, to assure that oxygen-Is not cdtitained within the system. 
Due to the criticality of, the liquid oxygen systems aboard Apollo, it is 
suggested that this proeddure be 'employad when filling the oxygen systems. 
Our recommendations are as follows:
 
1. Be sure that the main storage tank for the liquid oxygen is
 
periodically warmed to eliminate contaminants.
 
2. Withdraw the liquid from storage through a silica gel or molecular
 
sieve filter.
 
3. If the "slush" oxygen is produced in a vessel external to the main
 
storage tank, this auxiliary vessel should be connected to the service
 
module oxygen tanks-to-oform a completely dtght systemQ
 
4. Evacuate the combined "slush" and service nodule systems to a
 
pressure of 10-20 microns before introduction of liquid oxygen to the
 
system. A well-designed liquid nitrogen cold trap should be installed
 
between the vacuum pumps and the oxygen system to prevent back-streaming
 
of contaminants. Any plateaus, or periods of prolonged constant pressure
 
in the oxygen system will indicate the presence of moisture or contaminants
 
in the system.
 
5. Flush the oxygen sjstem with warm,- dry oxyge gas to slightly above 
ambient pressure and repeat the evacuation.
 
6. Introduce liquid oxygen into the vessel for "slush" production. Take
 
a sample of liquid oxygen from the main storage tank and analyze for
 
ignitible contamination.
 
7. Produce the "slush" by refrigeration, rather than by use of vacuum
 
pump, if possible.
 
8. Transfer the "slush" oxygen directly into the service module storage
 
tanks by displacement with clean, dry oxygen gas.
 
9. Other fuels and oxidants should be handled with similar care.
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Summa-r
 
If one postulates that a leak occurs in the wall of a gas storage
 
vessel, it is of interest to inquire whether or not there is a possibility
 
of an autocatalytic series of events which could lead to a fire or explosion.
 
We have, however, discussed in a separate memorandum the unlikely event of
 
such small leaks in high-strength metal tanks which are designed on the basis
 
of "no leak before break." For more ductile materials, however, leaks are
 
known to occur. In fact, it is a well-known fact that in hydrogen gas
 
cylinders, small leaks into air may ignite with no apparent source of ignition
 
(1). This has been attributed to static charge accumulation and/or to a
 
rise in temperature due to the negative Joule-Thomson coefficient for hydrogen.
 
In the following sections we consider a number of local thermal
 
effects and conclude that none are large enough to provide probable sources
 
of ignition in the event of storage vessel-leakage.
 
Temperature Rises in Metal Fracture
 
Experimental and theoretical studies do not indicate any appreciable
 
temperature rise occurring at the site of a fracture of a high-strength
 
metal pressure tank. With the exception of titanium and zirconium in the
 
presence-of gaseousoxygen, no oxidation of freshly torn metal surfaces
 
has been observed in extensive metal fracture studies (2). Thus, no
 
ignition should Se initiated solely by Inconel metal fradture in the &ase
 
of oxygen storage tanks.
 
Viscous Dissipation of Energy in Pin-hole Leaks
 
It should be noted, however, that there is some viscous dissipation
 
of energy of the exiting fluid as it flows out through the crack. Normally,
 
such dissipative inputs are small.
 
In the case of gases, viscous heat generation and cooling due to
 
free expansion are lumped together by the JouleThomson coefficient. It
 
should be noted that a Joule-Thomson expansion does not always result in
 
cooling - although this happens to be the case 
for the conditions encountered
 
in the Apollo 13 service module. For liquid propellants, however, there is
 
a possibility of heating. Brinkman (2) derived theoretically the temperature
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distribution in a liquid flowing in a capillary. He related three dimension­
less parameters:
 
p = r/R 
16 n X AT
lT A A
 
R4 
2
(dp/dz)

4 A rj.Z 
CR4 (dp/dz)
 
by means of a series for which he presented graphical solutions.
 
r = distance from the capillary axis to the wall
 
R = radius of the capillary
 
n = viscosity
 
A = thermal conductivity
 
AT = temperature rise
 
dp = pressure drop per unit length of capillary

dz
 
Z = length of capillary
 
C = specific heat of the liquid per unit volume
 
For a capillary with an insulated wall, the maximum temperature occurs
 
near the wall. Brinkman's calculations show that the maximum temperature
 
rise AT can be given approximately by
 
6 0.8 
X0.4 0.4 AP 
0 
AT =41.2 C!.4
 
For hydrazine, I= .009 poise
 
C .737 x 4.186 x 107 erg/cm3 .C
 
X = 1.2 x 10- 3 x 4.186 x 107 erg/cm °C sec 
For a pressure drop, AP, of 200 psi across the tank wall
 
- ( )0.8
 
AT .297 x 10
 
R 
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For Z =0.15'cn R'='.0cm , AT 4.1l 0C 
''
Z = 0.15 cm R = .0001 cm hT 630C
 
These temperature rises are not high enough to cause dissociation.
 
It would by worthwhile, however, to examine in detail, the assumptions made
 
by Brinkman (e.g., linear pressure drop in capillary) and validate any
 
theoretical conclusions experimentally.
 
Chemical Reactions at the Site of a Fracture
 
If a tank under pressure contains oxygen,-it may by-hypothesized that
 
at the site of a fresh break, the clean metal surface may be readily
 
oxidized - so readily that the heat of reaction could raise the surface
 
temperature to the ignition point.
 
Experimental evidence seems to rule out such a hypothesis except in
 
the case of titanium or in unusual cases where there is also some foreign,
 
organic fuel at the break-site. In reference to titanium, Jackson et. al.
 
(3) state: "Under conditions of tensile rupture, a pressure of about 100
 
psig will initiate a violent burning reaction (in the presence of oxygen)
 
from about -250'F up to room temperature." Titanium is also impact sensitive
 
with liquid oxygen.
 
Thus, one concludes that chemical reactions are not reasonable ignition
 
sources when a fracture occurs except for oxygen in titanium tanks. Of
 
course, small amounts of titanium in an alloy (e.g. 2.5% Ti in Inconel-X)
 
may be sufficient to support combustion after ignition occurs in a high
 
pressure oxygen atmosphere (4).
 
Kinetic Energy'of Fluid Particles Impinging on Surfaces
 
In a leak from a high pressure fluid vessel, it may be possible to
 
generate liquid droplets moving at sonic velocity which could then impinge
 
on other surfaces such as layers of insulation. In the case of oxygen,
 
for example, total conversion of such kinetic energy to thermal energy
 
amounts to a specific energy increase of about 6 cal/gm or about a 15°K
 
temperature increase in the impinging liquid. Again, these energy levels
 
are insufficient to be probable sources of ignition.
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High strength materials are often used to minimize tankage weight
 
in high pressure storage applications. These tanks have the characteristic
 
of "no-leak-before-failure," that is, they are designed on a crack propaga­
tion criteria for a particular burst pressure. At burst, a catastrophic
 
rupture occurs rather than a limited opening or leak which is a more usual
 
failure mode for ductile materials. To preclude failure, high strength
 
material vessels are "proofed" at a pressure chosen to eliminate any
 
vessels having defects which could lead to failure at prolonged normal
 
operating conditions.
 
In design of such a metallic pressure vessel, it is assumed that
 
failure occurs from built-in defects when the plane strain stress intensity
 
factor for the defects equals a critical value KIc' which is a measured
 
property of the material for specified environments. This factor %c
 
establishes the maximum allowable crack length c before failure at an
 
I 2 . 
operating stress, o, from the relation c= ac With proper design
 
and nondestructive analysis of the vessel, any defects in the tank will
 
not fail at the operating stress nor will they grow to a size large enough
 
to cause failure under operating conditions.
 
Crack propagation rates are established experimentally and are
 
determined as a function of applied stress intensity factor KI and time
 
for a slowly propagating crack in the environment to be contained. If
 
the vessel undergoes cyclic loading, crack growth rates are determined
 
for a cyclic stress intensity factor in this environment. From plots of
 
such data, the time to failure of a vessel can be predicted for a given
 
initial stress intensity factor K.
 
For many pressure vessel materials in a given environment, a threshold
 
stress intensity KTH exists, below which there is no possibility of failure
 
since a crack will not propagate at stress intensity levels below KTH or
 
else stops growing after a short travel distance.
 
In either case, the design is based on no crack growth or crack
 
propagation rates so low that any cracks surviving the proof test never
 
grow long enough to cause catastrophic failure. In proof testing the
 
vessel, a stress is picked which ensures that possible defects in the
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vessel will not cause failure at the operating stress. The proof stress
 
eliminates the possibility of defects above a maximum KI" 
(or cracks larger
 
K I C  
than )2
 
a proof
 
The proof test should be carried out in reasonably short times.
 
There is the danger that if the vessel is held at or near proof stresses
 
for too long a time, slow crack propagation can occur. It is also desirable
 
to proof test the vessel only once if possible.
 
We understand from contact with Mr. C.F. Tiffany of the Aerospace
 
Systems Division of the Boeing Company that Inconel 718 does not show slow
 
crack growth in liquid oxygen. Since the Apollo failure, Boeing has
 
evaluated this alloy in oxygen slush and found no evidence of slow crack
 
growth under load. A report on this finding will be presented to NASA by
 
the Boeing Company.
 
Practical Consequences
 
a. 
It would appear that under these design constraints, there would
 
be a low probability of any failure by a slow leak from the pressure
 
vessel. No leak will occur until a crack becomes sufficiently deep for
 
catastrophic failure to occur. 
Since the metal, though of high strength, is
 
inherently brittle, one might expect considerable fragmentation if failure
 
occurs. This fragmentation would, most probably, lead to rapid, catastrophic
 
failure of the outer shell. 
The importance of any studies concentrating
 
upon venting of gases into an insulating space is therefore diminished.
 
b. Since cracks propagate only under applied stress, it would appear
 
to be important that high-strength tanks be proofed only once and under
 
carefully controlled conditions of pressure rise, hold, and fall. 
Multiple
 
proof tests can only lead to more cracks and higher crack propagation
 
rates under proof stress conditions.
 
NASA- MSC 
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